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Abstract
Authentication is an important measure for protecting personal and sensitive information from unautho-
rised access. Password authentication still is the most widely used form of authentication despite its
well-established downsides, including the cognitive load it poses for users and coping strategies resulting
thereof. These include the creation of weak passwords or the reuse of passwords across accounts. Alterna-
tives to the knowledge-based password scheme include biometric schemes, such as fingerprint authentication
and token-based schemes like chip card authentication. However, attempts to replace the password on a
large scale have not yet been successful.
Commencing this research with an extensive rating and comparison of objective features of existing au-
thentication schemes confirmed that the password indeed is not easily replaceable. To shine light on this
seemingly intractable issue, a laboratory and an online study were conducted to explore the user perceptions
of authentication schemes. Although studied less frequently than technical aspects, user perceptions are
highly relevant. First, they can influence acceptance of authentication schemes, and second, mismatches
between technical security and security perceptions can ultimately impact security. The two studies re-
vealed a user preference for password authentication across different contexts of use, despite its downsides.
While the initial comparison acknowledged the password’s persistence with regard to objective features,
the studies confirm the relevance of password authentication from a user perspective. Because the security
of password authentication largely depends on the password creation and handling of the user, further
research was needed to explore measures that support secure and usable password authentication.
A promising approach for encouraging secure choices without constraining the user is provided by the con-
cept of ”nudging”, as proposed by Thaler and Sunstein. Nudges are small tweaks of the choice architecture
that target automatic cognitive processes and that do not limit or significantly influence the cost of the
available choices. To support secure password creation, three consecutive field studies analysed the impact
of various password nudges on password creation. The first two studies used visual nudges intended to
simply encourage stronger passwords and produced insignificant results. Based on the lessons learned, the
resulting intervention in the third study combined a nudge with password strength information and com-
pensation for stronger passwords in the form of later password expiry. This intervention indeed encouraged
the creation of stronger passwords.
The finding led to the assumption that the combination of a nudge and information provision, a hybrid
nudge, may be more effective in encouraging secure choices than either intervention on its own. An online
study analysed the single and joint effects of nudges and information provision across different security-
related decisions including password creation. The findings revealed that the hybrid nudge proved to be
most effective across decisions. Furthermore, the combination of transparent nudges with information
provision educating users about the reasons for encouraging a particular choice appeared most favourable
with regard to ethical considerations. A final online study compared the effects of different hybrid password
nudges on password creation, password memorability, and the users’ perceptions. It confirmed the ef-
fectiveness of the hybrid nudge as compared to exclusive information or nudge interventions on all three
counts. Yet, nearly no significant differences between hybrid password nudges emerged, indicating that the
type of nudge included plays a minor role compared to the combination as such.
It is concluded that the combination of nudging and information provision constitutes a promising strat-
egy for supporting users in creating secure passwords and in making security-related decisions without
enforcing a particular choice. This may further open the path towards a more human-centred approach in
cybersecurity as envisioned in a mindset labelled ”Cybersecurity, Differently”.
The findings are discussed regarding the transferability of the results to real-life settings and their scalability
to the large number of accounts users have to manage. Suggestions for future work include field studies
on hybrid password nudges, the integration into suitable tools such as password managers to ease the




Authentifizierung ist eine wichtige Maßnahme zum Schutz persönlicher und sensibler Informationen vor
unbefugtem Zugriff. Nach wie vor ist das Passwort die am weitesten verbreitete Form der Authen-
tifizierung, trotz bekannter Nachteile wie der kognitiven Belastung für die Nutzenden und daraus resul-
tierenden Bewältigungsstrategien. Diese umfassen die Erstellung schwacher Passwörter oder die Wiederver-
wendung von Passwörtern über Konten hinweg. Alternativen zum wissensbasierten Passwortverfahren
sind biometrische Verfahren wie Fingerabdruck-Authentifizierung und gegenstandsbasierte Verfahren wie
Chipkarten-Authentifizierung. Bisherige Versuche, das Passwort im großen Maßstab zu ersetzen, waren
jedoch nicht erfolgreich.
Beginnend mit einem umfangreichen Bewertungsprozess und Vergleich objektiver Aspekte von existieren-
den Authentifizierungsverfahren, konnte diese Forschung die Schwierigkeit, das Passwort durch ein an-
deres Verfahren abzulösen, bestätigen. Um dieses scheinbar unlösbare Problem zu beleuchten, wurden
eine Laborstudie und eine Onlinestudie zu den Nutzendenwahrnehmungen von Authentifizierungsver-
fahren durchgeführt. Diese sind relevant, obwohl sie bisher weniger untersucht wurden als technische
Aspekte. Erstens können sie die Akzeptanz von Authentifizierungsverfahren beeinflussen und zweitens kön-
nen Diskrepanzen zwischen technischer Sicherheit und Sicherheitswahrnehmung letztendlich die Sicherheit
beeinträchtigen. Die zwei Studien zeigten eine Präferenz der Nutzenden für das Passwortverfahren in ver-
schiedenen Anwendungskontexten trotz seiner Nachteile. Während der initiale Vergleich die Beständigkeit
des Passworts im Hinblick auf objektive Aspekte verdeutlichte, bestätigten die beiden Studien die Relevanz
des Passwortverfahrens aus Perspektive der Nutzenden. Da die Sicherheit des Passwortverfahrens maßge-
blich von der Passworterstellung und -handhabung durch die Nutzenden abhängt, ist weitere Forschung
zur Unterstützung von Nutzenden bei der Erstellung sicherer Passwörter notwendig.
Ein vielversprechender Ansatz zur Förderung sicherer Entscheidungen, ohne die Nutzenden zu beschränken,
stellt das Konzept des ”Nudging” von Thaler und Sunstein dar. Nudges sind kleine Veränderungen der
Entscheidungsarchitektur, die automatische, kognitive Prozesse aktivieren und die weder die Entschei-
dungsoptionen eingrenzen noch deren Kosten signifikant beeinflussen. Zur Unterstützung sicherer Pass-
worterstellung wurde in drei aufeinander aufbauenden Feldstudien der Einfluss verschiedener Passwort-
Nudges auf die Passworterstellung untersucht. Die ersten zwei Studien mit visuellen Nudges, die lediglich
zu erhöhter Passwortsicherheit ermuntern sollten, erzielten keine signifikanten Ergebnisse. Die aus den
Erkenntnissen resultierende Intervention in der dritten Studie kombinierte einen Nudge mit Passwortstärke-
Information und der Kompensation stärkerer Passwörter durch eine längere Passwortgültigkeit. Diese
Intervention förderte tatsächlich die Erstellung stärkerer Passwörter.
Die Erkenntnisse führten zu der Annahme, dass die Kombination aus einem Nudge und Informationsver-
mittlung, ein hybrider Nudge, wirksamer zur Förderung sicherer Entscheidungen sein könnte als einzelne
Maßnahmen für sich alleine. Daher untersuchte eine Online-Studie den individuellen und kombinierten
Effekt von Nudges und Informationsvermittlung auf verschiedene sicherheitsbezogene Entscheidungen ein-
schließlich Passworterstellung. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass der hybride Nudge über die Entscheidungen
hinweg am effektivsten war. Weiterhin erscheint die Kombination eines transparenten Nudges mit Infor-
mationen, die Nutzende über den Grund für die Förderung einer bestimmten Entscheidung aufklären, aus
ethischen Gesichtspunkten am günstigsten. In einer abschließenden Online-Studie wurden die Auswirkun-
gen verschiedener hybrider Nudges auf Passworterstellung, Merkbarkeit und die Nutzendenwahrnehmungen
verglichen. Die Studie bestätigte die Wirksamkeit hybrider Nudges gegenüber Interventionen, die nur einen
Nudge oder nur Informationen beinhalteten, in allen drei Punkten. Allerdings wurden nahezu keine sig-
nifikanten Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen hybriden Nudges gefunden, was darauf hindeutet, dass die
Art des verwendeten Nudges eine untergeordnete Rolle im Vergleich zur Kombination als solche einnimmt.
Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die Kombination aus Nudging und Informationsvermittlung eine erfol-
gsversprechende Strategie zur Unterstützung von Nutzenden im Hinblick auf sichere Passworterstellung
und sicherheitsrelevante Entscheidungen darstellt, ohne eine bestimmte Option zu erzwingen. Dies kön-
nte auch den Weg zu einem stärker mensch-zentrierten Cybersecurity Ansatz öffnen, wie er mit der als
”Cybersecurity, Differently” bezeichneten Denkweise vorgestellt wird.
v
Die Ergebnisse werden unter anderem im Hinblick auf ihre Übertragbarkeit auf reale Situationen und
ihre Skalierbarkeit für die große Anzahl von Accounts, die Nutzende verwalten müssen, diskutiert. Die
Vorschläge für zukünftige Forschung beinhalten daher Feldstudien zu hybriden Passwort-Nudges, ihre Inte-
gration in geeignete Tools wie Passwort-Manager zur Reduzierung der kognitiven Belastung von Nutzenden
oder die Entwicklung von Konzepten, die insbesondere Aspekte wie Account-Sensitivität und Wiederver-
wendung von Passwörtern berücksichtigen.
vi
Contents
Outline and Contribution of the Dissertation 1
Part A: Synopsis 4
Part A.1: Objective Features and User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes 4
1 Introduction to Human Factors in Authentication 4
1.1 Password Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Alternative Forms of Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Knowledge-based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Biometric Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 Token-based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Evaluating Objective Features and Subjective User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes 16
2.1 Rating of Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 User Perceptions of Different Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Summary of the Main Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 The Influence of Context and Type of Scheme on User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes 23
3.1 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.1 Pilot Study Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.2 Pilot Study Results and Implications for the Design of the Main Study . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Summary of the Main Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.3 Discussion & Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Interim Conclusion 28
Part A.2: Supporting Secure and Usable Password Creation 30
5 Strategies for Enhancing Secure Password Creation 30
5.1 Constraining Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.1 System-generated Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.2 Regular Password Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.3 Password Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2 Supporting Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2.1 Approaches for Creating Secure Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2.2 Approaches for Increasing Memorability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3 Evaluation of Strategies for Enhancing Password Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6 Password Nudges 35
6.1 Introduction to the Concept of Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2 Field Studies on the Effectiveness of Password Nudges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.3 Discussion & Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
vii
7 Differentiating the Concept of Nudging from Related Concepts 41
7.1 Dual Process Theories and the Concept of Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2 Definition of the Nudge Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3 Definition of Related Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3.1 Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.2 Sludge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.3 Information Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.4 Hybrid Nudge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.4 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8 The Ethics of Nudging 45
8.1 Arguments for Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.2 Arguments against Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.3 Guidelines for Ethical Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.4 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9 The Influence of Nudge Interventions on Security Decisions and Password Creation 49
9.1 Comparison of Different Nudge Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9.1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9.1.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
9.1.4 Discussion & Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2 Designing Hybrid Password Nudges for Secure and Usable Password Creation . . . . . . . . 57
9.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.2.3 Discussion & Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10 Discussion and Reflection 63
10.1 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10.2 Implications & Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.2.1 Rating of Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.2.2 Studies on User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.2.3 Field Studies on Password Nudges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.2.4 The Concept of Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.2.5 Online Studies on Hybrid Password Nudges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.3 Reflection & Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.3.1 Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.3.2 Content-related Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
10.4 Outlook & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10.4.1 Considering the Password Creation Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10.4.2 Cybersecurity, Differently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
10.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Part B: Manuscripts 78
Manuscript 1: “Keep on Rating – On the Systematic Rating and Comparison of Authentication Schemes” 78
Manuscript 2: “The Password is Dead, Long Live the Password – A Laboratory Study on User Perceptions
of Authentication Schemes” 79
Manuscript 3: “That Depends – How Context Affects User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes“ 80
Manuscript 4: “Nudging Folks towards Stronger Password Choices: Providing Certainty is the Key” 81
viii
Manuscript 5: “Ethical Guidelines for Nudging in Information Security & Privacy” 82
Manuscript 6: “The Nudge Puzzle: Matching Nudge Interventions to Cybersecurity Decisions” 83
Manuscript 7: “Hybrid Password Meters for more Secure Passwords - A Comprehensive Study of Password
Meters and Nudges” 84
Manuscript 8: “Moving from a “Human-as-Problem” to a “Human-as-Solution” Cybersecurity Mindset” 85
Bibliography 86
List of Abbreviations 107
List of Figures 108
List of Tables 109
Appendix 110
Appendix A: Author Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix B: List of Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Appendix C: Reference List of Authentication Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
ix
Outline and Contribution of the Dissertation
Overall, this dissertation is structured into two parts: Part A comprises the synopsis of the dissertation.
The synopsis includes the theoretical background for motivating the research, connects the different studies
and research works within this dissertation, and links the findings and implications in an overall discussion.
Of the eight manuscripts included within this dissertation, six have already been published while two are
currently being prepared for submission or are under review to make the findings publicly accessible and to
allow for peer feedback. The bibliographical information of each publication and manuscript, respectively,
is included in Part B of the dissertation. The synopsis briefly summarizes the main findings of each
manuscript to allow for reading the synopsis without having to switch between the synopsis and the
manuscripts multiple times. As the manuscripts provide much more detail for each study, the reader is
invited to take a closer look at each manuscript.
Figure 1 visualizes the logical structure of the dissertation described in the synopsis as a road map and
shows which of the manuscripts listed in Part B relates to each research step. This is indicated by a small
document symbol with a number that corresponds to the number of the manuscript.
The aim of this dissertation was twofold: first, to explore the user perceptions of different forms of authen-
tication as described in Part A.1, and second, to support user-friendly and secure authentication based on
the findings as detailed in Part A.2.
As depicted in Figure 1, the first step towards research aim 1 was to review the literature on human factors
in authentication. The insights were incorporated in the introduction of this dissertation. The background
colours yellow and blue indicate that this research step considered the objective and technological features
of different authentication schemes (yellow) as well as subjective user perceptions of authentication (blue).
Research step 2 involved the identification of numerous, different authentication schemes from the lit-
erature review conducted in step 1. These were rated in terms of objective features, namely objective
security, deployability, and usability features, using a rating framework developed by Bonneau et al. [34].
The rating results were then implemented within an authentication choice support tool named ACCESS
[197, 198, 247]. In so doing, this research contributes to enlarging the ACCESS database that supports
researchers and practitioners in choosing suitable authentication schemes for their particular context and
also provides suggestions for further improving ACCESS [349]. The different schemes in the database were
then compared and weighed according to multiple selection criteria to identify the best-rated schemes from
different authentication categories, such as knowledge-based or biometric schemes.
In step 3, a laboratory study [347] was conducted to evaluate potential differences in user perceptions
of twelve authentication schemes selected in step 2. Furthermore, differences and similarities in terms of
the users’ perceptions and the objective and technological features of the schemes were compared. This
laboratory study, in which people interacted with responsive mock-ups of each authentication scheme,
addresses the lack of empirical studies analysing actual as compared to hypothetical user perceptions of
authentication schemes (e.g., analysed in a survey). In addition, it contributes by analysing a large number
of authentication schemes that were implemented in similar ways to control for external influences, such as
different designs. The comparison of technological aspects and user perceptions supports understanding of
the user perspective and facilitates the detection of potential mismatches. These are especially important as
a mismatch between actual and perceived security may lead users to either refrain from using a technically
secure scheme, or to engage in insecure practices by using a technically insecure scheme [140].
In step 4, a consecutive online study was conducted to explore the influence of the type of scheme and
the context of use on user perceptions. To do so, the three schemes that were most preferred by the
participants in research step 3 were compared across different types of accounts. The study served to
validate the assumptions derived in the previous research step and also analysed the impact of potential
influencing factors on user perceptions in more detail.
In an interim conclusion, the combination of the rating of objective authentication features with the
study results in terms of subjective user perceptions revealed the persisting relevance of secure password
creation. Part A.2 of the dissertation thus focuses on supporting secure and usable password creation to
work towards research aim 2. The combination of the findings in terms of objective features and subjective
user perceptions is depicted by the colour gradient from blue and yellow to green, as shown in Figure 1.
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The next step, research step 5, was to review and compare different existing and potential strategies to
support secure and usable password creation. Again, the mechanisms (yellow) as well as implications
in terms of user perceptions and behaviour (blue) were considered. Based on the review of strategies,
”nudging” [303], i.e., subtly changing the choice architecture to encourage secure choices without limiting
the users’ set of options, was selected as a promising approach.
In three exploratory field studies described in step 6, several password nudges were evaluated in terms of
their influence on password security [253, 252]. By so doing, this research contributes to the relatively
small number of studies analysing the effects of security-related nudges ”in the wild”.
Based on the lessons learned in the field studies, a ”detour”, i.e., an excursus, was made to more clearly
define the concept of nudging and to separate it from other interventions such as information provision
in research step 7 [249]. Furthermore, the analysis of the nudge concept also led to the exploration of
the ethical aspects of nudging. In research step 8, ethical guidelines for deploying nudges in the area
of information security and privacy were derived based on psychological guidelines for ethical research
[249, 250]. One contribution of this work lies in the differentiation of nudges and related interventions that
forms the basis for evaluating their effectiveness and ethical implications. An ethics checklist also serves
as an additional aid for other researchers and practitioners aiming to deploy nudges in security, privacy, or
related fields.
Afterwards, an online study was conducted dissecting the influences of nudges, information provision, and
a combination of nudges and information provision on different security-related decisions. Research step 9
thereby constitutes an important step towards more empirical research analysing how nudges exert their
influence by examining the single and joint effects of different nudge interventions across different types of
decision contexts.
Research step 10 applied the insights to password creation in particular. In an online study, a number
of password meters with nudges based on different biases and heuristics were evaluated in terms of their
effect on password creation, password memorability, and the users’ perceptions. Concrete implications for
the design of nudge-related interventions to support secure and usable password creation can be derived
from the results.
Finally, research step 10 is followed by a summary and discussion of all research steps presented up to
that point. The discussion leads to an outlook on ”the road ahead”. It describes how future interventions
in the wider security and privacy area can be designed in an even more user-centred way to enhance the
users’ ability to be part of the solution in complex socio-technical environments, instead of being viewed
as a potential problem to control. The approach described in research step 11 is labelled ”Cybersecurity,
Differently” [353].
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Figure 1: Outline of the dissertation.
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1 Introduction to Human Factors in Authentication
Figure 2: Research step 1.
Authentication is an important means to protect data from unauthorized access, that is, to enable access by
authorized people and to prevent access by others. When it comes to authentication, three terms need to
be differentiated according to Renaud [243]. The first is identification. This step asks a person to identify
his- or herself, e.g., by means of a passport, an email address, account number, or an object the person
carries. The identity is then compared to the identities in the particular database. It can be compared
as one-to-many (identification) or one-to-one (verification) [76]. The second step then is authentication in
which the user provides some kind of secret that has been determined in the enrollment phase to provide
evidence for the claimed identity. The secret is usually knowledge-based (something the user knows),
biometric (something the user is), or token-based (something the user carries). If the provided secret is
correct and belongs to the claimed identity, the user is authenticated. Within the service, database, or tool
the user authenticated for, he or she may be granted certain permissions to undertake actions. This third
step is called authorization.
An authentication system usually consists of the user, the technology, and an interface between the user and
the technology, i.e., some mechanism for inputting the authentication secret according to the authentication
mechanism.
With regard to authentication, the literature shows that the user is an integral, but also a critical compo-
nent of the system [243]. The secrets of many authentication schemes, e.g., knowledge-based or cognitive
authentication schemes, require cognitive activity [243]. Others require users to perform certain actions
(e.g., behavioural biometric authentication schemes) or to provide certain physical or physiological fea-
tures (biometric authentication schemes). Besides relying on human cognitive processes and behaviour for
inputting the secret, the human also plays a vital part in securing the authentication secret. Knowledge-
based authentication secrets can be told or discovered, for example, if they are easy to guess for others or
physically stored in an insecure place. Some biometric features such as fingerprints could be captured from
surfaces by a potential attacker, and tokens could be forgotten, lost, or stolen.
The following sections will provide more detailed information on human factors in authentication based
on the reviewed literature. The next section will start with the most commonly used form of authenti-
cation, password authentication, before describing alternative forms such as biometric and token-based
authentication schemes in more detail.
1.1 Password Authentication
As stated above, password authentication has been and still is the most common form of authentication
[292]. A password consists of a sequence of alphanumeric symbols, e.g., uppercase and lowercase letters,
numbers, and symbols, that can either be randomly generated by the system or selected by the user [243].
Passwords belong to the group of knowledge-based authentication schemes as the secret, i.e., the password,
is supposed to be memorized by the user.
The history of passwords dates back to the early 1960s. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) Computation Center, Fernando Corbató worked on a project concerned with improving computer
efficiency through time-sharing [61]. At that time, the user-computer interaction was very slow due to
long periods of time required for writing and debugging programs. As a solution to that problem, Corbató
suggested time-shared computer usage by making the computer simultaneously available to multiple users
in a system called Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) [61].
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To protect each user’s private files and information from accidental or deliberate manipulation, Fano and
Corbotá [93] described a login interface that required the users to provide a project number and a personal
password. This was one of the first reported uses of password authentication and originally intended for
the highly technically-adept Computation Center personnel. Yet, as computers and the Internet became
increasingly available to all kinds of industries and the general public, also password authentication spread
across industries and user groups, and from only one to multiple accounts.
Reasons for the password’s prevalence might include the following advantages: Compared to other authen-
tication schemes, passwords are relatively easy to deploy, i.e., they are server and browser-compatible and
produce low costs per user [34, 36]. On the user side, password authentication has been found easy to learn
and efficient to use. Users do not need to buy or carry additional devices and forgotten or stolen passwords
can easily be recovered [34], e.g., by sending a password reset link to an associated email account.
However, passwords are not without disadvantages, as also acknowledged by Corbató who has been one
of the first persons to use passwords [60]. In terms of security, passwords are static secrets and prone to
phishing attacks and keystroke logging, as well as guessing attacks [100, 133]. With increasing computing
capacities, passwords need to have a higher entropy to withstand possible offline and online guessing
attacks. Information entropy, as introduced by Shannon [278], is a measure for the password’s complexity
or unpredictability from which it can be calculated how long it would take a potential attacker to guess the
password. It is measured in bits and influenced, e.g., by the character sets included in the password and
password length. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [115], passwords
should be at least eight characters in length. However, service providers should permit passwords to be at
least 64 characters long as length has found to be an important predictor for password entropy or password
strength, respectively [163, 171]. In contrast to that, password policies that are frequently deployed by
service-providers, i.e., requirements for a password to include certain character types such as uppercase
letters, numbers, and symbols, have been found to be less effective in terms of password strength [329].
Furthermore, they also negatively impact memorability and usability [142].
Memorizing a long, complex password as suggested by NIST [115] or required by password policies might
not be a problem if a user has one or very few password-protected accounts. Yet, studies found that the
number of user accounts increased a lot throughout the years [116]. In 2007, Florencio and Herley [94]
studied the password habits of a large group of users and found that users had 25 accounts on average.
Some years later, in 2014, Stobert and Biddle [293] conducted an interview study on password habits, in
which participants reported having between nine and up to 51 different online accounts such as online
shopping accounts, banking accounts, or social network accounts.
Memorizing up to 51 unique and long passwords would pose an enormous cognitive load for the users. To
deal with that cognitive effort, users deploy a number of coping strategies:
• Choosing weak passwords. Users tend to choose short and easily memorable passwords that, for
example, include dictionary words, names, patterns, or birthdays [116, 314, 315]. They are thus
easier to guess for a potential attacker. Wei, Golla, and Ur showed that password creation is also
influenced by the type of service the password is created for [326]. For example, passwords created
for the LinkedIn platform often contained variations of the name ”LinkedIn”.
• Reusing password across accounts. Research found that users frequently reuse passwords across
accounts [94, 230, 281, 323], even more so when partial reuse is taken into account [230].
• Writing passwords down. Users tend to write passwords down [4, 281, 293, 355] so they might be easily
discovered by other present users. However, the practice itself might not pose a security problem
in a world where attackers do not have to be present to attack an account. Some researchers even
advocate for it [50, 133, 270] given that passwords are stored safely as compared to posted on the
screen or keyboard.
Furthermore, research showed that the users’ perception of password security differs from technical pass-
word security measures. For example, in a laboratory study, Ur et al. [315] identified several misconceptions
in terms of password strength, such as that adding a symbol at the end of the password makes it secure,
or that difficult-to-spell passwords are more secure than others. Expecting only very targeted attacks,
participants also believed, e.g., birthdays, to be secure as long as they were not posted online. In an online
study analysing perceived and actual password strength, users had misconceptions in terms of the impact
of including digits or keyboard patterns in their passwords [314].
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With the help of an online game, Seitz and Hussmann [275] compared user ratings of password security
to their technical security. They found that users underestimate passphrases by 1.4 points difference on a
five-point score.
In some cases, users also seem to lack an understanding of the authentication mechanism that influences
their security perception. For example, Bhagavatula et al. [27] found that users perceived the security of
fingerprint authentication on a mobile phone to be higher than that of a personal identification number
(PIN), i.e., a password only consisting of numbers. However, the PIN served as a fall-back mechanism so
that the biometric scheme cannot be more secure than the PIN in that case.
Overall, this section showed that password security not only depends on the technical measures used to
securely store and transfer passwords but also largely on the users’ perceptions, their password creation,
and their password handling. To mitigate the security problems arising from the conflict between the high
cognitive load for memorizing numerous passwords and the users’ strategies to cope with that effort, a
number of alternatives to password authentication have been developed. These are presented in the next
sections.
1.2 Alternative Forms of Authentication
To overcome the shortcomings of the text password, many alternative forms of authentication schemes have
been developed. They can be classified in terms of the type of secret on which they are based. As described
above, a common differentiation is between knowledge-based, biometric, and token-based authentication
schemes. The following sections will describe the three categories and subcategories of authentication
schemes in more detail, along with some examples.
The focus of the following sections will be on single-factor authentication schemes, as compared to two-factor
authentication, as two-factor authentication is essentially a combination of any two single authentication
schemes. Similarly, special forms of authentication such as single sign-on services and password managers
that create and store passwords for the user fall outside the scope of this differentiation as they are based
on a single authentication scheme as well, e.g., password managers and many single sign-on services use
text passwords as an authentication scheme.
1.2.1 Knowledge-based Authentication
Knowledge-based authentication is based on a secret only known to the person that is authorized to access
the data or service, i.e., “something you know”. The secret can take the form of text, of which the most
popular example is the text password. Besides, it can take the form of, e.g., pictures, procedures, gestures,
or formulas used to calculate a secret. The secret can further be recall-based or recognition-based [160, 300].
Figure 3 provides an overview of these variations that are explained in the following sections in more detail.
Like the password, other knowledge-based authentication schemes rely on human cognition and memory.
The advantage is that users thus do not need to carry additional tokens. Another advantage is that many
knowledge-based secrets are easily revocable [34], which means that users can easily recover from a loss of
the secret, e.g., by having a reset link sent to a connected email account. Yet, on the downside, like with
password authentication, the cognitive effort increases with the number of accounts and unique secrets.
Furthermore, if a secret is actively shared with other users or guessed by an attacker, it is not possible for
the system to know who the actual user is. That’s because the secret is usually not linked to a person but
some kind of identity such as an email address or account name [145].
As the security of knowledge-based authentication very much depends on the scheme itself, e.g., whether
it uses a static or dynamic secret, and the handling of the secret by the user, details on technical security
are provided along with the descriptions of certain examples for alphanumeric, graphical, and cognitive
authentication.
Alphanumeric Authentication
As stated above, the most prominent example of alphanumeric authentication is the password or variants
thereof, such as a mnemonic password or a passphrase. As the password has already been described in
great detail above, this section describes another form of alphanumeric authentication, namely personal
knowledge questions.
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Figure 3: Categorization of knowledge-based authentication schemes. Note: The list is not exhaustive. For
references to the examples listed in the figure, see Appendix 10.5.
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Example: Personal Knowledge Questions
Personal knowledge questions, also known as challenge questions [238] or cultural passwords [243], ask users
to provide answers to personal questions, such as the mother’s maiden name or the favourite school subject.
The idea behind the scheme is that users should be able to easily recall this kind of personal information
with the help of a cue (cued recall). Thus, the scheme has often been used as a reset mechanism for
account recovery, e.g., in case of a forgotten password [153]. However, previous studies showed that the
answers to many of these questions are either known by relatives or friends of the user, or are easily
searchable or guessable. Personal knowledge questions thus provide reduced security as compared to
passwords [33, 238]. Furthermore, studies found that many users provide fake answers in order to increase
security, but involuntarily reduce security by hardening answers in a predictable way. Even the assumed
benefit of high memorability could not be confirmed in the study that instead found that about 40% of
users were unable to recall their previously provided answers [33].
Graphical Authentication
Graphical authentication makes use of the fact that people are better in recalling pictures than words
[263]. As described by Renaud [244] and illustrated in Figure 3, graphical authentication schemes can be
clustered into different categories depending on the action the user has to complete to authenticate, e.g.,
search for a pre-selected picture among distractors (searchmetric) or mark a certain pre-selected point in
a picture (locimetric).
Example: Persuasive Cued Click Points [51, 52]
One example of a graphical scheme is Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP) [51, 52]. Upon registration, the
user chooses one click point in each of the five subsequent images from a larger set of images. To overcome
the finding that users often choose salient and thus relatively easy-to-guess click points in an image [78, 306],
PCCP encourages users to choose a ”random” click point by restricting choice to a randomly selected area
within the image. To log in, the user has to click the pre-selected points on each picture again within a
small error margin. Each click point determines the next image that comes up. If the user makes a mistake,
the next image is one that was not among the images the user has chosen a click point on. The image
thus provides feedback to the user, who can quickly go back to correct the mistake, whereas attackers
would not profit from this feedback if they did not know the selected images. The scheme provides many
security features such as resilience to targeted impersonation, leaks from other verifiers, phishing, or theft
[34]. However, it is not resilient to physical observation, and like other knowledge-based schemes, is not
effortless in terms of memorability [34]. In user studies, the scheme was well perceived in terms of usability
and perceived security [52] by the participants.
Cognitive Authentication
Cognitive authentication differs from the other two categories in that the user does not need to memorize
the secret per se, but some kind of formula or procedure. Applying this formula leads to the calculation of
a new secret each time the user authenticates.
Example: Weinshall [328]
The Weinshall scheme [328] consists of a picture matrix that contains a large number of pictures (between
20 and 80 depending on the configuration). The picture matrix consists of a random selection of a picture
set the user has to memorize, and some decoy images. As compared to a picture password, it is not sufficient
to recognize the memorized images among the decoys, but the user has to apply a set of rules. The user
starts with the picture in the upper left corner of the matrix. If the picture is not among the memorized
ones, the user goes to the next picture to the right. Otherwise, the user goes to the picture below. This
process is repeated until the user reaches the lower or right side of the matrix and notes the number that is
displayed next to the final picture in the matrix. The number is part of the code the has to enter to finally
authenticate. To derive the complete code, the user has to repeat the process with as many matrices as
numbers in the code before the final code can be entered. If users make a mistake in the process, they
have to start anew. The password space, and the scheme’s resistance to brute-force attacks, is calculated
with between 247 and 2190 password options [328] depending on the number of images, combinations, and
the length of the code. However, Golle and Wagner [113] could show that the scheme was not resistant to
eavesdropping attacks. In terms of usability, the Weinshall scheme has been found to require user training




The ”secrets” in biometric authentication schemes are based on unique features inherent to a person, i.e.
“something you are”. The word secret is used in brackets here, as biometric characteristics are not per se
secret even though they might sometimes be hard to acquire without the person cooperating [218, 324].
That is why some researchers even dismiss biometrics as a form of authentication [269].
Biometric technologies have been defined as ”automated methods of verifying or recognizing the identity of a
living person based on a physiological or behavioral characteristic.” [324, p.1]. According to this definition,
biometric authentication has often been divided into schemes based on physiological and behavioural char-
acteristics [10, 28, 145, 324, 325]. Physiological characteristics can further be differentiated from anatomical
physical characteristics, which is captured in the definition by Riley et al. [255].
While physiological characteristics result from the interaction of physical and (bio-)chemical processes in the
organism and can change during measurement [266], anatomical, physical features remain unchanged during
measurement. An example of a physical feature would be the fingerprint; an example of a physiological
feature would be a person’s brainwaves that change in reaction to a cognitive task. A behavioural feature
would be the way someone walks. Figure 4 visualizes the different forms of biometric authentication
schemes.
Biometric authentication can further be classified in terms of whether it is based on static information
(e.g., a facial image) or dynamic information (e.g., blinking movement) [284], whether the information is
examined once per session or continuously, or whether the information is provided actively or passively.
An advantage of biometric authentication is that, in contrast to knowledge-based and token-based schemes,
biometrics allow for recognition of a specific person [145] and require personal presence [76]. Furthermore,
the ”secret” cannot be forgotten like a password or lost like a token as people carry the characteristics
with them in any case [145]. In that, they increase convenience for users. Mimicking or stealing biometric
information is not impossible, e.g., a fingerprint can be lifted from a surface, but very difficult [145]
especially as current sensors often include liveliness checks. Thus, they cannot be circumvented by just
using images of, e.g., a face or fingerprint. In addition, the storage of the sensitive biometric information
can be protected by not storing the biometric information in its original format, but as an encrypted
digital representation [145]. These so-called templates could, e.g., consist of certain points extracted from
a fingerprint instead of a complete fingerprint image. The security of biometric systems could be further
enhanced by using multimodal biometric systems [145].
To be suitable for authentication, a biometric feature should fulfill the following requirements according to
Jain, Ross, and Prabhakar [145]:
• Uniqueness: The manifestation of the characteristic should be sufficiently different between individ-
uals to be able to distinguish them.
• Universality: All people must possess the biometric characteristic.
• Permanence: The biometric characteristic should not be affected by time or age, respectively.
• Measurability: The acquisition of the biometric feature should be easy and allow for further process-
ing, e.g., by using feature extraction.
• Performance/ Reliability: The technology used to extract the feature should be accurate, fast, and
robust.
• Circumvention: It should be hard to substitute or imitate the characteristic.
• Acceptability: The use of the characteristic for authentication and the corresponding technology used
to capture the data should be acceptable for a large group of the relevant population.
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Figure 4: Categorization of biometric authentication schemes. Note: The list is not exhaustive. For references
to the examples listed in the figure see Appendix 10.5. *DNA can be clustered differently.
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While these requirements are important, they also pose some challenges. The following list describes the
challenges connected to each requirement that apply to biometric authentication in general.
• Uniqueness: As stated above, biometric features should be unique for each person and thus might
allow a link between the biometric feature and the person’s identity. This, on the one hand, can be
viewed as a security feature, but also raises privacy concerns on the other hand [63, 308]. Privacy
concerns about how the personal and unique biometric information is stored and used are most
prevalent. Even though not all biometric information can be used to reveal the user’s identity, the
fear is that biometric information could be linked to a person [324]. Face recognition could, for
example, be used in combination with security cameras to detect and trace criminals, or to exert
control over employees [261]. Other biometrics, such as iris images, can be used to derive personal
information such as certain diseases [260]. Furthermore, if biometric information is successfully
imitated or stolen, the information could be misused for identity theft. Apart from that, once stolen
information cannot be easily revoked or replaced [324]. Another challenge results from the fact that
even though the biometric characteristics might be distinct, the information collected by a sensor,
e.g., certain points within a fingerprint, might bear inter-class similarities reducing the practical
distinctiveness of the biometric feature [145].
• Universality: Even though biometric characteristics such as the fingerprint might be universal, not
every person might be able to use them, e.g., due to a disease or injury. For example, fingerprint
authentication might be temporarily or permanently unsuitable for people with burns or cuts, finger-
prints worn down by chemicals or labour, or in case of genetically indistinct fingerprints [145, 261].
Thus, there is a small percentage of people of which the biometric characteristic cannot be captured
[261].
• Permanence: Similar to the aspect stated above, many biometric characteristics might well be af-
fected by age, disease, or injury over time, causing intra-class variations. Consider, e.g., the change
in male voices in puberty, changes in an older person’s gait, or difficulties in tracing an iris affected
by cataract.
• Measurability: Not all biometrics are as easily observable and measurable as the fingerprint. For
example, the extraction of someone’s DNA or the capturing of someone’s brainwaves during a certain
task might be more intrusive and effortful. Additionally, the features that are more easily observable
might also be more prone to ”theft”. For example, in the past, fingerprint images have been used to
circumvent a sensor [45]. Another problem affecting the measurement process is noise in the data,
e.g., caused by cuts in a finger or a dirty sensor [145].
• Performance/ Reliability: In general, the biometric technology performs the more accurate, the more
data points it uses. However, this also increases the cost and processing time of technology [261].
Apart from that, for each level of accuracy, a trade-off has to be made. If the number of people
who are falsely accepted is to be minimized, this increases the number of people falsely rejected. For
example, a study cited by Schneier [267] calculated that a one percent increase of the false rejection
rate would increase the throughput time of passengers at an airport by 45 minutes.
• Circumvention: As a general rule, Sasse [261] states that the better biometric technologies are pro-
tected against potential attacks, the more expensive they are. This might not only refer to the
financial cost, but also to time or effort for the user. And even though sensors are getting more so-
phisticated, e.g., by using liveliness detection, previous research has shown that it is possible - while
cumbersome - to circumvent, e.g., a fingerprint sensor [14, 196], or to replace or steal the information
stored in the database [205].
• Acceptability: The acceptability of using certain biometric characteristics for authentication might
depend on a variety of factors, including culture and religion. For example, some religions prohibit
the photographing of eyes or face or the touching of objects that have been touched by the opposite
gender [261]. Research indicates that general acceptability might be higher for applications with a
high perceived security need or when user effort is considerably reduced, e.g., when replacing multiple
passwords with fingerprint authentication [261]. Finally, the acceptability among experienced users
is higher than amongst inexperienced users [261].
To make these considerations more graspable, examples for physiological, physical and behavioural bio-




Example: Body Odour Authentication
Body odour authentication is based on the fact that a component of each human’s body odour is unique.
The body odour can be captured non-intrusively by sensors that analyse the chemicals the smell consists
of, known as volatiles [28]. As the composition of chemicals changes with recent activities and medications,
it is, for example, possible to diagnose certain diseases or recent activities such as sexual activity apart
from authenticating people. This raises some privacy issues [28]. Further, the analysis of the body odour
might be impacted by chemicals in the surrounding environment, such as deodorants [76, 145].
Anatomical/Physical Biometric Features
Example: Fingerprint Authentication
Fingerprint authentication, which concerns the patterns of ridges and valleys on a fingertip [145], is the
oldest form of biometric authentication [28]. While in the past ink has been used to capture and compare
fingerprints, nowadays, sensors based on optical, thermal, silicon, or ultrasonic principles are used of which
optical sensors are the most common [28].
With the progressive development of fingerprint sensors, their acquisition cost has been considerably re-
duced in the last years [234], making it publicly available in laptops and smartphones. Furthermore, the
maturity and accuracy of fingerprint sensors has been shown to be very high [144, 240], which further
contributed to the spread of fingerprint authentication. To date, it is the most commonly used biometric
authentication scheme [292]. Still, as stated above, fingerprint authentication is not available for a small
percentage of the population due to injuries, worn-down, or genetically indistinctive fingerprints [145, 261].
The performance of the authentication process can further be impacted by dirty fingers or sensors, and too
wet or too dry fingers that influence their capacitance [28, 76]. Apart from that, the use of the personal
fingerprint for authentication has been connected to privacy concerns (e.g., the fingerprint being misused
for identity theft) [49, 68], safety concerns (e.g., being cut-off the finger for circumventing the system) [261],
concerns in terms of hygiene (e.g., the transmission of viruses on shared sensors) [210], and associations
with criminals as the fingerprint has often been used for forensic purposes [144]. Studies analysing user
perceptions of fingerprint authentication have often found fingerprint authentication to be highly rated in
terms of preference, convenience, or security perception by many participants [49, 81, 139, 193], but also
disliked by some for privacy reasons [49, 68].
Behavioural Biometric Features
As indicated by the name, behavioural authentication relates to the behaviour of a person [28]. Anatomi-
cal/physical and physiological characteristics ”are innate or naturally grown to; and behavioral biometrics
are mannerisms or traits that are learned or acquired.” [159, p.1566]. Examples include gait, gesture,
signature dynamics, and keystroke dynamics recognition the last of which will be described in more detail
below.
Example: Keystroke Dynamics
The underlying assumption of keystroke dynamics recognition is that each person types in a particular way.
Even though the typing might not be exclusively unique to a person, it seems to be sufficiently distinct to
differentiate users from one another [145]. The keystroke dynamics could be unintrusively traced for typing
a specific password (static keystroke analysis) or for general typing over a longer time period (dynamic
keystroke analysis) [159]. The method measures the time taken to type a certain word, the speed of typing,
typing errors, the time between hitting keys, or the pressure applied [76, 159]. This method is relatively
cheap as no external sensor or hardware is needed [28, 159]. Methods for classifying keystroke dynamics
include statistical methods, neural networks, pattern recognition techniques, and hybrid approaches [159].
As described above, keystroke dynamics can be captured unintrusively and transparently. The advantage
is that users might not need to be interrupted for authentication and are already familiar with typing
and typing-based authentication, such as passwords, which might increase the acceptability of keystroke
dynamics recognition [159]. However, the fact that keystroke dynamics can also be collected without the
user being aware of it might also raise privacy concerns.
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1.2.3 Token-based Authentication
In token-based authentication schemes, the secret is a token or “something you have”, respectively. First
of all, token-based schemes can be classified in terms of whether the token is linked to a person’s identity,
e.g., an identity card, or whether it can be used by any person, e.g., a key or a transponder. In that case,
the mere possession of the token enables a person to authenticate. Second, token-based schemes can be
electronic, e.g., a hardware token, or non-electronic, e.g., a paper token. Sometimes, the differentiation is
not entirely clear as also some of the non-electronic tokens require some electronic processing. Consider,
for example, a paper card with a personal bar code that requires a bar code scanner or a list of codes that
needs to be entered in an online system. Figure 5 provides an overview of different forms of token-based
authentication schemes.
An advantage of token-based schemes is that they do not require any mental effort of the user, as no secret
has to be remembered. However, a disadvantage is that tokens have to be carried and can thus easily be
left or stolen. Furthermore, in the case of non-personalized tokens, the token can be used by any other
person to authenticate. This reduces the security of single-factor token-based schemes [243, 261]. Apart
from that, revoking or replacing lost or stolen tokens is often connected to high costs [261], as may be
the general acquisition of hardware needed for the authentication process, e.g., in the case of smart card
readers.
These disadvantages can at least be partially mitigated by storing multiple credentials on one token [261],
miniaturizing tokens [261], or choosing tokens that users always carry with them, such as their smartphones.
Another option is to combine token-based schemes with a secondary factor (two-factor authentication), e.g.,
a knowledge-based password that protects access to the information in case the token is stolen [261] or
a secret that is directly incorporated in a configurable 3D object [194]. Then again, this involves some
mental effort for the user similar to that of knowledge-based authentication. An example is the YubiKey
[343] token, of which some configurations require a different password for each verifier. Previous research
on user aspects of token-based authentication suggest that tokens such as smart cards or radio-frequency
identification (RFID) tags were less accepted by users as compared to knowledge-based or biometric schemes
[101, 152].
In the following, one example each will be provided for personalized and a non-personalized token.
Personalized Tokens
Example: Identity Cards
A prime example of personalized tokens are passports or identity cards, often including a photograph of
the person, which are issued to citizens by states, but are also used by insurance companies or private
organisations such as fitness studios issuing personalized membership cards that users have to carry. In the
increasingly digital world, efforts are undertaken to combine the multiple identities a user has for different
services, e.g., for accessing public services, travelling, health insurance, the driver licenses, or parking
permits into one identity card or an electronic smart card, respectively. Examples of nations including
several identities in one card, as listed in [26], are Greece, Malaysia, and Portugal. The challenges of these
efforts include the large cost of the infrastructure for introducing, maintaining, and revoking the identity
cards [26]. In addition, there might be privacy concerns resulting from storing many digital identities in
one place and challenges in terms of trust in the issuing state or organisation [26].
Non-personalized Tokens
Example: Transponder
An example of a non-personalized electronic token would be a transponder that communicates with an
electronic door or car lock [136]. The word transponder is a combination of transmitter and responder
because a transponder, upon reception of an electronic signal, emits a response. In essence, a transponder
is an electronic equivalent to a key with the advantage that for many different doors, a person would not
need to carry a number of keys but that all required access codes can be stored on one transponder. It can
take many different forms, such as a key chain, a chip card, e.g., as described in [136], or could be integrated
into a personal watch or other objects such as suggested by [181]. The transponder being non-personalized
means that if the transponder is lost, stolen, or passed to another person, the other person gains access to
the room or car the same way the primary user would.
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Figure 5: Categorization of token-based authentication schemes. Note: The list is not exhaustive. For references
to the examples listed in the figure see Appendix 10.5.
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This might have benefits in terms of usability, e.g., when a person aims to borrow someone’s car, but
impacts security if the loss is not noticed in time [261]. On the other hand, a loss of a physical object
such as a transponder might be noticed earlier than the stealing of a password by an attacker [218], and
a missing transponder can be revoked quickly and remotely via a web interface. This benefits security
and also decreases cost and effort compared to the loss of a physical key that requires exchanging the lock
cylinder and all distributed keys.
After introducing password authentication as well as existing alternatives including other knowledge-based
schemes, biometric, and token-based authentication schemes, the next section analyses and compares the
objective features and well as the user perceptions of these different forms of authentication.
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2 Evaluating Objective Features and Subjective User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes
This chapter first details the identification and rating of different authentication schemes in terms of
objective features (see section 2.1). Afterwards, the results of the rating process were used for the selection
of authentication schemes that are analysed in terms of the users’ perceptions in a laboratory study (see
section 2.2). Finally, the findings of the laboratory study led to a follow-up study focusing on the influence
of the context of use on users’ perceptions of authentication schemes that is described in section 3.
2.1 Rating of Authentication Schemes
Figure 6: Research step 2.
Manuscript 1: Zimmermann, V., Gerber, N., Mayer, P., Kleboth, M., von Preuschen, A., and Schmidt,
K. Keep on rating–on the systematic rating and comparison of authentication schemes. Information &
Computer Security 27, 5 (2019), 621–635. doi:10.1108/ICS-01-2019-002
Based on a systematic literature review Velásquez, Caro, and Rodríguez [319] identified eight decision
frameworks aiming to facilitate comparison and selection of authentication schemes. Some of these consider
certain, specialized contexts or requirements. For example, one framework concerns Internet Protocol
Multimedia Subsystems [85], one focuses on supporting the design of knowledge-based authentication
schemes [97], and a third one compares paid user authentication methods in Korea in terms of managers’
preference [166]. The comparison of schemes in terms of their resistance to certain types of attacks by
Wang et al. [321] concerns two-factor authentication, whereas this research was foremost interested in
single factor-authentication. Altinkemer and Wang [11] analysed the costs and benefits associated with
implementing a new authentication scheme or a combination of schemes from an economic perspective,
e.g., in terms of implementation costs and market share. Guel [118] suggests a framework mainly focusing
on technical requirements in terms of authentication, authorization, and server attributes.
Other frameworks can be more broadly applied. For example, Palmer [225] proposes an approach for
selecting the most suitable automated personal identification mechanism, short ASMSA, as a decision
framework for authentication schemes. It considers the organisational and user perspective and consists
of three stages: 1) understanding of strategic goals, 2) effectiveness of requirements, and 3) efficiency of
solutions. For each step, a list of criteria is identified that should be considered in the decision process, such
as the task environment characteristics or the stakeholders’ compromise ability. While very comprehensive
and helpful, the framework is also very extensive, including over 200 criteria that need to be discussed in
a given organisational context for each scheme. This makes its application to a large number of schemes
rated outside of a certain context impracticable.
Thus, to assess and compare objective features of different authentication schemes, the framework proposed
by Bonneau et al. [34] was chosen. This framework includes 25 rating features categorized into three
dimensions: usability, deployability, and security. Each feature is described along with rating criteria
detailing when a certain feature is given or not. An example is provided by the feature ”Memorywise-
Effortless” belonging to the usability features. It is given if the user does not have to memorize any secrets,
quasi-given if the user has to memorize one secret, and not given if the user has to memorize more than
one secret. Furthermore, the rating can be conducted independently of a certain organisational context.
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Instead, different contexts and requirements resulting from different contextual factors can later be applied
to judge which of the rating features are especially important and to exclude authentication schemes not
possessing the features.
Manuscript 1 ”Keep on Rating - On the Systematic Rating and Comparison of Authentication Schemes”
by Zimmermann et al. [349], that is an extended version of Zimmermann et al. (2018) [348], details how
various authentication schemes were chosen from a literature review and rated using an adapted version
of the rating framework by Bonneau et al. [34]. The adapted version by Mayer et al. [197] included a
refinement of the rating criteria and a procedure for pairwise comparisons of schemes falling into the same
category. The results were integrated into the database of ACCESS 1 [198, 247], an authentication choice
support system, that builds on the refined rating system. Thereby, the number of schemes in the database
was increased from 45 to 85 schemes. The process is graphically depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Procedure of the rating process conducted to compare and select authentication schemes for this
research as described in [348].
As described in Manuscript 1, ACCESS allows for comparing authentication schemes against each other in
terms of the included rating features. It is not possible to quantify which of the schemes performs ”best”
overall, but to compare the schemes in terms of their suitability for a certain use case. To do so, it is
possible to specify requirements, e.g., by excluding rating features that are not important for a certain use
case, or by giving more weight to rating features that are deemed more important than others. Given the
requirements specification, ACCESS then calculates a performance score for all included schemes so that
these can be ranked.
For this research (also see section Application of Manuscript 1), the rating was conducted considering a
user with a laptop and mobile phone available. In addition to the included usability, deployability, and
security criteria, the following requirements were applied for the rating:
• The scheme should produce no or low cost for the users to not reduce acceptance or adoption rates
due to financial aspects.
• The scheme should be deployable on web browsers to prevent users from having to rely on additional
software or hardware and from not being able to authenticate from different places.
• The scheme should not require users to carry additional items besides the assumed laptop and the
mobile phone to decrease the burden for the user and the reliance on additional items that need to
be present for each login attempt. Besides, laptops and mobile phones are nowadays often equipped
with a variety of sensors, such as cameras, microphones, and fingerprint sensors, allowing for a variety
of authentication schemes.
• The feature ”accessible” was excluded from the rating, even though it was deemed important. The
idea was to avoid bias by excluding schemes not yet providing alternatives for all kinds of impair-
ments in their current form. This is especially important as the rating also included theoretical
concepts of schemes that did not have the maturity to provide alternatives for different impairments.
Nevertheless, this feature should be considered for the chosen schemes.
• The feature ”non-proprietary” was excluded from the rating, as it was deemed irrelevant for identi-
fying the most suitable schemes from a research perspective.
1 available from: https://access.secuso.org/
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• The features ”resilient-to-throttled guessing” and ”resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing” detailing the
number of guesses needed to compromise the authentication secret were excluded from the rating.
They are implementation-specific and can be adapted to fulfill the required security needs when
setting up the chosen authentication scheme. For example, login attempts could be throttled to
three unsuccessful attempts before an account is locked for a certain time frame.
• Likewise, the features ”no-trusted-third-party” and ”server-compatible” were excluded assuming that
potential service providers or the researchers within, e.g., the research project ”Secure and user-
friendly authentication and communication” would be able to set up the chosen scheme without
having to rely on external servers or third parties.
The rating resulted in a list of all applicable authentication schemes within the ACCESS database sorted
by their performance score. Again, it has to be noted that the schemes on top of the list can not be viewed
as the ”best” schemes overall, but just as the most suitable schemes given a certain use case, certain
weighting and selection criteria, and specific implementations or configurations of schemes. The rating
overall confirmed the difficulty to replace the password as none of the authentication schemes included in
the database stood out as being superior to password authentication in all regards and across all contexts
of use.
Thus, for the next research step, from the resulting rating list, the top two authentication schemes of five
different authentication categories, such as knowledge-based and biometric schemes, were chosen. These
are listed in section 2.2.2 and described in detail in Manuscript 2. The ten schemes selected from the
list were supplemented by the two ”challengers” password authentication and fingerprint authentication
resulting in twelve schemes overall. These twelve schemes were compared in terms of the users’ perceptions
in a laboratory study described in section 2.2.2.
2.2 User Perceptions of Different Authentication Schemes
...
Figure 8: Research step 3.
Manuscript 2: Zimmermann, V., and Gerber, N. The password is dead, long live the password–a labo-
ratory study on user perceptions of authentication schemes. International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies 133 (2020), 26–44. doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2019.08.006.
To compare the twelve schemes in terms of the users’ perceptions, first, the experimental setup was tested
and refined in a pilot study before conducting the actual laboratory study. The next sections describe the
pilot study setup and implications for the main study before summarizing the key points of the main study.
2.2.1 Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted to test the intended experimental setup, procedure, and the convincibility of
mock-ups used to simulate the authentication schemes in the laboratory study. The authentication schemes
were chosen to be simulated rather than using existing implementations for several reasons:
First, for privacy reasons, no participant’s authentication data should be stored or processed by third
parties. This was especially relevant in terms of biometric data.
Second, the use of a simulation allowed for controlling differences between the authentication schemes
not related to the authentication mechanism itself, e.g., different maturity levels, error rates, brands and
designs.
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The primary focus of the pilot study was not on the results in terms of user perceptions but on identifying
ways to improve further the study design and the simulation of authentication schemes to increase the
validity of the results in the main study. The pilot study will thus be presented with this focus here. The
following sections refer to the article ”’If it wasn’t secure, they would not use it in the movies’ - Security
Perceptions and User Acceptance of Authentication Technologies” by Zimmermann and Gerber (2017) [346].
For further details concerning the method and results of the pilot study, the reader is referred to the article.
Pilot Study Method
To evaluate the study design, an ad-hoc selection of eight authentication schemes covering knowledge-
based and biometric authentication was analysed: text password, graphical password, gesture recognition,
fingerprint recognition, face recognition, iris recognition, speech recognition, and ear shape recognition.
Procedure
After an introduction to the study and the provision of an informed consent sheet, the participants inter-
acted with all eight authentication schemes in a within-subject design. The password authentication served
as a baseline; the order of the seven remaining schemes was randomized. The user interaction with the au-
thentication schemes was implemented in the following way: The participants interacted with an interface
showing instructions and providing feedback, as well as with the technologies required for authentication
(e.g., a fingerprint sensor). The system was designed to convey the intended functionality. However, it
was actually operated by the experimenter from a remote work station. No technical functionality of the
authentication schemes was implemented. This usability method is also known as “Wizard of Oz” study
[65]. The instructions and the system’s feedback were presented within a PowerPoint presentation. For all
authentication schemes, the design and layout were equal. On the experimenter’s screen, the participant’s
screen was duplicated so that the experimenter could react to the participant’s input in time. To maintain
the convincibility of the simulation, the experimenter’s screen was not visible to the participants. The
authentication schemes were simulated using the following apparatus:
• An eye and facial expression tracking system called “FaceLAB” [273] used to simulate the face, iris,
gesture, and ear shape recognition,
• A microphone for simulating speech recognition,
• A PowerPoint feature to simulate a graphical password similar to PassPoints [333],
• And a built-in fingerprint sensor of a Sony VAIO notebook to simulate fingerprint recognition.
Following each interaction with an authentication scheme, the participants rated the scheme’s perceived
security, effort, and cost-benefit ratio, as well as expected usage problems, and intention to use the scheme.
After having interacted with all schemes, the participants were asked to rate the schemes against each other
in terms of preference and privacy concerns and to answer some questions in a semi-structured interview.
The interview aimed to identify reasons for different ratings, to control for experience with biometrics,
and to inform users about the simulation approach used in the study. Finally, the participants were asked
whether they had been aware of the simulation and to provide ideas for further improvements.
Sample
The sample consisted of N = 35 German undergraduates studying either psychology (29) or psychology in
IT (6). Of these, 24 identified as female, eleven as male. The participants were between 19 and 47 years
old (M = 23.09, SD = 5.38). Seventeen out of 35 participants had never used biometric authentication
schemes before. The participation was compensated with course credit.
Pilot Study Results and Implications for the Design of the Main Study
First of all, the results revealed differences in user perceptions in terms of privacy concerns and expected
problems (see [346]). This can be viewed as an indication that the type of authentication scheme is a
relevant factor for influencing user perceptions.
Second, the perceived effort did not differ between authentication schemes. This might be due to all
authentication schemes being designed in a similar way and with a zero-error rate to avoid influences
resulting from different stages of maturity.
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While this can be viewed as an indication for successful unification of authentication schemes, current
implementations of authentication schemes (e.g., fingerprint sensors vs. face recognition) used in everyday
life do differ in their error rates. Therefore, the main study implemented realistic error rates for the
analysed authentication schemes to increase the external validity of the findings.
Third, the simulation approach was efficient in that a majority of n = 22 participants did not see through
the simulation and felt like interacting with actual authentication schemes.
Eight participants mentioned doubts after having been informed about the simulation, five participants
raised questions during the experiment or clearly stated to have been aware of the simulation in the
interview. Four of the five participants had previous experience with biometrics. Some participants felt
that the authentication process had been too “smooth” to be realistic. Thus, to make the simulation more
realistic, especially for people having experience with different authentication schemes, the main study used
enhanced HTML mock-ups that reacted to the participants’ input instead of the experimenter’s. Further,
this once more encouraged implementing realistic error rates and authentication-scheme specific problems.
Fourth, the authentication schemes analysed in the pilot study had been selected ad hoc informed by
related work. However, to be able to compare objective features with subjective perceptions, and to
include relevant schemes for researchers and practitioners, the choice of authentication schemes for the
main study was based on the rating process described in Zimmermann et al. [349] (see Manuscript 1).
2.2.2 Summary of the Main Study
Please note that the study and its results are described in detail in Manuscript 2 ”The password is dead,
long live the password – A laboratory study on user perceptions of authentication schemes” by Zimmermann
and Gerber (2020) [347] that has been published in the International Journal of Human-Computer Studies.
As described above and in Manuscript 2, twelve authentication schemes representing different types of
authentication were compared in terms of the users’ perceptions in a laboratory study:
• ”Challengers”: password authentication, fingerprint authentication
• Knowledge-based (text): personal questions, e.g. [264], preference-based authentication [147]
• Knowledge-based (graphical): PassPoints [333], Persuasive Cued Click Points [52]
• Cognitive: Weinshall [328], associative questions [143]
• Biometric: signature recognition, e.g. [208], keystroke dynamics, e.g.[42]
• Token-based (phone): PhotoTAN [220], MPAuth [191]
Method
In a between-subject study, N = 41 participants interacted with and rated realistic, interactive HTML
mock-ups of all twelve schemes. Mock-ups rather than actual schemes were chosen to a) control for dif-
ferent designs, b) control for different maturity levels of schemes, and c) to respect the participants’ privacy
in that no personal data was collected or transferred by the schemes.
Procedure
After receiving information on the study and agreeing to participate, the participants completed twelve
rounds of registration and authentication with the mock-ups of the selected authentication schemes in a
randomized order. To increase the realism of the study and as authentication is a secondary task, the
participants were asked to authenticate for a fictional email account. They had to complete a number of
short, different tasks, such as checking a date in an email or replying to a question in an email. After each
task that required authentication with another scheme, the participants rated the scheme in terms of pref-
erence, security, security-readiness [295, 296], privacy, usability, effort(-benefit ratio), expected problems,
and intention to use. After having interacted with all twelve schemes, the participants were furthermore
asked to rate the schemes against each other and to provide their opinions in a short follow-up interview.
The study procedure is graphically depicted in Figure 9 along with an exemplary screenshot of the mock-up
for the scheme Persuasive Cued Click Points [52].
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Sample
The N = 41 participants were undergraduate students with majors in psychology and psychology in IT
that were compensated with course credit. The participants’ mean age was M = 21.8 (SD = 2.82) years.
A total of 33 participants identified as female, eight as male. Twenty-four participants reported previous
experience with biometrics.
Figure 9: Study procedure of the laboratory study on user perceptions of authentication schemes, adapted from
[347].
Results
Conducting repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM ANOVAs), significant differences were found in
the user perceptions of the twelve schemes in terms of preference, perceived usability, problem expectation,
perceived security, privacy concerns, intention to use, security readiness, perceived effort, and perceived
effort-benefit ratio.
The findings further revealed, that despite its shortcomings in terms of the cognitive load it poses for the
users, the ”challenger” password authentication was still rated highest in terms of preference, usability,
intention to use, and lowest in terms of expected problems and effort. As reasons for preferring password
authentication, the users often mentioned familiarity with the scheme (n = 11), its ease of use (n = 4),
perceived security (depending on the password creation and handling) (n = 4), and also memorability (n
= 4).
The second highest preference rating was received by the fingerprint scheme that also received favourable
ratings in terms of usability, effort, expected problems, and intention to use. Furthermore, the fingerprint
scheme perceived the highest security rating, but also scored high in terms of privacy concerns.
While usability, effort, intention to use, and problem expectation ratings correlated with the users’ prefer-
ence, security and privacy ratings were not related to preference. Nevertheless, when asked for the reasons
for preferring or disliking a certain scheme, security and privacy were often mentioned. From the privacy
ratings across all schemes, it seems that biometric schemes, and schemes asking for the users’ personal
information, such as the personal knowledge questions, raised greater privacy concerns than the other
schemes. Furthermore, while biometrics were rated as very secure, often privacy issues were mentioned in
the follow-up interviews as a reason for not intending to use biometrics.
Discussion & Implications
Overall, the results provided relevant insights in terms of user preferences and comparisons of subjective
perceptions with objective features from the previous rating. For example, the password and fingerprint
were not selected for the study based on their high performance score in the rating, but as wide-spread
”challengers”. Yet, that they were more preferred than the ten higher-scoring schemes from the rating
indicates that they live up to their label as ”challengers”, at least from a user perspective.
One reason for the finding that security and privacy were uncorrelated with user preference might be that
security and privacy are complex and often invisible constructs. Thus, it might be difficult for users to
include these aspects in their decision process. The finding thus points to the need to make security and
privacy features of schemes visible for the users.
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Aside from this, the study also led to the assumption of a perceived security-privacy trade-off of biometric
and knowledge-based schemes. That is, while biometric fingerprint authentication was well-liked for its
perceived ease of use and security features (uniqueness of information, security against theft and forging)
by some participants, it was also often disliked because of perceived privacy concerns for providing personal
information.
Thus, fingerprint authentication was the only scheme ranging both among the most preferred (n = 6) and
the least preferred schemes (n = 5). Instead, password authentication was rated as less secure, but also as
less privacy-invasive as no personal information was required.
However, it has to be considered that the laboratory study only included a relatively small and homogeneous
sample of participants. Thus, to shine light on this seeming trade-off, a follow-up study was conducted
to analyse security and privacy perceptions of biometric and knowledge-based authentication schemes in
more detail and with a larger, more heterogeneous sample.
Another factor that seemed to influence the users’ perceptions of authentication schemes was the context in
which the schemes were used. For example, fingerprint authentication was most often reported for unlocking
the mobile phone and known from border control when travelling. In contrast, password authentication
is widely implemented in online services of all kinds, such as email accounts, social networks, or online
shopping. Thus, the follow-up study considered the context of use as a second aspect to analyse in more
detail.
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3 The Influence of Context and Type of Scheme on User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes
Figure 10: Research step 4.
Manuscript 3: Zimmermann, V., Gerber, P., and Stöver, A. That Depends – How Context Affects User
Perceptions of Authentication Schemes. (in preparation).
This section details the follow-up study to analyse the impact of the context of use and the assumed
security-privacy trade-off on the users’ perceptions. The first part describes the pilot study, its setup, and
implications before the main study and its findings are described after that.
3.1 Pilot Study
To test a study design for analysing the users’ perceptions in terms of security and privacy of authentication
schemes, and the users’ perceptions in terms of different contexts of use, a pilot study was conducted. It
was completed with the support of a student group within the course ”Project and process management”
that is part of the psychology master’s study program at Technische Universität Darmstadt. The student
group was supervised by Nina Gerber and Verena Zimmermann, and the study results incorporated in the
publication ”Security vs. privacy? User preferences regarding text passwords and biometric authentication”
that has been presented at the conference ”Mensch und Computer” [105].
3.1.1 Pilot Study Method
Procedure
In an online survey implemented on SoSci Survey, the N = 129 participants were first provided with some
general information on text passwords and biometric authentication. The participants were then asked to
indicate their preference for the two and to provide reasons for their choice. Afterwards, seven contexts of
use were described in a randomized order, among others, online banking, social networks, cloud services,
and notebook unlocking. For each context of use, the participants were again asked to indicate their
preference in terms of text passwords and biometric authentication and provide reasons in a text field.
All participants that were unfamiliar with at least one of the contexts of use or indicated not to have any
preference were excluded from the further analysis resulting in N = 95 participants.
Sample
A total of 55 out of the 95 people identified as female, 40 as male. The medium age was M = 28.71
(SD = 11.88). Most participants (51.54%) were students, followed by employees (43%), and people being
self-employed (3%).
3.1.2 Pilot Study Results and Implications for the Design of the Main Study
Not given any context, n = 52 out of the 95 people preferred password authentication over biometric
authentication. Categorizing the qualitative responses following an open coding approach with two raters
revealed efficiency and perceived security as the main reasons for the users’ preference.
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Interestingly, the n = 43 participants preferring biometric authentication did so mainly for the same
reasons. In all contexts of use, the password was more often preferred than biometric authentication. The
descriptive differences were smallest for online banking and online shopping and largest for social networks
and email accounts. McNemar tests for dependent samples revealed differences between the users’ overall
preference and their preference indicated for the following contexts of use: social networks, cloud services,
and email accounts. The protection of personal data, i.e., privacy, was rated most important in contexts
involving financial information such as online banking and online shopping.
First of all, the roughly 50/50 split of participants overall preferring password authentication or biometrics
indicates that there might be different user groups with different needs that may not be fulfilled by only
one standard authentication scheme for all users. Thus, online service providers might consider offering
multiple authentication schemes or combinations thereof.
Second, while the findings suggest that the context of use may indeed influence the users’ perceptions of
authentication schemes and the perceived importance of privacy, privacy concerns were not among the
main reasons for preferring text passwords over biometrics. However, this may also be due to the format
of the questions asking for reasons for the users’ preference rather than justifying why the other option
was not chosen. Apart from that, it may have been difficult for some users to rate text passwords as one
concrete authentication scheme against the group of biometrics that were not further limited in the study
to one concrete scheme.
Furthermore, it was found that habit or familiarity with a scheme in a certain context of use may act
as a predictor for preference, as the contexts with the highest preferences for text passwords, e.g., social
networks and email accounts, were the ones that often use password authentication as the standard scheme.
This could also be partially confirmed by the users’ qualitative responses.
The findings led to the following implications for the main study:
• First, to complete the picture also token-based schemes were included in the main study to cover the
three main categories of authentication schemes.
• Second, for each authentication category, a specific authentication scheme was introduced. These were
the three schemes scoring highest in terms of the users’ perceptions in the previous laboratory study:
passwords (knowledge-based), fingerprint authentication (biometric), and PhotoTAN authentication
(token-based).
• Third, familiarity with each scheme was measured to analyse its role as a factor influencing user
preference.
• Fourth, user perceptions, including privacy and security perceptions, were collected for all schemes,
also the less preferred, to shine light on the assumed privacy-security trade-off.
3.2 Summary of the Main Study
Please note that the study and its results are described in detail in Manuscript 3 ”That Depends - How
Context Affects User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes” by Verena Zimmermann, Paul Gerber and
Alina Stöver [351] that was being prepared for submission at the time of the publication of this dissertation.
The manuscript describes an online study in which N = 202 participants rated their perceptions of dif-
ferent authentication schemes across different contexts of use. The study aimed to analyse the influence
of the type of scheme and the context of use on the user’s perceptions in general, and on the assumed
privacy-security trade-off in particular.
3.2.1 Method
The online study was conducted using the platform Clickworker and used a within-subjects design. Thus,
all participants rated all authentication schemes in all contexts of use.
Based on the results of the laboratory study described in Manuscript 2, the three best-rated authentication
schemes in terms of user perceptions from each authentication category were chosen, resulting in the
following selection:
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• Password authentication: As described in the previous sections, password authentication is a rep-
resentative of the knowledge-based authentication schemes. The user memorizes and types in an
alphanumeric secret to authenticate.
• Fingerprint authentication: Fingerprint authentication belongs to the group of biometric authenti-
cation schemes. To authenticate, the user needs to register the fingerprint or certain points thereof
that are compared with the fingerprint upon login using a fingerprint sensor.
• PhotoTAN authentication: This scheme is a token-based scheme using the smartphone as a token
[220]. An individual secret key is generated and stored on the smartphone. The key and thus the
smartphone is necessary to extract a one-time code from a colored pattern that is created by the
website or service the user aims to access. The user is authenticated upon entering the correct
one-time code on the website.
The following contexts of use were selected based on their spread and relevance, and also in terms of the
different types of data protected by authentication in each context:
• Email Account: Email accounts can include personal and work communication of varying sensitivity,
and are often used as a possibility to reset forgotten passwords of other accounts.
• Social Network: Social networks can be used to share personal and social information including
text messages, pictures or locations with friends or a wider range of people, e.g., on Facebook or
Instagram. Other networks are specialized in sharing certain types of social information such as
work-related information, e.g., on LinkedIn or Xing, or academic information, e.g., on Google Scholar
or ResearchGate.
• Online Banking: Online banking accounts generally provide access to personal financial informa-
tion such as the account balance and types of transactions, and also provide functionalities such as
initiating transactions or withdrawals of money.
• Smart Home: Smart home technologies and devices intelligently connect household appliances, sen-
sors, and consumer electronics [350]. Exemplary smart home devices include smart TVs, smart
speakers, smart heating, or lighting. Smart home devices can hold personal information of varying
degrees of sensitivity such as motion detection from movement sensors, personal routines such as
wake-up times, personal images from security cameras, or health-related data from smart health
devices.
Procedure
At the beginning of the study, the participants were presented with some information on the study and
an informed consent sheet. After having accepted to participate, the participants were provided a textual
and visual depiction of the registration and login process for each of the three schemes in a randomized
order. This part was followed by a rating of the familiarity with and the frequency of use of each scheme
on a 100-point visual analogue scale.
In the main part of the study, the participants were presented scenario descriptions of the four contexts
of use and asked to rate their preference for using each scheme for the respective context of use on a
100-point scale. Afterwards, the participants could select qualitative reasons for their preference rating
from a matrix that was based on the findings from a literature review and previous studies [105, 346, 347].
For example, the participants had the option to explain their preference rating by choosing low vs. high
security, learnability, or intrusiveness of the scheme. Besides preference, the participants were asked to rate
the perceived security, privacy concerns, effort-benefit ratio, and their intention to use a certain scheme
within a certain context of use on a visual analogue scale ranging from 1 to 100. The sequence of the
contexts of use was randomized to balance sequential effects.
Finally, the participants were asked for their general perceptions of all three schemes independent of a
certain context of use. Besides the measures already mentioned, this part included a rating of the subjective
usability of the scheme using the System Usability Scale (SUS, [38]) and a rating of the scheme’s efficiency.
The study ended with the collection of basic demographic information, the participants’ technological
affinity [98], and general privacy concerns based on Smith, Milberg and Burke [286] and adapted by
Malhotra, Kim and Agarwal [190].
For an overview, the study procedure is depicted in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Study procedure of the online study on the influence of the context and type of scheme on user
perceptions of authentication schemes [351].
Sample
The sample consisted of N = 202 German participants that were recruited via the online survey panel
Clickworker and compensated according to the platform’s suggestion and above minimum wage. A total
of 98 identified as female, 103 as male, and one as diverse. The sample’s age distribution was as follows: n
= 25 were between 18 and 24, n = 86 were between 25 and 34, n = 22 were between 45 and 54, and n =
15 were between 55 and 64 years old.
3.2.2 Results
Repeated-measures multivariate analyses of variance (RM MANOVAs) were conducted to analyse dif-
ferences in the users’ perceptions across schemes and contexts. Linear regressions were used to analyse
the influence of certain predictors on the users’ preference for a certain scheme. Due to deviations from
normality, robust procedures based on trimmed means and bootstrapping were used for the subsequent
analysis wherever possible.
Despite its downsides in terms of cognitive effort, that was even acknowledged by the participants, the
password was most preferred in general and across all contexts of use. The relatively new PhotoTAN
scheme that is increasingly deployed in the banking sector (for which it also received the highest relative
preference rating) was the least preferred overall. Preference ratings concerning the fingerprint scheme
were ambiguous. While some people highly preferred the scheme, others highly rejected it. Furthermore,
the fingerprint scheme was rated as the most secure but also received the highest values in terms of privacy
concerns.
The results revealed that the type of scheme as well as the context individually influenced the participants’
perceptions of the schemes. However, while all measured perceptions, including privacy and security,
differed across the schemes, the privacy and security perceptions did not differ across contexts of use.
The finding was mirrored when analysing the interaction effects of scheme and context on the participants’
perceptions that were significant except for security and privacy perceptions. When analysing the extent to
which certain measures influenced the participants’ preference ratings, it was found that security perception,
the perceived effort-benefit ratio, and perceived usability were relevant predictors across a number of
schemes and contexts.
3.2.3 Discussion & Implications
The high preference ratings in terms of password authentication confirm the findings from the laboratory
study on user perceptions [347] and show that users prefer the password despite its downsides in terms of
cognitive load. Likewise, the ambiguity in fingerprint preference ratings hints at a split in the user group
already found in previous research [49, 68, 254, 347].
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The high level of security perceptions and privacy concerns at the same time associated with fingerprint
authentication offer an explanation for the ambiguity in terms of preference. This can also be viewed as
an indication of the assumed security-privacy trade-off.
Furthermore, the finding that security and privacy perceptions differed across schemes but not contexts
indicates that these perceptions are closely tied to the scheme. Likely, security and privacy may somehow
be traded-off with other aspects such as usability or an estimation of whether the security and privacy level
are ”acceptable” for the respective context of use. An indication for this trade-off might be that security
perception was among the significant predictors for preference ratings, along with usability perceptions and
the effort-benefit ratio. The effort-benefit ratio itself constitutes a trade-off that might include other aspects
not directly measured and bears similarities to related concepts such as ”security readiness” [295, 296], the
effort people are willing to take for security given differing levels of data sensitivity.
Finally, the research revealed indications for the influence of familiarity on the participants’ perceptions,
yet, these could not be confirmed when analysing the predictors influencing user perceptions. Reasons for
this finding might be that familiarity has been measured in general as opposed to context-specific, and




Figure 12: Interim conclusion.
This research started with a rating of objective features and an analysis of subjective perceptions of a
large number of authentication schemes with the initial aim of finding or developing a secure, while usable
alternative to password authentication. Yet, the findings revealed that the quest to replace passwords
persists:
The extensive rating of authentication schemes in terms of objective usability, deployability, and security
features updated and extended the original database of Bonneau et al. [34], but did not lead to the
identification of an authentication scheme outranking password authentication across all rating criteria.
Rather, it became obvious that all classes of schemes have certain advantages and shortcomings. This is
also true for password authentication that has, for example, often been criticized for the memory load it
poses for users and for being susceptible to guessing, phishing, and keylogging attacks on the one hand
[133]. On the other hand, password authentication provides some important advantages. It does not
require client hardware as, for example, fingerprint authentication or smart cards do [133]. Passwords do
not require tokens that would need to be carried, and that are often expensive. Forgotten passwords can
be easily replaced using automated self-service resets via secret questions or by sending reset links to an
associated email address. Passwords have shorter login times than other forms of authentication, e.g.,
some graphical or cognitive schemes [187]. They allow for setting up an account at once without having to
wait for some digital validation or setting up a physical device. Finally, passwords are browser-compatible,
allowing access to accounts from anywhere in the world. Thus, the additional security features offered by
other forms of authentication might not always justify the cost [133].
The subsequent comparison of subjective user perceptions of authentication schemes that have rarely been
subject to laboratory studies involving actual interaction before, shed light on the seemingly intractable
issue. However, the findings were different than expected. It was found that the password, despite its
shortcomings, especially with regard to the cognitive load, was preferred by the users. This finding could
be confirmed not only in the laboratory study but also in two consecutive online studies (pilot and main
study) analysing users’ preferences across different contexts of use.
28
Thus, the ”overwhelming hatred from the users” [282, p.13] attested by other researchers could not be
confirmed in this line of research.
Instead, the participants provided valid reasons for preferring the password, at least when compared with
other authentication schemes that all have their advantages and shortcomings. In the laboratory and online
studies, password authentication was rated high in terms of usability and low in terms of privacy concerns,
effort, or expected problems. The users’ preferred password authentication out of habit and familiarity with
the scheme, but also - contrary to the expectation - perceived it as relatively secure and memorable. The
online study further revealed that the preference for password authentication was stable across different
contexts of use when compared to fingerprint and PhotoTAN authentication.
Furthermore, the users’ positive attitude towards and their high intention to use passwords are both
predictors for acceptance and actual use following the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [66]. It is
thus likely that users will continue to use password authentication for some more time when given the choice.
In line with that, researchers acknowledged the persistence of passwords [133], even if for other reasons:
Herley and van Oorshot argue that security experts aim to replace passwords without understanding what
is required to do so, or what the actual achievement will be. Significantly improving usability and security
at the same time without causing disruption is deemed unlikely. Given the variety of account types and
assets protected by them, Herley and van Oorshot also view it as naive to expect a single solution for all
use cases. Another problem concerns the difficulty of estimating harm caused by compromised passwords,
but also the harm prevented by and cost for implementing alternative schemes. Given the lack of a ”silver
bullet” meeting ”all goals in all situations” [133, p.32], best-fit solutions should be explored. For many
authentication needs, these might include password authentication. That said, Herley and van Oorshot rate
the belief that passwords are dead as incorrect and harmful, and instead, encourage a research agenda for
improving password authentication. In line with that, Siddique, Akhtar, and Kim [282] find that promoting
biometrics as the ultimate in authentication is unfounded and even suppressed valuable password-related
research.
Acknowledging passwords as the most widely-spread authentication scheme, with a number of advantages
in terms of objective features, and as positively perceived by the users, the second part of this research
will focus on password authentication. This is not to say that password authentication was the ”best” or
should be the sole form of authentication. Indeed, the previous studies also revealed preferences for other
forms of authentication (especially fingerprint authentication), and different groups of users preferring dif-
ferent authentication schemes. Furthermore, differences in user perceptions were apparent across different
contexts of use in the online study. Aside from legal, technical, or security-related requirements, these user-
centred aspects should be taken into account when choosing authentication schemes for a certain service
or context.
Password authentication will not only be focused on in the following because it is wide-spread and well-
perceived but because improving password security remains an open challenge. Human factors play an
important role therein: Aside from technical measures, the security of password authentication is largely
impacted by the users’ decisions and behaviours, i.e., their password creation and password handling. As
formulated by Jain ”the security of the entire system is only as good as the weakest password” [145, p.14].
The password’s shortcomings that especially concern human factors, i.e., human cognition, perception, and
behaviour, remain unsolved and require further research. Therefore, instead of developing ”yet another
authentication scheme” [133, p.29], the second part of this research focuses on supporting users in creating
secure and memorable passwords.
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5 Strategies for Enhancing Secure Password Creation
Figure 13: Research step 5.
A variety of measures have been developed to increase password security. While some of the strategies
rely on increasing security by constraining the users to comply with a set of rules or technical measures,
others aim to increase the security by reducing cognitive load or by providing support in creating secure
passwords. All the strategies have advantages and disadvantages that will be discussed in the following.
Please note that this section serves to review common strategies and to explain the reasons for focusing on
a certain type of measure in the second part of this dissertation. However, it has not been included in one
of the manuscripts.
5.1 Constraining Strategies
Constraining strategies focus on providing technical measures or rules to prevent users from creating weak
passwords.
5.1.1 System-generated Passwords
Early on, users were often provided with system-generated passwords [5] that are generally stronger than
user-generated passwords [203]. Yet, system-generated passwords consisting of a random sequence of
alphanumeric symbols are also generally harder to memorize as they bear no meaning for the user, and
lead users to write passwords down [5, 224, 355]. Even the technique of chunking, as tested for PINs of
different length, had promising but only limited impact on the memorability of system-generated PINs
[141]. For these reasons, user-generated instead of system-generated passwords became most widely used
in the long-term [5].
5.1.2 Regular Password Expiration
Regular password expiration requires users to change their passwords at regular intervals with the idea
to limit the opportunity to expose the password or the damage an attacker could do to a system with a
compromised password, respectively [50].
Even though a long-upheld practice in industry and universities [95], empirical studies suggest that regular
password expiration does not achieve the security aims hoped for and should be called into question
[53, 344]: Zhang et al. [344] studied a large data set of previous university account passwords that had
to be changed every three months and found that for 17% of the passwords an attacker knowing the
last password would be able to guess the new password in less than five attempts. Furthermore, 41% of
the accounts could be compromised within three seconds in an offline guessing attack. The finding that
users tend to use slight variations of previous passwords as new passwords, e.g., by appending numbers to
previous passwords [119], making it easier for attackers to guess passwords based on prior knowledge, was
also confirmed by Chiasson and Van Oorshot [53]. Furthermore, it may be possible for an attacker that
had once gained access to an account to install malware or a keylogger allowing him or her constant access
even when passwords are changed [64].
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Apart from that, regular password change has also been found to be a ”source of frustration” for users [262,
p.ES-2] and a ”usability disaster” [133, p.34]. A recent online study on the users’ self-reported behaviour and
attitudes concerning mandated password change [119] indicated that the practice might neither negatively
impact password strength of new as compared to previous passwords, nor does it increase password or
account security overall as password changing strategies were found to be predictable.
Given the questionable benefit in terms of security and the downsides in terms of usability, organisations
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [115] now suggest that passwords do
not need to be changed unless there is evidence of compromise.
5.1.3 Password Policies
Password policies are a form of restricting user-generated passwords to include a minimum number of
characters and certain types of character sets. Often password policies also forbid the use of frequently
used words collected on blacklists. A password policy that has been widely used is comprehensive8 that
requires the user to create a password of a minimum eight characters length, an uppercase letter, a lowercase
letter, a number, a symbol, and no dictionary words. Yet, this strategy to increase password security and
”randomness” has not had the effects hoped for. First of all, the security benefits of applying password
policies were smaller than expected [329]. Proctor et al. [237] furthermore found that password policies
increase the length of the password creation and login procedure and lead to systematic password creation
patterns. In line with that, Inglesant and Sasse [142, p.383] have identified several usability issues related
to password policies and conclude that existing policies ”are too inflexible to match their capabilities, and
the tasks and contexts in which they operate”. Therefore, also NIST [115] calls for focusing on password
length as the primary predictor for password strength [163, 171, 237] as opposed to password composition.
5.2 Supporting Strategies
Supporting strategies focus on lessening the security-usability trade-off or overcoming mismatches between
user perceptions and technical security. These can again be divided into approaches aimed at supporting
secure password creation and approaches aimed at decreasing the memory load.
5.2.1 Approaches for Creating Secure Passwords
Password Information
One approach for supporting users in creating strong passwords is to educate users about what makes
strong passwords, e.g., by presenting information texts next to a password entry field. Exemplary advice
might include: ”Avoid basing your passwords on easily-guessed information, such as names, birthdays, or
things you like (e.g., favourite animal or song). This would make it easy for attackers to guess.” The idea
is that improved decision making is possible when the user has all the facts [43], i.e., is aware of potential
threats and has the knowledge to counteract them.
Yet, research has shown that security advice and security-related information, in general, are often not
followed. For example, empirical studies show that privacy policies or terms of service are not read by
the majority of people [217] and that users were still found to use weak passwords despite many years of
password advice [96]. Potential reasons for not following the advice or applying coping strategies include
the overwhelming amount of existing advice, their benefits being (or appearing to be) hypothetical [132],
and conflicting advice across websites and services [211, 342].
However, to date, few studies specifically examined the construction of password advice and the passwords
created with it [342]. For example, the recent NIST guidelines from 2017 [115] suggesting to no longer
enforce password composition policies but to allow for very long passwords as an important predictor for
password strength has yet to be implemented by many providers and developers. Thus, evaluations of its
effectiveness are still rare [342].
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Password Meters
Password meters provide the user with an indication of their created password’s strength to allow for
aligning the user’s perception with technical security measures and for motivating the user to increase
password strength without enforcement. Password meters can, e.g., take the form of a coloured feedback
bar or text such as ”Your password is strong”. They are frequently implemented in practice on various
websites and in different forms, among them eBay, Facebook, Google, or Twitter [99]. In 2015, Van Acker
et al. [317] found password meters to be deployed in about a third of the top 250 Alexa domains. In
practice, password meters are sometimes combined with additional elements such as nudges (see next
section), suggestions for improving password strength, or password policies.
Even without enforcing any rules or minimum requirements, some studies analysing different types of
password meters with different user groups found an increase in users’ password strength when a password
meter was deployed (e.g., [84, 102, 167, 232, 318]). Furthermore, memorability rates did not seem to
be negatively affected [84, 167, 232]. At the same time, a number of studies did not reveal significant
improvements for some or all of the tested password meter conditions (e.g., [84, 112, 274, 317] so that
findings in terms of the effectiveness of password meters remain mixed.
Furthermore, analysing different password meters implemented in practice revealed the importance of
consistent measures and feedback across accounts. Different cracking algorithms and strength estimations
used by different researchers and websites can produce inaccuracies and inconsistencies [111, 316] that
might lead to confusion among users that receive varying feedback for similar passwords across accounts.
Password Nudges
Nudges aim to encourage users to choose the wise or secure option, respectively, by making small changes to
the choice architecture that do not limit the choice set and that activate automatic cognitive processes such
as biases and heuristics [303]. The term nudge was introduced by Thaler and Sunstein in their seminal book
”Nudge” in 2008 [303]. It describes multiple examples of successful applications across various domains,
such as default nudges to increase the number of organ donors or an image of a fly in a urinal to reduce
spilling.
Emerging from the field of behavioural economics, nudging has also been applied to the digital world,
including cybersecurity in general and password creation in particular. As described above, password
meters are often combined with nudges such as colour-coding nudges [313], nudges invoking social norms
[84], or fear appeals [318].
Password nudge examples aside from password meters are still rare: Kaleta, Lee, and Yoo [157] nudged
users to focus on the desirability of creating strong passwords to make users take a high construal level
perspective. They found that passwords were indeed stronger when users were induced to think at a high as
compared to low construal level. A study by Kankane, DiRusso and Buckely [158] aimed to increase users’
intention to change auto-generated passwords by, e.g., using default and salience nudges. Nicholson et al.
[214] made use of three interventions, including an incentive, a length instruction nudge, and a priming
nudge. The priming nudge consisted of an image of a man in a library carrying many books along with the
instruction to create a password based on that image. However, similar to password meters, the findings
are mixed: Kankane, DiRusso and Buckely [158] found one nudge to significantly reduce comfort levels
with the auto-generated password. Nicholson et al. [214] found no significant differences for the priming
nudge, but for the length instruction and incentive.
5.2.2 Approaches for Increasing Memorability
Passphrases and Mnemonics
Passphrases and mnemonics are exemplary strategies aiming to enhance the memorability of strong pass-
words. Passphrase approaches suggest using a complete sentence or a combination of words as a password
as compared to one single password [162]. An example would be: ”Let’seatsomeicecreamatthemalltomor-
rowat3pm!”. That way, long passwords can be created with the idea that these meaningful sentences
might be more memorable than meaningless passwords [235]. The increase of password length is aimed at
increasing the time necessary to guess a password, thereby enhancing its security [162].
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Mnemonics are a variant of passphrases that suggest thinking of a sentence and then take the first character
of each word as a password [180]. The exemplary passphrase above would result in the following mnemonic:
”Lesicatmta3p!”.
Empirical research found that the strength of random passwords and mnemonics were similar and that
both were stronger than user-generated passwords [340]. At the same time, mnemonics were not harder
to remember than user-generated passwords [340]. Similar results were found for the passphrases. The
memorability of passphrases did not significantly differ from user-generated passwords [162, 280]. However,
the use of passphrases increased the number of typographical errors and login times, resulting in negative
user perceptions [162, 280]. More recent studies found that typographical errors could be mitigated by
using well-designed passphrases that were consistent with a normal word processing mode [161], or by using
an algorithm that accepts the most common typing errors [215].
Password Managers
Password managers and single-sign-on services are technical approaches for decreasing the cognitive load
for the user [182]. They do so by storing the users’ multiple passwords for them. In general, they only
require one master password to gain access to all the stored passwords.
Password managers that can be browser-based, cloud-based, or a client application, offer to relieve the
cognitive load of memorizing multiple passwords from users [133]. Yet, password managers also face some
challenges, including security issues and user adoption rates.
Security threats are posed by a password manager being a single point of failure and the frequent lack
of malware-resistance [133]. In addition, Li et al. [182] identified vulnerabilities in terms of the use of
bookmarklets, web browsers, authorization, and the user interface.
Aside from the security-related challenges, adoption rates are still low despite the promise of lessening the
cognitive burden for the user [231, 251]. Among the factors hindering adoption, researchers identified a
lack of trust in the security of password managers and an underestimation of the threat of password loss
[16, 17, 231]. A study by Alkaldi, Renaud and Mackenzie [7] suggests that meeting self-determination
needs, such as autonomy, relatedness, and competence, might positively affect adoption.
In terms of the effectiveness of password managers, Pearman et al. [230] found, at least until the point of
their study, that the use of password managers or auto-fill tools neither had a significant effect on password
strength nor reuse. The findings of Lyastani et al. [186], who conducted a large-scale study on the impact
of password managers on password reuse and password strength, are mixed. They found that password
managers, at least if they include password generators, can indeed positively influence password strength
and reduce reuse. Yet, the effect also depends on the user’s password strategies, i.e., whether the user relies
on the technical support for password creation.
5.3 Evaluation of Strategies for Enhancing Password Security
The review of strategies for secure password creation shows that the strategies can be classified as con-
straining and supporting strategies. From the comparison above, it appears that strategies supporting
users without enforcing rules are not necessarily less effective in increasing password strength as compared
to constraining strategies such as mandatory password change or strict password policies. Making users fit
technical requirements without further consideration of the human factor might instead lead to frustration
or resistance among users, and perhaps even to the use of security-weakening workarounds. This is sup-
ported by the finding that the security benefit of the constraining strategies is questionable [53, 329, 344]
and accompanied by considerable usability problems [133, 142, 237, 262].
Furthermore, the human-centred stance taken in this research suggests focusing on the strategies that
support users in creating and managing secure passwords by considering human factors such as users’
knowledge, perceptions, and cognition. For a detailed discussion of the stance taken towards the user
in this research also see Manuscript 8 ”Moving from a “Human-as-Problem” to a “Human-as-Solution”
Cybersecurity Mindset” [353]. Instead of considering the human a weak link or a problem to control, it is
assumed that users may well be able and willing to contribute to security, given that they are sufficiently
considered and supported.
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Thus, focusing on supporting approaches, a range of choices remain. While password information, pass-
word meters, and password nudges aim to primarily support password creation, passphrases and password
managers primarily constitute strategies for facilitating the memorability of strong passwords.
However, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. For example, password information can contain
the suggestion to create passphrases or hint at the use of password managers. Yet, the three strategies
for supporting secure password creation address the first, relevant step towards secure passwords. A
password manager would only be of limited help when used to store only weak passwords. Thus, password
information, password meters, and password nudges remain in the selection process.
While all three strategies appear promising and provide potential for future research, they are also ac-
companied by mixed findings. Password information is often not followed [96], and password meters and
password nudges are sometimes found to be ineffective [84, 112, 214, 274, 317].
The mixed findings in terms of information provision are likely to result from decades of overwhelming
and contradictory security advice [132, 211, 342]. Even though empirical research on individual sets of
password information is still rare [342], it is unclear whether adding a new set of guidelines to the large
amount of advice that also quickly changes with technological developments adds an important benefit for
users. Contrary to information provision, the application of nudges to the digital space, including password
nudges in cybersecurity, is a relatively new field [327]. Thus, the mixed findings might be due to the still
small number of empirical studies.
While some studies across cybersecurity domains revealed the nudge’s potential (e.g., [55, 310, 320, 322]),
some aspects of nudging are not yet well understood. For example, further research is needed to understand
how nudges exert their influence and why some nudges are effective while others are not [46].
As described above, password meters in practice are often combined with a nudge (e.g., [84, 313, 318]).
Thus, it remains unclear whether their (in)effectiveness results from the password feedback alone or from
the nudges targeted at motivating users to increase password strength.
Therefore, the second part of this research will focus on designing password nudges as a new and promising
field of research. Yet, as already described, the strategies to enhance password security are not mutually
exclusive. Thus, after first undertaking efforts to design effective password nudges, consideration will be
given to the combination with potentially beneficial aspects of other strategies such as password meters,
password information, or password managers.
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6 Password Nudges
Figure 14: Research step 6.
Manuscript 4: Renaud, K., and Zimmermann, V. Nudging folks towards stronger password choices:
providing certainty is the key. Behavioural Public Policy 3, 2 (2019), 228–258. doi:10.1017/bpp.2018.3.
Following the decision to focus on designing password nudges as a promising and new area of research, this
chapter describes three consecutive field studies that aimed to compare the influence of different variants
of password nudges on password creation.
First, the concept of nudging will be briefly introduced. For a detailed introduction to nudging, the reader
is referred to Manuscript 5 ”Ethical guidelines for nudging in information security & privacy” that has
been published in the International Journal of Human-Computer Studies by Renaud and Zimmermann
[249], and Manuscript 6 ”The Nudge Puzzle: Matching Nudge Interventions to Cybersecurity Decisions”
by Zimmermann and Renaud that is has been published by the journal ACM Transactions on Computer-
Human Interaction [354].
Second, the study design, results, and implications of the field studies will be described. This part is a brief
summary of Manuscript 4 that has been published by the journal Behavioural Public Policy by Renaud
and Zimmermann [252]. Specific aspects of the three field studies are furthermore published as ”Lessons
Learned from Evaluating Eight Password Nudges in the Wild” in the Proceedings of the LASER Workshop
by Renaud, Zimmermann, Maguire, and Draper [253], as well as ”Enriched Nudges Lead to Stronger
Password Replacements ... but Implement Mindfully” by Renaud and Zimmermann in the Proceedings of
the Information Security for South Africa (ISSA) conference [248].
6.1 Introduction to the Concept of Nudging
With their seminal book ”Nudge”, Thaler and Sunstein introduced the concept of nudging in 2008 [303].
According to the authors, a nudge describes ”any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives” [303, p.6].
The term ”choice architecture” broadly refers to any context in which a decision is made, such as physical
contexts but also digital decision interfaces. As stated in the definition, nudges are supposed to preserve
all choice options and to not unbalance the choice by introducing significant incentives, not only in terms
of money, but also time, effort, or social sanction [129]. Thus, no choice should be enforced. An example
would be that of a store in which healthy snacks are placed next to the checkout to encourage healthier
choices while people still have the opportunity to buy unhealthy snacks [173].
Nudges are supposed to work by activating certain automatic cognitive processes such as heuristics or
biases [43, 122, 129]. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that ignore part of the information to facilitate
decision-making [107]. An example would be the availability heuristic that describes how cognitively easily
accessible information also comes to mind more easily [107]. A widely-cited example is that of an experiment
in which English words with a certain letter in the first position were more easily available than words
with this letter in the third position even though these were more frequent [311]. Cognitive biases include
some systematic distortion from an objective aspect [126]. For example, the hindsight bias describes the
tendency of seeing past events as predictable even though the information was not given before the event.
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Among the large number of choices people are confronted with on a daily basis, it is estimated that about
95% are guided by automatic cognitive processes [46], introducing numerous possibilities for nudging.
The nudge concept originates from the area of behavioural economics, where the concept has been applied
with the intention to encourage citizens to choose the ”wiser” option. Exemplary applications include
prompts to encourage stair use as physical activity [29, 165], the use of social comparisons to encourage
energy saving [8], or the variation of food proximity and serving tools at a salad bar to reduce food-intake
[259]. As of today, several governments including the UK, the USA, and New South Wales in Australia
[22, 31, 80, 304] embraced the idea and established units to analyse the effects of nudging for the public
welfare.
Beyond the physical contexts, nudging has already been applied to the digital area, labelled ”digital
nudging” [327]. This concerns a variety of choices, e.g., taken on websites, during smartphone configuration,
or software installation. One important area of digital nudging is the field of human-centred security and
privacy [2]. For example, Choe et al. [55] used a framing nudge to increase users’ awareness of the privacy
implications of smartphone applications. In a study by Almuhimedi et al. [9], users were presented with
notifications about how often and with which applications the user’s location has been shared to encourage
users to review and adapt their privacy-settings. Raja et al. [239] used images representing the term
”firewall”, such as a brick wall, to encourage users to undertake protective measures. Von Zezschwitz et
al. [320] used background images to encourage users to choose stronger Android Unlock Patterns based on
the image.
Finally, as already described in section 5.2.1, initial studies have trialled a number of password nudges
such as default or salience nudges [158], a priming image next to the password entry field, or changing the
wording of the password creation instruction [214]. Kaleta, Lee, and Yoo [157] designed a technique to
nudge users to focus on the desirability of creating strong passwords as compared to feasibility based on
construal level theory. Different variants of password nudges such as fear appeals [318] or nudges appealing
to social norms [84] have also been used within password meters.
Because these initial studies produced some promising but also mixed results [84, 158, 214, 318], the field
studies described in the next section aim to shine light on the effectiveness of password nudges by testing
several variations in the wild.
6.2 Field Studies on the Effectiveness of Password Nudges
To analyse the impact of different password nudges on password creation, three consecutive field studies
have been conducted. All three studies have a similar setup, were conducted in the same environment,
and the design of the password nudges builds on the findings of the respective previous study. Thus, the
studies will be described and discussed together.
6.2.1 Method
The studies were conducted within a university web application, which allowed the students to view course-
work deadlines and timetable information, as well as to access coursework grades and to submit requests.
To gain access to the system, students had to authenticate with an identifier and a password within the
university network. For the purpose of the study, different types of password nudges were displayed on
the login interface to encourage stronger passwords. Each of the three studies ran for an academic year
between October 2014 and April 2017.
Password strength was measured with the zxcvbn.js password strength estimator [331]. Zxcvbn is available
open-source and heuristically estimates password strength, e.g., by checking for common words, patterns,
and repetitions in passwords. The tool works completely client-side so that the transmission of unhashed
passwords to the server was avoided. Among others, zxcvbn provides a password score between 0 and 4
that indicates whether the number of guesses needed to break the password is less than 102, 104, 106,




The following list details the password nudges and the control condition deployed in the studies. Screenshots
of the images displayed in the different conditions are shown in Figure 15.
• IV0 Control: The control condition consisted of the standard login interface asking the participants
to ”Choose a password”. The condition was deployed in studies 1 and 2.
• IV1 Priming: To encourage people to choose another and more secure password than the frequently
chosen term ”password”, this condition asked people to ”Choose a secret”. The idea was to prime
people by the use of the wording based on the priming effect [134]. The condition was included in
study 1.
• IV2 University Context: Aimed to activate an expectation effect [258], the participants were presented
with a static graphic that compared average and expected password strength in the university context.
The condition was used in studies 1 and 2.
• IV3 School Context: This condition targeted the identification with the peer group by adapting
the static graphic of IV2 to compare average passwords with the stronger passwords of the school
of computer science students to which most participants belonged. The idea was to encourage
participants to identify with and increase their password strength to that of their peers based on the
findings by Brewer [37] and Castano et al. [47]. The condition was used in studies 1 and 2.
• IV4 University Context and Feedback: In addition to IV2, this condition displayed interactive feedback
on password strength in relation to the static graphic as used in password meters (e.g., [84, 313]).
The condition was deployed in study 1.
• IV5 School Context and Feedback: In addition to IV3, this condition displayed and interactive feed-
back on password strength in relation to the static graphic as in IV4. The condition was deployed in
study 1.
• IV6 University Context and Reflection: This condition showed the static graphic used in IV2 along
with an item asking people to indicate how strong they perceived their password to be on a 5-point
scale ranging from very weak to very strong. The idea was to make people reflect on password
strength. The condition was included in study 2.
• IV7 School Context and Reflection: This condition showed the static graphic used in IV3 along with
the item from IV6 asking people to indicate how strong they perceived their password to be. This
time participants were asked as computer science students to facilitate identification with the peer
group. The condition was included in study 2.
• IV8 Social Norm: Condition IV8 that was used in study 2 aimed to activate social norms by inducing
the feeling of being watched. It was implemented with an image of a pair of watching eyes that has
been shown to activate norms and increase pro-social behaviour [21].
• IV9 Hybrid Authentication Nudge: This intervention used in study 3 consisted of three parts: 1)
an image of a long dachshund aiming to invoke the association of ”the longer, the stronger”, 2) a
compensation of the effort associated with stronger passwords provided by increasing the duration
a password can be retained before it had to be changed, and 3) a reminder of the current password
expiry date. When users created the password, they received dynamic feedback in terms of their
password expiry date as a password strength estimation.
Procedure
For an overview, the study procedure is depicted in Figure 15. The figure includes screenshots of the
password nudges deployed in the three studies.
When participants started the registration process for the university web application, they were first pre-
sented an informed consent form for participation in the study. When students decided not to participate,
they could still use the web application.
When agreeing to participate, students were randomly assigned to one of the password nudge conditions
or a control condition that simply asked participants to create a password in the first two studies. The
respective password nudge was then displayed on the login page where the students created their passwords.
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Figure 15: Study procedure of the three field studies exploring the influence of password nudges on password
creation as described in [252]. Images included with permission of © 2018 Cambridge University
Press.
Based on the requirements of the ethics committee to treat all students equally, and as the nudge in study
3 impacted the password changing policy, all participating students in the third study were assigned to the
same password nudge. Thus, no control condition existed in the third study.
Sample
The participants were students who created passwords for their actual university account. The majority was
enrolled in technical courses, mainly computer science. Due to the requirements of the university’s ethics
committee the collection of further demographic information such as gender or age, and other variables, was
not possible. Even though participation in the study was voluntary, the majority decided to participate.
In study 1 N = 497 of the 587 students that registered for the application participated, study 2 comprised
N = 776 out of 816 students, and study 3 included N = 672 participants out of 918.
6.2.2 Results
For the analysis of the results of studies 1 and 2, password strength and password length of the experimental
password nudge conditions were compared to the control condition. As password strength was measured
on an ordinal scale and password length not normally distributed, Benjamini-Hochberg corrected [25]
Mann-Whitney-U tests were conducted.
The results of study 1 revealed that none of the experimental conditions (IV1, IV2, IV3, IV4, IV5) differed
from the control group (IV0), neither in terms of the password strength score nor the password length.
Likewise, comparing password strength and password length of the experimental conditions (IV2, IV3, IV6,
IV7, IV8) with the control group (IV0) in study 2 did not reveal any significant differences.
Due to ethical considerations, no control group existed in study 3 that used IV9. Thus, as a substitution,
the results of study 3 were compared to the control and experimental conditions of study 2 that had
been conducted the previous year. As the sample consisted of natural groups of students, some students
used the application for more than a year and took part in both of the studies. This was acknowledged
by separating the participants that had previously participated from those that had participated only
once. Accordingly, separate analyses were conducted for independent and repeated measures. The results
revealed that password strength in study 3 was significantly higher compared to the previous year’s control
group and all experimental conditions. The same was true for password length and the independent as
well as the repeated measures analyses. The only insignificant difference was between the password length
of IV9 and IV7 in the analysis of the independent measures.
6.2.3 Discussion & Implications
The finding that none of the password nudges in study 1 led to stronger or longer passwords than the
control condition was unexpected as all password nudges were based on effects previously successful in
other contexts.
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In the case of failed nudges Sunstein [299, p.4] suggests to ”nudge better (or differently)” when there is
good reason to believe that the user’s choice might be biased or based on misconceptions. Indeed, previous
studies could show that users’ knowledge and perceptions in terms of passwords include misconceptions
and deviations from technical measures [275, 314, 315]. Thus, the password nudges per se seemed to be
warranted but might need to be redefined to be effective.
Thus, study 2 tested a different set of nudges. These partially included interventions from study 1 to
exclude influences that might have affected the time frame of study 1 or the specific sample, and also new
interventions to test alternative password nudges. Yet again, no significant differences were detected. This
led to a discussion and reflection on the non-significant results of studies 1 and 2, as described by Renaud
et al. [253]. The reflection included methodological aspects and password-related considerations.
In terms of methodology, password strength was measured using an artificial password score ranging from 0
to 4 that might have considerably reduced the variance of the data as, e.g., all passwords requiring between
104 and 106 guesses to be broken would be assigned the same score. Next, the use of hashed passwords for
privacy reasons later prevented the calculation of different metrics. Furthermore, the required application
of a non-parametric procedure might have slightly reduced the test power.
Finally, while the application of the password nudges in real university accounts with actual passwords
had certain benefits in terms of the external validity of the findings, it also suffered from some limitations.
These included ethical considerations in terms of the collection of demographic and additional variables,
but also the lack of possibility to control for external influences or password reuse.
In terms of password-related aspects, it was acknowledged that the participants’ password creation context
might not have been sufficiently considered, i.e., that authentication is a secondary aim and a complex
task influenced by many factors such as time, cognitive effort, knowledge, and experience.
It was furthermore found that at least some of the deployed nudges did not sufficiently enhance under-
standing of what makes a good password. This would have been especially important considering the
deviations of user perceptions from technical measures in previous studies [275, 314, 315]. For example,
the priming nudge using the word ”secret” (IV1) or the social norm nudge showing a pair of watching eyes
(IV8) simply aimed to encourage stronger password choices but did not indicate how to do so or whether
the participants achieved that aim. In contrast, the university context nudge (IV4) displaying a graphic
and interactive feedback provided the participants with an indication of actual strength. That this might
be more helpful is supported by the fact that this condition had the highest descriptive values even though
the difference was deemed non-significant after applying a correction for multiple testing.
In line with that reasoning, also Nicholson et al. [214] did not find an effect of a simple, visual password
nudge on password strength. In a between-subjects study, users’ were presented an image of a man in
a library carrying a lot of books in conjunction with the instruction to create a password based on that
image. The authors did not find a main effect of the image on password creation. In another condition,
Nicholson et al. [214] changed the wording in the instruction, which positively impacted password creation.
When participants were instructed to create a long password, the password strength increased. In contrast
to the use of the word ”secret” in this research, the word ”long” seems to have provided users with a hint
of what to do as length is an important predictor for password strength.
Following these considerations and the suggestion of Sunstein, failed but warranted nudges could be handled
by enhancing the effects of the nudge through incentives, mandates, or bans [299]. This led to the design
of the password nudge for the third study.
It was decided that the study 3 nudge should not only encourage stronger choices, labelled a simple nudge,
but also provide participants with an indication of password strength, labelled a hybrid nudge. Furthermore,
the participants should be provided an incentive or rather a compensation for the increased effort associated
with creating stronger passwords to acknowledge the complexity of password creation. To directly relate
the incentive with password creation, stronger passwords were compensated with an increased password
expiry date before it had to be changed, as suggested by Seitz et al. [276]. Thus, the hybrid nudge finally
consisted of an image of a long dachshund as a simple nudge, a dynamic indication and a reminder of
password strength in the form of the current expiry date, and the related compensation to keep strong
passwords longer than weak ones.
As no control group existed due to ethical considerations, the results of the previous year’s study served as
a comparison. Even though not ideal, the comparison provided a strong indication that the hybrid nudge
was more successful in encouraging the creation of strong passwords than the previous simple nudges.
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Overall, reflecting on the findings of the exploratory field studies on password nudges led to further con-
sideration in several regards:
First, the potential decrease in variance caused by the applied 5-point zxcvbn password score [331] led to
a consideration of alternative measures for future password nudge studies.
Second, while beneficial in terms of external validity, the field study setting prevented the collection of
additional demographic or control variables to analyse or control for potential influencing factors. Thus,
future studies should systematically examine the effectiveness of different nudges in controlled settings
before transferring the findings to practical applications.
Third, the insignificant findings in studies 1 and 2 might be explained by the potential lack of feedback
and password information in these simple nudges. Indeed, the assumed benefit of providing participants
with feedback and compensation for strong password creation became visible in study 3, applying a hybrid
nudge. To analyse the assumed distinction between simple and hybrid nudges and to tests differences in
terms of their effectiveness, it would be beneficial to more clearly distinguish the concept of nudging from
other interventions such as feedback or information provision.
Fourth, beyond a more clear-cut definition of nudges, the design of future nudges should also be based on
a better understanding of how nudges exert their influence.
The first and second consideration resulted in adaptions of the study design in that it was decided to use
an artificial but controlled setting for future password nudge studies, and to include more fine-grained
password scores and measures such as password entropy or the number of guesses required to crack a
password.
The third and fourth consideration led to an in-depth examination of the existing nudge literature to
better understand what a nudge is compared to related interventions, how nudges exert their influence,
and when and where nudges are not only successful but also suitable. Finally, this also led to a detailed
engagement with the ethical aspects of nudging. The next sections thus differentiate the nudge concept
already described in section 6.1 from related interventions and discuss their ethical implications.
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7 Differentiating the Concept of Nudging from Related Concepts
Figure 16: Research step 7.
Manuscript 5: Renaud, K., and Zimmermann, V. Ethical guidelines for nudging in informa-
tion security & privacy. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 120 (2018), 22–35.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.05.011.
Reflecting on the mixed findings of the field studies revealed the importance of having a clear understanding
of what constitutes a nudge and how a nudge can be separated from related interventions. For example,
one of the nudge conditions studied by Nicholson et al. [214] included a financial incentive, even though
the original definition by Thaler and Sunstein excludes ”significantly” changing the economic incentives for
certain options [303]. Likewise, information provision has sometimes been labelled a nudge [44, 59, 146].
Yet, even though not directly excluded from Thaler and Sunstein’s definition, researchers pose the question,
what would be new about nudging if mere information provision was classified a nudge [122] and deem
such a broad definition problematic in terms of the falsifiability of the nudge concept [223]. Finally, also
a discussion about whether or not the proposed ban of 16-ounce drinks in the United States fulfils the
definition of preserving all options as people would be able to refill smaller cups [192] demonstrates some
ambiguity in the nudge concept.
Based on a review of the nudge literature, this section will thus provide a more clear-cut definition of
the nudge concept and related concepts. It will first briefly introduce Dual Process Theories that have
often been used to explain how nudges exert their influence [123, 204, 303]. For more detail, the reader is
referred to the article ”Ethical guidelines for nudging in information security & privacy” by Renaud and
Zimmermann [249] of which the next section is a brief summary.
7.1 Dual Process Theories and the Concept of Nudging
Psychological Dual Process Theories [88, 156, 222, 285, 290] differ in terms of certain details and the labels
provided for different concepts. However, most share the distinction of System 1 and System 2 information
processing of the brain. These two types of reasoning can be broadly differentiated as follows:
System 1 can be described as a ”form of universal cognition shared between humans and animals” and
comprises several, partially autonomous subsystems [88, p.454]. The System 1 mode of reasoning is re-
ferred to as instinctive, fast, parallel, automatic, and requiring little capacity [88, 290]. With regard to
consciousness, it is assumed that System 1 processes are rather implicit [90] and that only the final product
of the process is conscious [88]. However, other researchers do not detail the question of consciousness [285].
System 1 is associated with heuristic processing and intuition [290].
System 2 is supposed to be evolutionary recent and specifically attributed to human information processing
[88]. This mode of reasoning is often described as slow, sequential, and limited in terms of capacity [88].
System 2 processes are supposed to be explicit and conscious [88]. This type of reasoning allows for analytic
processing, explicit learning, and rational decision-making [290].
Researchers conducted studies based on the deductive reasoning paradigm to demonstrate the existence
of the two modes of reasoning [87, 89] and also provided indications through neuropsychological studies
[109, 110].
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However, the nature of the relationship between the two systems is not yet entirely clear. Assumptions
include an interaction of the two systems [285], parallel processing [90], and serial processing [108]. Others
suggest that the two systems complement one another with System 1 being the default system of which the
outputs are monitored by System 2 [91, 155]. Some researchers propose single system frameworks in which
the type of reasoning varies along a continuum and in relation to the quality of the cognitive representations
[222]. Despite the different assumptions in terms of the two systems’ relationship, many researchers agree
that there is some kind of connection between System 1 and 2, and that ”a fully dissociationist view of
System 1 and System 2 is not adequate for capturing the complexities in which decision-making processes
operate” [183, p.295].
The nudge concept is related to Dual Process Theories in that these have often been used to explain how
nudges exert their influence [123, 204, 303]. Following prominent definitions of nudging that include the
activation of automatic cognitive processes [43, 122, 129], there is a relation between nudges and automatic
System 1 information processing. Thus, nudges are supposed to encourage a certain choice by purposefully
tapping System 1 information processing and by making use of the automatic, quick, and rather implicit
processes associated with it. This also implies that the nudgees are not necessarily aware of the intervention
that takes place. Consider for example the previously mentioned study in which food intake was reduced
by varying the proximity of certain food choices and the serving tools at a salad bar [259], or the use of
smaller plates [123]. Without adequate information, customers might not be aware of the intervention or
its purpose.
Taking into account some connection between System 1 and System 2, some authors differentiate between
Type 1 and Type 2 nudges [123, 183]. While Type 1 nudges primarily target System 1 information
processing as described above, Type 2 nudges also activate System 2 information processing. Examples
include traffic light labelling [183] or the use of framing [123]. According to Lin et al. Type 2 nudges aim to
encourage a reevaluation by disrupting coherence between the evidence base for decision-making and the
actual choice. Hansen and Jespersen’s [123] differentiation bears some similarities in that a Type 2 nudge
is supposed to attract reflective attention so that both definitions include a reflective, and thus conscious,
aspect. However, a Type 2 nudge does not directly activate System 2 but does so indirectly via activating
System 1 [123]. This implies that both Type 1 and Type 2 nudges make use of automatic cognitive processes
but vary in the degree in which they target System 2 and conscious reflection, respectively.
7.2 Definition of the Nudge Concept
Based on the considerations above and the reviewed literature, the following criteria for an intervention
counting as a nudge were derived.
• Predictability: Nudges should influence nudgees in a predictable way and towards a predicted outcome
[303].
• Automatic cognitive processes: Nudges activate the automatic cognitive processes used by System 1
information processing such as well-known biases and heuristics [43, 122, 129].
• Equality of costs: No choice should be more costly financially or economically, or in terms of time,
effort, or social sanction [129, 303].
• Preservation of choices: The nudge should not remove or ban any pre-nudge choice [129, 303]. Here,
it is important to disentangle the concept of choices (e.g., the possibility of eating as much as one
likes staying with the food-intake example from above) from that of options (e.g., smaller plates)
[192].
• Nudge for good: Nudges should be deployed for the good of the nudgee [303].
7.3 Definition of Related Interventions
Throughout the literature review, some related concepts emerged that are differentiated from the nudge
in the following. Table 1 provides a short overview of the aspects in which these interventions differ from
the criteria for nudges.
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Table 1: Differences between the criteria for a nudge and related interventions.
7.3.1 Code
According to Calo [43], a code constitutes an intervention designed to make the undesired behaviour more
difficult by making changes to the environment. Speed bumps on a road that require drivers to slow down
would be an example for a code. Like nudges, a code can activate automatic cognitive processes to reduce
the possibility of users choosing the ”unwise” option. An equivalent to the physical speed bump example
would be speed bumps drawn on a street to create the optical illusion of speed bumps to make drivers
slow down [15, 117]. However, there are two main differences to a nudge: First, while codes mainly focus
on decreasing the undesired choice, nudges generally focus on facilitating the desired choice. For example,
while a code would aim to prevent speeding, a nudge would encourage slow driving by motivating drivers
behaving accordingly with a happy face traffic sign [3]. Second, codes also include interventions that
make choosing another option unduly difficult, ”illegal or next to impossible” [43, p.778], e.g., by applying
sanctions or physical barriers. This type of intervention falls outside the definition of the nudge as costs
for different choices are not equal, and the preservation of choices might be endangered.
7.3.2 Sludge
As originally intended by Thaler and Sunstein nudges should be used ”for good” and for encouraging people
to make ”better” choices as judged by the nudgees themselves [303]. Nevertheless, as with many insights or
interventions, it is also possible to misuse nudges for personal or economic benefits rather than for the good
of the individual nudgee or the general public. An example would be some low-cost airlines that make use
of nudges to encourage customers to purchase unnecessary options for the company’s financial gain [327].
This type of intervention would be labelled a sludge [302] and does not comply with the definition of the
nudge. What is different from the definition of the nudge is not the intervention per se, but the purpose
the concept is used for.
7.3.3 Information Provision
Information provision, also labelled a notice by Calo [43], is aimed at supporting better decision-making
by providing users with the relevant facts. The idea is to bridge a potential knowledge gap between some
party (e.g., a service provider or organisation) on the one side and the user on the other side [43].
Information provision can take the form of various educational elements, such as reports on certain topics,
explanations, notifications, warnings, or feedback. Examples include terms of use or warnings on dangerous
products [43]. Information provision is widely used as a regulatory intervention, yet criticised for seldom
working in practice [43]. Potential reasons for the failure of information provision include an overload of
information [24, 132], high complexity of the provided information, and difficulties with making sense of
the information for decision-making [24].
The main difference from a nudge is the cognitive process the intervention targets. While nudges target
automatic cognitive processes in System 1 (or indirectly System 2 via System 1 in case of Type 2 nudges),
information provision primarily and directly targets active cognitive involvement and reflective reasoning,
i.e., System 2 processing.
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7.3.4 Hybrid Nudge
The combination of a nudge with additional educational elements was termed a hybrid nudge in the field
study described in section 6.2.
The exemplary hybrid nudge described in the study comprised two simple nudge elements: 1) an image of
a long dachshund to automatically activate the association of ”the longer, the stronger”, and 2) the com-
pensation of a stronger password with a later password expiry date. The latter intervention was supposed
to nudge users towards stronger passwords not by incentivizing, but by compensating the increased effort
for secure password creation with a password-related feature rather than with financial or other economic
incentives. By so doing, the choice of weak versus strong passwords should become more balanced rather
than imbalanced by the compensation. Yet, it could be argued that this intervention is positioned at the
limits of the simple nudge definition that includes no ”significant” change of the economic incentives [303].
The hybrid nudge furthermore included two educational elements: 1) feedback on password strength sup-
posed to educate users on their current password strength, and 2) a reminder of the password expiry date
coupled to the password’s strength.
The main difference to a nudge is that educational elements enhance the hybrid nudge. It is thus a
combination of two types of interventions: the nudge and information provision. As such, it is supposed to
activate automatic cognitive processes (System 1) to encourage a certain choice, but also to target reflective
reasoning (System 2) to enhance the users’ awareness and understanding of the intervention.
7.4 Implications
This section differentiated the concept of nudging from related interventions. It has been shown that the
code, sludge, and information provision fall outside the definition of the nudge. The combination of a
nudge and information provision has been labelled a hybrid nudge. The field studies provided indications
for the effectiveness of this type of joint intervention.
Thus, apart from the nudge as a main focus of this research, the hybrid nudge will further be discussed and
analysed in the following. Likewise, information provision as a supplement to the nudge in the combined
intervention hybrid nudge will be considered in the next sections even though outside the nudge definition.
This is relevant for analysing the single versus joint effects of the nudge interventions across the dual
processing model, as suggested by Dolan et al. [80].
The code and sludge, however, will not be considered further, as they may limit the choice set and are not
implemented ”for good”, respectively. They are thus not in line with the aim of this research to design
user-centred interventions that support users without restricting choices or enforcing strict rules.
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8 The Ethics of Nudging
Figure 17: Research step 8.
Manuscript 5: Renaud, K., & Zimmermann, V. (2018). Ethical guidelines for nudging in in-
formation security & privacy. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 120, 22-35,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.05.011.
Despite its spread and numerous applications, the concept of nudging has not enjoyed unanimous success.
This section briefly summarizes the arguments of the supporters and critics of the nudge concept before
discussing the ethical implications for the nudge, the hybrid nudge, and information provision as dif-
ferentiated in the previous section. The ethical considerations led to the derivation of guidelines for ethical
nudging based on established guidelines for ethical psychological research that are summarized at the end
of the section. The process is depicted in Figure 18.
Please note that the discussion surrounding nudging and ethics is described in more detail in the article
”Ethical guidelines for nudging in information security & privacy” by Renaud and Zimmermann [249] of
which this section is a brief summary.
Figure 18: Graphical depiction of the process to differentiate the nudge from related interventions before
analysing ethical implications for the selected intervention types as described in [249].
8.1 Arguments for Nudging
The arguments of the supporters of nudging can broadly be classified into four aspects.
The first argument is that there is no such thing as a neutral choice architecture and that nudging is thus
inevitable [2, 39, 298]. Any design decision, such as colouring, positioning, or wording, will influence the
nudgee. Instead of nudging unawares and with unintended and possible negative side effects, supporters
of nudging argue for designing the choice architecture deliberately and ethically.
The second argument extends the first by not only acknowledging that nudges are inevitable but also
beneficial [79]. Not actively and ethically deploying nudges might open the path for the deployment of
nudges for malign purposes [298]. Nudging ”for good” instead can counteract unethical nudges [298] and
support civic behaviour as a government’s responsibility [151].
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Third, advocates for nudges argue that humans are confronted with a plethora of often difficult choices with
many options [124]. Thus, nudges that support the nudgees by facilitating choice may well be considered
helpful [32, 57] rather than compromising autonomy.
Autonomy is also the topic of the fourth argument. Autonomy is referred to as ”the quality or state of
being self-governing” in general and ”self-directing freedom and especially moral independence” on the level
of personal autonomy [77]. Some supporters of nudging believe that nudging does not infringe human
autonomy as the original choice set is preserved and nudgees are free to ignore the influence of the nudge
and to choose otherwise [298].
8.2 Arguments against Nudging
The main arguments against nudging can be clustered into four groups.
First, to pick up on the last argument of the nudge advocates, its critics question that autonomy is
preserved when nudges are applied [164]. For example, Mitchell [206] states that ”libertarian paternalism”,
a term intertwined with nudging and used to describe the idea of authorities influencing towards the ”right”
choice without constraining or coercing [297], is an oxymoron. He explains that freedom of choice, and thus
perhaps also autonomy, cannot be assumed in contexts in which decision-making is known to be influenced
by biases and heuristics [206]. Other researchers suggest that nudges can be manipulative if they lead to
choices people would not have made without the nudge [336]. Furthermore, the removal of the need to
think about a choice might lead to excessive convenience [271].
Second, the critics of nudging argue against the ”covert” influence of nudges that primarily target automatic
and perhaps subconscious cognitive processes [123]. According to them, the transparency of nudges is a
prerequisite for their ethical deployment [216]. Indeed, also Thaler and Sunstein agree that the disclosure
of the nudge and the defence of its ”goodness” is warranted for an ethical deployment of nudges [303].
A third argument against nudging concerns the power of the choice architect. Researchers are concerned
that the choice architects, like the nudgees, succumb to automatic cognitive processes so that their decision-
making might be flawed [43]. Thus, the qualification of choice architects and the trust in their ability to
know ”better” is questioned [212], especially given changing opinions and uncertainty on what is deemed
the ”best” choice.
Fourth, mismatched nudges that do not align with the targeted group, context, or choice can produce
unanticipated and perhaps adverse side effects. For example, the use of pictorial warnings on cigarette
packs to reduce smoking increased anxiety and craving in heavy smokers [185].
8.3 Guidelines for Ethical Nudging
Ethical principles should guide research as well as the practical application of research. Well known sets of
principles for ethical psychological research include that of the British Psychological Society (BPS) [305],
the American Psychological Association (APA) [12], the European Federation of Psychologists’ Association
(EFPA) [86], or the Belmont report [74].
A comparison of the principles revealed some similarities so that the main principles can be summarized
as follows:
• Respect for Persons: People should be respected regardless of cultural and individual differences
such as gender, race, religion, or disabilities. No person should be treated in an unfair, prejudiced
or discriminatory way. Autonomy and self-determination of the person should be maximised while
recognising potential limits. Personal data should be treated confidentially and anonymously.
• Beneficience: Research should be aimed at contributing to the common good. All people involved in
the research should be protected from potential harm or risks.
• Justice: Research should be just in that all people should equally be entitled to access and benefit
from it.
• Scientific Integrity: Researchers should comply with ethical and scientific standards to ensure the
quality and contribution of the research.
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• Social Responsibility: The social responsibility of research as well as the expected, and perhaps
unexpected, outcomes and consequences of research should be considered.
Comparing these principles with the arguments against nudging, it can be seen that some of the objections
raised by the nudge critics do not align with the principles for ethical research.
For example, the criticism that nudges impair personal autonomy affects the principle to respect people and
to maximise their autonomy and self-determination. The assumed impact on autonomy is also connected to
the second criticism that nudges target cognitive automatic processes, and by so doing influence ”covertly”.
An increase in transparency, as called for by some researchers [123, 216, 272, 303], would be in favour
of the respect principle and could be viewed as an important step towards autonomy. If users are aware
of the nudge and its purpose, it might be easier for them to ignore the nudge’s influence. An important
distinction in this regard again is the concept of Type 1 and Type 2 nudges as described by Hansen and
Jespersen [123]. From their point of view, the use of transparent Type 2 nudges that not only target
automatic cognitive processes but also indirectly activate reflective reasoning are most favourable in terms
of ethics.
The third argument of nudge critics concerned the power and role of the choice architect. The actions
and decisions of the choice architect can, in the worst case, negatively affect a number of principles. For
example, the beneficence principle can be compromised if the nudge is not intended for the good of the
nudgee, the social responsibility principle is affected if the nudge produces adverse and unintended side
effects, and scientific integrity can be endangered if the use of the nudge cannot be justified.
Finally, the last argument against nudging also concerns scientific integrity in that the quality of research
is endangered if the employed nudge does not fit its intended purpose. Furthermore, potential unintended
side effects may not only affect the social responsibility principle but also justice if the effects concern
certain groups of people in particular such as in the example where anxiety and craving was especially
increased in heavy as compared to light smokers [185].
These considerations lead to several implications and guidelines for the ethical deployment of nudges:
• Suitability: In light of the concerns for autonomy and regarding the principle respect, researchers
should only use a nudge if warranted. In some contexts, other forms of intervention with no implica-
tions for personal autonomy, such as information provision, might be more suitable.
• Consideration of Ethics: When using a nudge, researchers, i.e., the choice architects in that case,
should generally reflect on its ethical implications. They can, for example, discuss implementation
plans with other researchers or ethical review boards to ensure the intervention respects people and
is scientifically sound.
• Justification: Researchers should be able to justify their decision to nudge and the selected type of
nudge to ensure scientific integrity.
• Nudge for Good: Even though already a criterion for nudging as such [303], nudging ”for good”
should also be the intended purpose for the ethical deployment of nudges. This guideline is supposed
to ensure the beneficence and respect principles.
• Preservation of equally costly Choices: To comply with the definition of nudges and with regard to
autonomy, no choices should be banned or significantly altered in terms of financial or other economic
incentives.
• Transparency: The nudge itself should be transparent so that the nudgees are aware of its existence
and the purpose of the intervention [123, 216]. By increasing transparency the potential ”covert”
influence of the nudge should be counteracted. If transparency is not possible for a good reason,
people should at least be debriefed.
• Matching: In order to ensure scientific integrity and quality of research, the nudge should be designed
to match the targeted group, context, and choice.
• Avoid Unintended Side Effects: The consideration of the nudge’s effects is supposed to reduce un-
successful nudges and unintended side effects. This implication serves the social responsibility and




Regarding the interventions selected for further analysis, the nudge, information provision, and the hybrid
nudge, the ethical considerations have the following implications:
The discussion summarized in this section and the guidelines derived from it primarily concern the nudge.
Apart from following the nudge definition, the guidelines derived from the discussion suggest that future
research on nudging should carefully consider the suitability of the nudge and its ethical implications.
The type of nudge should be matched with the respective decision, and the effects of nudging should be
considered. Furthermore, the design of the nudge should be transparent in terms of the presence of the
nudge and its intended purpose. In this regard, Type 2 nudges that indirectly activate reflective reasoning
in System 2 via System 1 seem to be ethically favourable over Type 1 nudges [123].
The use of information provision in research and practice does not seem to be accompanied by ethical
concerns as long as no sanctions or coercion are applied [249]. The literature analysing the reasons for
unsuccessful information provision [24, 132] suggests that information should be designed in a way that it
is not overwhelming, of little complexity, and clear in terms of the implications for the decision.
As information provision directly targets reflective reasoning in System 2, it is supposed that the com-
bination of a nudge and information provision in a hybrid nudge further contributes to the transparency
of the nudge. The educational elements of information provision could provide users with information
beyond the existence and purpose of the nudge. They could, for example, be used to educate users why
a certain choice is deemed ”better” or how people can make ”better” decisions in the long term when the
nudge may not be present. In the context of password creation, information provision could be used to
inform users of password strength but also to educate users on how to improve password strength or how
to manage multiple, strong passwords. The combination of the power of the nudge targeting automatic
cognitive processes with information provision that has sometimes been shown to be ineffective on its own
[219] might further lead to synergistic effects as indicated by the results of the hybrid nudge in the field
studies [252].
However, other researchers raise the question whether the power of the nudge that is drawn from the
activation of automatic cognitive processes might be decreased by increasing its transparency and thus the
degree of reflection [192]. It may well be that the first trialled hybrid nudge used in the field study (see
section 6.2) was only effective because of the certain context, sample, or combination of elements.
Thus, after this ”detour” to better understand the concept of nudging and its ethical implications, the
next section details two studies designed to explore the single and joint effects of nudging and information
provision in hybrid nudges, first, in different cybersecurity-related decision contexts, and second, in terms
of password creation in particular.
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9 The Influence of Nudge Interventions on Security Decisions and Password Creation
The following sections summarise two consecutive studies on the effectiveness of nudging in cybersecurity
with a focus on password creation. The first study analyses the single versus combined effect of nudging and
information provision on different types of cybersecurity decisions, including password creation. The second
study specifically applies the findings of the first study to password creation and compares differences in
password nudges based on different heuristics, biases, and norms in detail.
9.1 Comparison of Different Nudge Interventions
Figure 19: Research step 9.
Manuscript 6: Zimmermann, V., and Renaud, K. The Nudge Puzzle: Matching Nudge Interventions
to Cybersecurity Decisions. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 28, 1 (2021), 7:1-7:45.
doi:10.1145/3429888.
This section is a brief summary of Manuscript 6 ”The Nudge Puzzle: Matching Nudge Interventions to
Cybersecurity Decisions” by Zimmermann and Renaud [354]. The focus of the summary is on password
creation. For further details and findings, the reader is referred to the manuscript.
9.1.1 Background
From the discussion around the ethics of nudges primarily targeting automatic System 1 information
processing (see section 8) it was concluded that nudges should be transparent for the user. Transparency
in that sense can concern two aspects: (a) a nudge intervention can be visible so that the user is aware of
the intervention and its purpose, and (b) beyond that, a nudge can be transparent in terms of its reasons
so that the user can understand why they are being nudged towards a certain option.
In terms of the first aspect, the nudge itself can be more or less transparent following the Type 1 and Type
2 nudge differentiation by Hansen and Jespersen [123]. For example, a positioning nudge changing the
sequence of options is invisible to the user and probably goes unnoticed. Instead, transparent footprints
leading to a garbage bin [123], or an emoticon posted next to a certain option, is visible. However, in both
cases, it might not become clear for the user why they are being nudged towards a certain option.
One way to achieve this aim, and address the second aspect might be an intervention clearly targeting
System 2 information processing, a prime example of which is information provision. It is assumed that
the nudge’s transparency, and thereby its acceptance, can be increased by combining it with information
provision. That way, the nudge is supposed to encourage a secure choice while the information educates
users about why it is deemed the favourable option. Education might also support users in making better
related or subsequent decisions in which the intervention is not present. Furthermore, being informed about
the reasons for the choice, it might also be easier for users to resist the nudge should they decide to choose
another option. Yet, it remains unclear whether the inclusion of information provision would diminish the
nudge’s influence [192]. Therefore, this study analysed the single and combined impact of a nudge and
information provision as the first aspect of interest. For an easier differentiation from the hybrid nudge, a
nudge was labelled a simple nudge in this study.
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The hypotheses guiding the study were formulated as follows:
Hypothesis H1: Hybrid nudges, i.e., the combination of a simple nudge and information provision, are most
effective in encouraging secure choices, as compared to no intervention, a simple nudge, or information
provision on their own.
Hypothesis H2: Information provision and hybrid nudges are more effective in helping people to choose the
secure option in subsequent decisions where no nudge intervention is present.
As a second aspect, the single versus the combined impact of simple nudges and information provision
was analysed across four different types of decisions. One of the decisions was password creation as the
focus of this research. The type of decision was differentiated in terms of its frequency (high vs low) and
complexity (high vs low).
9.1.2 Method
In an online study conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk N = 450 people were asked to take four
cybersecurity-related decisions that included different types of nudge-related interventions. In a follow-up
study two weeks later, the participants took the same security decisions in the control condition variant to
check the long-term effects of the interventions on decision-making when the nudge intervention was not
present.
Study Design
The study design included four nudge-related intervention types and four types of decisions.
The types of interventions were a simple nudge, information provision, and a hybrid nudge following the
definitions provided in sections 7.2 and 7.3. The fourth condition was a control condition in which no
nudge-related intervention took place.
The four security decisions included the choice of a public WiFi as an example for a simple and frequent
decision, the choice to encrypt one’s smartphone storage as a simple and infrequent decision, and the choice
of a cloud service provider with numerous features as a complex and infrequent decision. Secure password
creation was classified as a frequent and complex decision, with numerous password options that among
others are influenced by the users’ knowledge, experience, time, or the effort associated with memorizing
and repeatedly typing the password.
As the focus of this chapter is on password creation, the following example details the different nudge-
related interventions in the password creation context. All password creation interventions are based on
a password meter developed by Ur et al. [313] and the respective code made available open-source. The
password meter was slightly adapted for this study.
• Control: In the control condition, a plain password entry field was shown along with the instruction
to create a password that users had not previously used.
• Simple Nudge: In the simple nudge condition, a coloured bar filling with increasing password strength
was added to the password field shown in the control condition. The feedback bar aimed to activate
the learned connection red-bad/insecure and green-good/secure.
• Information Provision: Next to the password entry field, people were provided dynamic password
guidance that changed with the user’s input. It was based on the password meter designed by Ur et
al. [313] and the NIST password recommendations [115].
• Hybrid Nudge: The hybrid nudge condition combined the simple nudge and information condition.
Thus, next to the password entry field, the participants were provided with a coloured feedback bar
filling with increasing password strength as well as dynamic password guidance. Figure 20 shows an
exemplary screenshot of the hybrid nudge condition, including the simple nudge and the dynamic
information.
Manuscript 6 only details these four different conditions, yet, for this research, two additional conditions
were analysed. Aiming to analyse whether participants were influenced by the information being static or
dynamic, the following variants were added:
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Figure 20: Screenshot of the password creation hybrid nudge condition with dynamic information based on Ur
et al. [313].
• Static Information: Next to the password entry field people were provided with a static text field with
password guidance. It was based on the password meter designed by Ur et al. [313] and the NIST
password recommendations [115]. Variations of the text were furthermore evaluated in a bachelor’s
thesis conducted by Franziska Koch [170] and co-supervised by Verena Zimmermann.
• Static Hybrid Nudge: The static hybrid nudge condition used the same static text as described in
the static information condition, combined with the coloured feedback bar described above.
The other three security decisions were designed with the following intervention types:
• WiFi Choice: Based on a study by Turland et al. [310] participants were asked to select a public
WiFi from a list of WiFis with similar names. These were either sorted by signal strength (control
condition) or by security (simple nudge). The simple nudge thus was a positioning nudge. The
information provision condition consisted of coloured security indicators next to the WiFi name,
and the hybrid nudge combined the security indicators with the sorting according to security. In all
conditions, users could click on the WiFi name to view the security details.
• Phone Encryption: Participants were asked to imagine configuring a new phone which among others
included the decision to encrypt the phone. In the control condition users were asked to either click
”yes” or ”no”. The simple nudge condition used a default nudge with ”yes” being pre-selected, and
the information condition consisted of a short text on encryption and its benefits. The hybrid nudge
combined the information text with the default nudge.
• Cloud Service Choice: In the control condition, participants were asked to choose one of three fictional
cloud service providers based on a description. Each service performed best on one of the multiple
described features while all others were held constant. The service provider descriptions were either
accompanied by a ”most popular” banner above the most secure option as a popularity nudge (simple
nudge), an information table highlighting the differences between services (information provision), or
both the banner and the information table (hybrid nudge).
Table 2 provides an overview over all conditions and interventions analysed in the study. The decision
types were varied within participants and presented in randomized order. For each decision type, users
were assigned to one type of intervention, so that they took each decision only once. The sequence of the
decision types and intervention types was drawn without replacement to balance sequential effects and to
avoid bias on either the security decisions or the kind of intervention. For example, a participant might
have been assigned to the following sequence of conditions: 1) WiFi Choice - Simple Nudge, 2) Smartphone
Encryption - Control, 3) Password Creation - Hybrid Nudge, and 4) Cloud Service Choice - Information
Provision.
Procedure
After agreeing to the informed consent form, participants were asked to imagine being in the situation
described on the following pages and to take the related decisions, e.g., having to create a new password for
a new account. After completing all four decision scenarios with one type of intervention each, participants
were asked to describe the reasons for the choices they made in an open text field.
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Table 2: Overview of the conditions and interventions tested in the study to analyse the single and joint effect
of simple nudges and information provision. Note: This is an adapted version of a table also included
in [354].
These answers were used to analyse whether people were aware of any intervention and to explore additional
factors that were deemed important for making the decision.
Afterwards, participants were asked to provide basic demographic information, their technological affinity
as well as their security knowledge and attitude using the Affinity for Technology Interaction (ATI) scale
[98], the Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) [83] and a slightly adapted version of the Human
Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) [228]. At the end of the study, participants were
asked to provide their created password again to analyse memorability. The study procedure is graphically
depicted in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Study procedure of the online study analysing the single and joint effects of nudging and information
provision in hybrid nudges. Note: Figure also included [354].
Two weeks later, the participants who had previously participated were asked to take part in a follow-
up study. The follow-up study again started with an informed consent sheet and a prompt to provide
the password created in the main study. Then, participants took the same security decisions as in the
main study in a randomized order, including the creation of a new password. The difference was that all
participants were assigned to the control conditions of all four conditions. Thus, no nudge intervention
or information was provided. After completing the security decisions, participants were again asked to
provide reasons for their choices and the newly created password.
After the follow-up study, all participants, including those that had not participated in the follow-up study,
received a message with detailed information on nudges in general and the nudges employed in the study.
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Sample
The sample of the main study consisted of N = 450 people residing in the USA. Of these, 264 identified
as male, 180 as female, and six identified as other or did not provide an answer. The age distribution was
as follows: 36.7% 18-29 years, 36% 30-39 years, 14.4% 40-49 years, 8.4% 50-59 years, and 3.8% over 60
years. Most participants were employees of various kinds (69.1%), self-employed (16.2%) or reported an
IT-related occupation (8.9%). A subset of 330 of the participants again took part in the follow-up study.
The participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and compensated with $2.50 for the main
study and $2 for the follow-up based on a 10$ per hour rate. The payment exceeded the minimum wage
suggestions of most states in the USA.
9.1.3 Results
This section will first describe the results in terms of password creation in detail before briefly summarizing
the findings with regard to the other security decisions.
To test hypothesis H1 in terms of the effectiveness of hybrid nudges, for each security decision the distri-
butions of ”secure” and ”insecure” decisions in the simple nudge, information and hybrid nudge conditions
was compared to that of the control condition without any intervention. To analyse hypothesis H2 in
terms of the educational effects of hybrid nudges and information provision the distributions of ”secure”
and ”insecure” choices in the follow-up study, where all participants were assigned to the control condition,
were compared to the results of the respective interventions the participants were assigned to in the main
study. In addition, the qualitative data provided as reasons for the participants’ choices was categorized
using an inductive, open coding approach [199].
Please note that in contrast to the other manuscripts, concrete test results are displayed for the password
creation decision in a table format as the related Manuscript 6 only contains a selection of the different
conditions analysed in terms of password creation. However, the results in terms of the three other decisions
are only summarized briefly as the manuscript already contains all results and as these decisions are not
the focus of the synopsis.
Password Creation
As the password strength score by Ur et al. [313] and password entropy were measured on an ordinal scale,
and password length was not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were conducted.
Participants who stated to have reused a password or used a password manager were excluded from the
analysis to avoid bias from results that were not influenced by the interventions. Afterwards, the groups
consisted of the following number of participants: control n = 101, simple nudge n = 105, information
static n = 36, information dynamic n = 48, hybrid nudge static n = 47, and hybrid nudge dynamic n =
54.
Comparing the results across the six conditions with Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed significant differences in
terms of password strength (H (5) = 42.52, p < .001), length (H (5) = 39.26, p < .001), and entropy (H (5)
= 45.73, p < .001).
Follow-up Mann-Whitney-U tests revealed significantly higher values in all experimental conditions as com-
pared to the control condition. Furthermore, the dynamic hybrid nudge was more effective in encouraging
strong, long and high-entropy passwords as compared to the simple nudge condition and the static informa-
tion condition. However, the differences between dynamic information provision and the dynamic hybrid
nudge were not significant. Likewise, the static and dynamic hybrid nudge did not differ significantly. The
test values for the analyses of password strength, password entropy, and password length are shown in
Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
After again excluding participants reusing a password or using a password manager in the follow-up study,
the sample size in each condition was as follows: control n = 71, simple nudge n = 72, information static
n = 35, information dynamic n = 37, hybrid nudge static n = 36, and hybrid nudge dynamic n = 44. A
comparison of the results of the follow-up study sorted by the conditions participants were assigned to in
the main study using a Kruskal-Wallis test did not reveal any significant differences between conditions.
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PW Strength Main Study PW Strength Follow-Up Study
M SD Md Comparison Z df p r M SD Md
Control 31.55 25.80 31.69 - - - - - 36.50 23.36 38.20
Simple Nudge 41.06 23.28 39.33 Control -2.80 1 .003 .20 37.29 23.60 38.06
Informations 40.60 22.66 40.42 Control -2.17 1 .030 .19 36.32 27.49 36.03
Informationd 50.38 25.42 50.96 Control -3.94 1 <.001 .32 39.38 28.34 39.33
Hybrid Nudges 52.89 28.11 53.97 Control -3.97 1 <.001 .33 35.77 26.83 34.68
Hybrid Nudged 58.27 27.72 65.25 Control -5.29 1 <.001 .44 36.63 25.79 32.35
Simple Nudge -3.71 1 <.001 .31
Informations -3.01 1 .003 .34
Informationd -1.58 1 .058 .17
Hybrid Nudges -1.06 1 .288 .11
Table 3: Descriptive values and Mann-Whitney-U test results of the password strength values, M = Mean, SD
= Standard deviation, Md = median, Z = standardized test statistic, df = degrees of freedom, p =
level of significance, r = Effect size. Note: This is an adapted version of a table also included in [354].
PW Entropy Main Study PW Entropy Follow-Up Study
M SD Md Comparison Z df p r M SD Md
Control 54.74 22.82 52.31 - - - - - 58.42 19.96 56.87
Simple Nudge 67.71 23.88 65.39 Control -4.13 1 <.001 .29 62.72 20.68 56.87
Information stat 63.17 20.52 58.85 Control -2.22 1 .027 .19 58.41 21.84 53.59
Information dyn 75.54 29.15 66.73 Control -4.51 1 <.001 .37 61.87 22.97 56.87
Hybrid Nudges 73.75 31.90 71.93 Control -4.19 1 <.001 .34 59.95 21.84 56.64
Hybrid Nudged 78.20 26.33 72.35 Control -5.44 1 <.001 .45 60.67 23.90 57.86
Simple Nudge -2.59 1 .005 .21
Informations -3.04 1 .002 .34
Informationd -1.27 1 .102 .13
Hybrid Nudges -.98 1 .327 .10
Table 4: Descriptive values and Mann-Whitney-U test results of the password entropy values, M = Mean, SD =
Standard deviation, Md = Median, Z = standardized test statistic, df = degrees of freedom, p = level
of significance, r = Effect size. Note: This is an adapted version of a table also included in [354].
There were neither differences in terms of password strength (H (5) = .637, p = .986), nor in terms of
entropy (H (5) = .981, p = .964), or length (H (5) = .961, p = .966). Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the descriptive
password strength, entropy, and length values in the main and the follow-up study.
The qualitative analysis of the reasons provided for password creation revealed that security and mem-
orability, often mentioned in combination, were the factors most often considered for password creation.
A total of 18 participants mentioned either the provided information or the colour-coded strength bar in
relation to their password creation. Yet, no obvious differences across the conditions were discernable.
In terms of memorability, the majority of participants (94.89%) was able to reproduce their created pass-
word at the end of the main study. At the beginning of the follow-up study about two weeks later the
memorability rate was reduced to 23.71%.
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PW Length Main Study PW Length Follow-Up Study
M SD Md Comparison Z df p r M SD Md
Control 9.82 3.16 9.00 - - - - - 10.11 2.93 10.00
Simple Nudge 11.18 3.39 11.00 Control -3.24 1 .001 .23 10.74 3.07 10.00
Informations 11.00 2.88 10.00 Control -2.42 1 .016 .21 10.09 3.41 9.50
Informationd 12.56 4.61 12.00 Control -4.01 1 <.001 .33 10.62 3.40 10.00
Hybrid Nudges 12.45 4.35 12.00 Control -4.09 1 <.001 .34 13.44 4.26 12
Hybrid Nudged 12.89 3.79 12.00 Control -5.07 1 <.001 .42 10.45 3.40 9.50
Simple Nudge -2.93 1 .002 .24
Informations -2.54 1 .011 .28
Informationd -1.06 1 .145 .11
Hybrid Nudges -.69 1 .489 .07
Table 5: Descriptive values and Mann-Whitney-U test results of the password length values, M = Mean, SD =
Standard deviation, Md = Median, Z = standardized test statistic, df = degrees of freedom, p = level
of significance, r = Effect size. Note: This is an adapted version of a table also included in [354].
WiFi Choice
A Chi2 test revealed significant differences in the frequency distributions of ”secure” and ”insecure” choices
across all conditions. Follow-up one-sided Chi2 goodness-of-fit tests revealed that the proportion of secure
choices was significantly higher in the simple nudge, information provision, and hybrid nudge condition
as compared to the control condition. Furthermore, the hybrid nudge was significantly more effective in
encouraging secure WiFi choice options than the simple nudge or information provision on their own.
However, after sorting the follow-up study participants into the intervention groups, they belonged to
in the main study, no significant differences across groups were revealed. The exploratory analysis of
the participants’ reasons for their choices showed that participants in the information and hybrid nudge
condition more often referred to privacy and security as a reason for their choice. Many people chose the
option on top of the list. However, the position nudge, i.e., the intervention to place the secure option on
top of the list, was not directly mentioned by the participants as such.
Phone Encryption
Across all conditions, the number of participants choosing to encrypt and rejecting to encrypt varied
significantly. Consecutive one-sided Chi2 goodness-of-fit tests revealed that all experimental conditions
were more effective in encouraging participants to choose ”encrypt” compared to the control condition.
The hybrid nudge condition was most effective overall and encouraged significantly more ”encrypt” choices
than the information condition and the simple nudge condition. An analysis of the follow-up study results
showed no significant differences between participants that belonged to different conditions in the main
study. The qualitative responses provided no indications for large differences between conditions. The
default nudge, i.e., the pre-selected ”yes”-option was never explicitly mentioned.
Cloud Service Choice
Of the cloud service providers one performed best in terms of security, one provided most data storage, and
one allowed for most installations. Comparing the participants’ cloud services choices across all conditions
with a Chi2 test revealed significant differences. Like in the other decisions, follow-up tests showed that in all
experimental conditions, the secure option was chosen significantly more often. The hybrid nudge condition
was also more effective than the information provision condition, but not the simple nudge condition. The
comparison of the frequency distributions of the follow-up study, sorted by the interventions the participants
were assigned to in the main study, did reveal significant differences. However, follow-up tests did not reveal
a clear pattern as each of the services was chosen most often in one of the conditions.
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Again, security was more often mentioned as a reason for participants’ choices in the information and
hybrid nudge condition as compared to the other two. Also, the popularity nudge was explicitly mentioned
by a third of the participants that saw the nudge.
9.1.4 Discussion & Implications
This section first interprets the results with regard to the two hypotheses before reflecting on the impli-
cations for password creation. The findings and implications should be interpreted in light of this study
being conducted in an artificial context via Amazon Mechanical Turk and with a sample that might differ
from the general public, for example in terms of age and technological affinity.
Discussion of H1: Single and Combined Effects of Nudging and Information Provision
Regarding H1, the results revealed that the hybrid nudge condition across all four security decisions was
more effective in encouraging secure choices as compared to the control condition. Furthermore, in most
cases, the hybrid nudge as a combination of a simple nudge and information provision, was also more
effective than either intervention on its own. Exceptions were found in the password creation decision and
the cloud service choice. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the hybrid nudge is at least as, and perhaps
even more effective, than a mere simple nudge or information provision. Thus, the results overall speak in
favour of H1.
The findings also have implications in terms of the nudge’s transparency: First, following the Type 1 and
Type 2 nudge differentiation [123], the colour-coded bar used in the password creation decision and the
”most popular” banner used in the cloud service choice should be transparent to the user in that they
were visible to the user. Contrary to that, the position nudge used in the WiFi choice and the pre-selected
”yes” option should be less salient as interventions. At least the exploratory findings from the qualitative
analysis supported these assumptions as the strength bar and the banner were mentioned a couple of times
as a reason for the participants’ choices and appeared to make people reflect on them. In contrast, the
position nudge and the default nudge were not explicitly mentioned.
In terms of the strength bar and the banner, two exemplary quotes illustrate the participants’ reasoning:
“I tried to make security box green, so I made an inordinately long password.” (Password
Creation, Condition Dynamic Hybrid Nudge, Main Study)
“The services were fairly similar, but I choose “Cloudy” as it was the most popular. I figure if
it’s that popular, then it must be good and reliable. If it was poor quality, then few people would
use it.” (Cloud Service Choice, Condition Hybrid Nudge, Main Study)
The findings also imply that further increasing the nudge’s transparency by adding information on why
the person is being nudged towards a certain option or how a secure choice can be supported does not
necessarily decrease the simple nudge’s effectiveness. Furthermore, the combination does not seem to
compromise the idea of nudging as envisioned by Thaler and Sunstein as Sunstein states: “there is no
opposition between education on the one hand and nudges on the other. Many nudges are educative. Even
when they are not, they can complement, and not displace, consumer education” [298, p.207].
Discussion of H2: Educational Effects of Information Provision and Hybrid Nudges
Contrary to the assumptions, H2 concerning the educational effect of information provision or hybrid nudges
cannot be confirmed. When participants in the follow-up study were clustered according to the conditions
they were assigned to, no significant differences were found across conditions. One exception is the cloud
service choice, but no clear pattern in line with or contrary to the hypothesis was found. This indicates
that the effect of the intervention does not necessarily translate to future or related interventions in which
the nudge is not present. Considering that security is only a secondary aim for users it may well be that
users care about security and are willing to make secure choices if assisted so that it does not significantly
impact their primary aim, i.e. their primary task. Yet, without the intervention, the primary task may be
the users’ focus.
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One implication might be to display the intervention every time the decision is taken. This may be useful
for decisions that are taken only once or infrequently. However, the effects of repeated exposure to the
intervention in frequent decisions are not sufficiently explored yet. In the long term, adverse side effects
such as reactance to the intervention, annoyance, or habituation may occur. For frequent decisions, it might
thus be beneficial to explore interventions that not only help users make a secure decision the first time,
but that facilitate choice for future related decisions by offering suitable options or tools. For example,
after nudging users towards and informing them about secure privacy settings, users might have the option
to make their selection a default setting for future decisions.
Implications for Password Creation
In terms of password creation, it could be shown that the dynamic hybrid nudge encouraged users to create
stronger passwords than the control condition, the simple nudge condition, and the static information
condition. Even though the difference between the hybrid information condition and the hybrid nudge
was insignificant, the descriptive values suggested that the coloured strength bar was rather helpful than
counterproductive. Furthermore, that some people referred to the intervention as a reason for their choice
is an indication for the users’ awareness of the intervention and thus, its transparency.
The comparison of static and dynamic information separately and in the hybrid nudges indicates that
dynamic information might be more suitable in supporting users even though the differences between the
two hybrid nudge variants were insignificant. Reasons might include the interactivity as such, but also the
differences in information provision resulting from it. While the static variant presented all information
and suggestions at once and might thus appear overwhelming, the dynamic information only presented
the piece of information deemed most helpful for the currently entered password based on an underlying
algorithm by Ur et al. [313]. It was further presented as a concrete and actionable suggestion. Thus,
the dynamic information might be more suitable to mitigate the factors potentially contributing to the
ineffectiveness of information provision including information overload, complexity, and a missing link to
the decision [24, 132].
Overall, the results suggest that hybrid nudges are a promising strategy to support users in creating secure
passwords without constraining the choice set and while being transparent to the user. However, this study
only analysed one particular password nudge, that is a password meter with a colour-coding nudge. From
this study, it remains unclear whether the intervention would have been equally successful, or even more
successful, using another type of nudge targeting another bias, norm, or heuristic. A comparison with the
hybrid nudge compensating stronger passwords with later password expiry in the field study is difficult.
The field study was not only conducted in another setting and with a different sample but also comprised
different information elements. Thus, the next section details a study to compare hybrid password meters
that only differ with regard to the type of nudge deployed in them.
9.2 Designing Hybrid Password Nudges for Secure and Usable Password Creation
Figure 22: Research step 10.
Manuscript 7: Zimmermann, V., Marky, K., and Renaud, K. Hybrid password meters for more se-
cure passwords - A comprehensive study of password meters and nudges. Behaviour & Information
Technology (submitted).
Based on the conclusions of the study described in the previous section 9.1, this section details an online
study on the effects of hybrid password meters based on different types of nudges on password creation.
The study is described in detail in Manuscript 7 ”Hybrid password meters for more secure passwords - A
comprehensive study of password meters and nudges” that is currently under review [352].
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This is an ‘Original Manuscript’ of an article submitted to Behaviour & Information Technology, published
by Taylor & Francis Group, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tbit20/current. The
following section is a summary thereof.
The manuscript first describes the process and results of a systematic literature review on password meters.
In line with the study described in section 9.1, the review provides indications for the assumption that
hybrid password meters are more helpful in encouraging secure password creation than ”plain” password
meters.
”Plain” password meters provide the user with some form of feedback on password strength such as a text
stating ”weak” or ”strong”. Until that point the password meter can be described as a form of, more or
less neutral, information provision.
In contrast, a hybrid password meter provides the feedback in a form that targets a certain bias or norm,
and by so doing aims to ”nudge” users towards increasing password strength. An example is provided
by password meters making use of fear appeals [318] or social comparisons [84]. The literature review
further indicates that beyond an indication of password strength, additional information on how to increase
password strength, like in the password meter developed by Ur et al. [313] and shown in Figure 20, might
be a relevant aspect in supporting users’ password creation. A hybrid password meter according to this
definition thus consists of a) information in terms of current password strength and on how to increase
password strength, and b) a feedback nudge encouraging users to increase the password strength.
The first aim of the study described in Manuscript 7 was to test the assumption that hybrid password
meters would be more effective in encouraging stronger passwords than a password meter exclusively using
a simple nudge or password information.
H1: A password meter combining information and a feedback nudge leads to increased password strength
values, increased password length, and increased password entropy than either on its own.
The second aim was to compare different hybrid password meter variants based on different types of nudges
with each other. The aspects of interest included potential differences in terms of password strength,
password memorability, and the users’ perceptions of the password meter. The latter two aspects were
especially important in order to support not only secure but also usable password creation. The resulting
research questions were formulated as follows:
How do hybrid password meters based on different feedback nudges, e.g., targeting different biases, heuris-
tics, and norms, impact:
• RQ1: password creation, that is password strength, length and entropy?
• RQ2: password memorability?
• RQ3: users’ perceptions of the password meter and password creation?
The following sections describe the design of the hybrid password meters analysed in the online study, the
results of the study, and the implications for supporting secure password creation.
9.2.1 Method
In a between-subjects online study, a slightly adapted version of the original password meter developed
by Ur et al. [313] was compared to six different hybrid password meter variants based on different types
of nudges. In addition, two control conditions that exclusively included a simple nudge or password
information served as a comparison. Across all conditions, password strength was calculated based on the
same 100-point score [313] for comparability (even though visualized differently for the users in different
conditions). Additionally, password length and password entropy were measured. The next section details
the different hybrid password meter variants before describing the procedure and sample.
Hybrid Password Meters
Overall, the variants tested in the study consisted of seven hybrid password meters and two control con-
ditions. Small exemplary screenshots of some conditions are shown in Figure 23. The original and control
conditions are depicted in the upper row and the variations of the original condition in the lower row.
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• Original - Hybrid Nudge: Building on the results of the study described in section 9.1 and as a basis
for the design of different hybrid password meter variants, the password meter developed by Ur et
al. [313] (Figure 20) was selected.
• Control - Simple Nudge: Similar to the simple nudge condition in the previous study, this control
condition only provided password strength feedback in the form of a coloured feedback bar targeted
to activate the learned connection red-bad/insecure and green-good/secure based on by Ur et al.
[313].
• Control - Information: Similar to the information condition in the previous study, this control
condition exclusively provided dynamic password information based on Ur et al. [313].
The six variants of the original hybrid password meter not only used different kinds of nudges but were
also designed considering different aspects of the password creation context. The first aspect of password
creation is the individual person creating the password with their own experiences, knowledge, and aims.
A second aspect is the password creation process itself. Like other security-related tasks, password creation
is a secondary task that users have to complete to get to their primary task such as sending an email
or browsing a social network. Finally, password creation takes place within a wider social context of
the individual that includes previous experiences and behaviours of others, other people’s advice and
suggestions, or social comparisons.
For each of the aspects, two hybrid password meter variants were designed to specifically target the person,
the password creation context, or the social context. These only differed from the original by Ur et al.
[313] in terms of the type of nudge employed and respective adaptions of the wording in the instruction
and password information.
The Person:
• (Positive) Fear Appeal Nudge: The idea of an effective fear appeal is to create both a high perceived
threat (e.g., by displaying the time needed to crack a password) as a form of motivation and high
perceived efficacy to counteract the threat (e.g., by providing actionable suggestions for improving
password security) [337]. To not induce overly negative feelings in participants based on ethical
considerations [245], the fear appeal nudge used in this study was framed positively. The participants
were informed about how much the time to crack a password increases with their changes to the
password. As a visual component, a picture of a hacker was added that became increasingly frustrated
with increasing password strength.
• Motivation Nudge: The motivation nudge aimed to encourage users to create secure passwords with-
out inducing fear. The intervention consisted of a visualization of a little runner that came closer to
the finish line with increasing password strength. The dynamic visualization was supplemented by
motivating statements such as ”Take a final leap!”.
The Password Creation Context:
• Compensation Nudge: Similar to the intervention in the field study described in section 6.2, this nudge
aimed to compensate for the additional effort of stronger password creation with a later password
expiry date. Very strong passwords with the maximum score of 100 points had no expiry date at all
following the NIST [115] suggestion to only change secure passwords if there is an indication for a
compromised account. The intervention was visualized with a picture of a little calendar in which a
date was marked later and later.
• Reciprocity Nudge: This intervention was based on the idea of compensating the increased effort
for secure password creation with ”giving” something from a technical or provider side, respectively.
The nudge highlighted the technical efforts undertaken to ensure a secure environment for password
creation and storage in a list. A little ”technical” strength bar that was already filled and green
was displayed next to the list. Participants were then asked to return the favour by contributing to
security and filling their ”password creation” strength bar as well.
The Social Context:
• Descriptive Social Norm Nudge: A descriptive norm relates to the perceptions of what the members
of a social group actually do [56]. It can especially influence behaviour when made salient to the
person [56]. This intervention thus visualized the participants’ password strength in relation to that
of an ”average user”.
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To increase salience, the strength bar also took the form of a person as a representative of the average
user and filled with increasing password strength. The design of the descriptive norm nudge was based
on the findings of a master’s thesis by Christiane Rosa [257] that has been co-supervised by Verena
Zimmermann.
• Injunctive Social Norm Nudge: In contrast to a descriptive norm that relates to actual behaviour,
an injunctive norm relates to the perceptions of desired or accepted behaviour [56]. The intervention
consisted of ten emoticons as a strength bar that ”rated” the participant’s password strength in terms
of its acceptability. The reasoning was that the weak password of one person could also endanger
other accounts in the system [145]. The design of the injunctive norm nudge was based on the findings
of a master’s thesis by Christiane Rosa [257] that has been co-supervised by Verena Zimmermann.
Procedure
The online study was conducted via the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. To avoid bias from
participants who participated in the previous study described in section 9.1, these were excluded from this
study. For a quick overview, the study procedure including screenshots of different conditions is visualized
in Figure 23.
After providing their informed consent, participants were asked to create a new, not previously used
password for a fictional, important online service. For password creation, the participants were randomly
assigned to one of the nine conditions. Afterwards, the participants were asked to rate the password
creation process, the created password, and their feelings and perceptions when using the password meter.
The items were partially inspired by the ones asked by Ur et al. [313] and the questionnaire ”AttrakDiff”
[127], but adapted and extended for the study.
Afterwards, the participants’ technological affinity (ATI, [98]), their security intention with regard to
passwords (SeBIS, [83]), and basic demographic information were collected.
Finally, participants were asked to re-enter the password they created and to state how they created and
memorized the password, e.g., whether they memorized the password or used a password manager. In a
follow-up study two weeks later, the participants were asked to reproduce their password again to check
for memorability.
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Figure 23: Study procedure of the online study analysing hybrid password meters based on different biases and
heuristics as described in Manuscript 7 that has been under review by the journal Behaviour &
Information Technology at the time of the publication of this dissertation [352]. The exemplary
screenshots show varying password scores to illustrate differences in the feedback.
Sample
The sample consisted of N = 645 people with residence in the USA. Of these, 379 identified as male, 255
as female, and two as diverse. All participants were aged 18 and older with the following distribution:
6.4% 18-24 years, 48.8% 25-34 years, 26.7% 35-44 years, 10.4% 45-54 years, 4.8% 55-64 years, and 1.6% 65
years and older. The remaining 1.4% did not provide an answer. The majority of people were employed
(71.3%), self-employed (17.8%) or college/university students (5.7%). A total of 229 participants reported
some kind of IT-related studies or occupation.
The participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and compensated with $2.50 based on a 10$
per hour rate.
9.2.2 Results
Before the analysis of H1 and R1 concerning differences in password strength, length, and entropy dif-
ferences, all participants that stated to have reused a password or used a password manager to create
the password for them were excluded leading to a sample size of N = 521. Similar to the previous study
described in section 9.1, the ordinal password strength and entropy data, and the non-normally distributed
strength data were analysed using non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests. Benjamini-Hochberg corrected
one-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests were used to follow up on significant findings.
To answer H1 and RQ1, the nine password creation conditions were compared in terms of password strength,
length, and entropy. The Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed significant differences across the nine conditions.
The highest median values for password strength, length, and entropy were produced in the motivation
nudge condition, the lowest in simple nudge condition. A first follow-up comparison concerned the original
hybrid nudge and its ”components”, the simple nudge and information condition. While the original hybrid
nudge encouraged longer and higher entropy passwords than the information condition, the differences to
the simple nudge were not significant. Further follow-up tests showed that most of the six hybrid nudge
variants were more effective in encouraging stronger, longer, and higher entropy passwords than the simple
nudge or the information condition on their own.
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In particular, the motivation, the fear appeal, the reciprocity, and the descriptive norm nudge were more
effective than the information or simple nudge on all three counts, i.e., strength, length, and entropy. The
motivation nudge was even more effective than the original hybrid password nudge. Results in terms of
the compensation and injunctive norm nudge were mixed and insignificant, respectively.
In terms of RQ2 concerning memorability, nearly all participants (94.42%) were able to reproduce their
passwords at the end of the study. After two weeks, this rate decreased to 34.83% of the people that
returned for the follow-up. Exploratory comparisons revealed that the memorability rates were lowest
for the simple nudge (21.43%) and information condition (21.21%). In contrast, memorability rates were
highest for the original hybrid nudge, the reciprocity nudge, and the compensation nudge (between 44.44
and 50%).
An analysis of the rating items to answer RQ3 concerning the users’ perceptions revealed that the hybrid
nudge variants were generally perceived very positive, e.g., as very easy, fun, intuitive and helpful. The
simple nudge was described as the least novel and informative, the information condition as least pleasant
and motivating. The original hybrid nudge was perceived as the least fun and easy. The created password
was rated best in the motivation nudge condition and worst in the simple nudge condition. Furthermore,
the participants felt especially appreciated, competent and capable using the fear appeal and compensation
nudge, and least competent and assured with the reciprocity nudge.
9.2.3 Discussion & Implications
The results at least partially confirm H1 in that four conditions of the hybrid password meter variants
were more effective in encouraging strong, long, and high entropy passwords than the simple nudge or
information condition on their own. Comparing hybrid password nudges amongst each other (R1), only
the motivation nudge was more effective than the original hybrid nudge condition. Furthermore, the
exploratory analysis in terms of R2 shows no indication for a reduced memorability but suggests higher
memorability rates for hybrid password meters.
In line with that, also the user perceptions in terms of the hybrid password meter variants (R3) were
more favourable as compared to the simple nudge and information condition. Additionally, the positive
perceptions of the (positive) fear appeal nudge indicate that, as intended, no negative feelings were induced
in the participants. Furthermore, the at least equally effective motivation nudge indicates that fear appeals
might not be a necessary prerequisite for eliciting motivation.
Aside from the differences, it seems that all password meters helped users to align their security perception
with technical security measures. The ratings in term of the motivation nudge passwords being ”best” and
those in the simple nudge condition being ”worst” were congruent with the descriptive strength values.
Overall, the findings suggest that hybrid password meters, in general, better support the creation of secure
and usable passwords as compared to the single use of information or a simple nudge. Furthermore, they
are also perceived as being more supportive by the participants.
However, no clear differences between hybrid password meters targeting either the person, the password
creation context, or the social context emerged. Thus, it seems that the combination of a) information on
password strength and password creation, and b) a nudge encouraging users to increase password strength,
is more relevant than the type of nudge used within the combination.
Finally, the results should be interpreted against a background similar to that of the previous study in
section 9.1. The study was conducted in a somewhat artificial context on Amazon Mechanical Turk for
comparability with the previous study and to control for various external influences. Aside from that, the
long-term effects of displaying a hybrid password meter frequently require further research.
The next section, the discussion, will take up and reflect on the results and the associated limitations of
all studies presented so far in more detail.
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10 Discussion and Reflection
Figure 24: Conclusion
The discussion will start with a brief summary of the main findings across all research steps presented
in this dissertation and regarding the two main research questions guiding this research. Afterwards, the
results will be interpreted in terms of their contribution and their implications for research and practice.
The next section will then reflect on the limitations associated with different methodological and content-
related aspects. An outlook on future research on hybrid password meters and beyond the context of
password creation will be provided before concluding.
10.1 Summary of Findings
This research was guided by two research aims: first, to explore the user perceptions of different forms of
authentication as described in Part A.1, and second, to support secure and usable authentication based on
the findings as detailed in Part A.2.
With regard to the first aim, this research started with an analysis and rating of authentication schemes
based on the framework developed by Bonneau et al. [34]. As a result, the rating led to the selection of ten
different authentication schemes out of five different authentication categories (e.g., knowledge-based and
biometric schemes). Together with the ”challengers” password and fingerprint authentication, the schemes
were compared in a laboratory study using interactive mock-ups of each scheme. The findings revealed
that user perceptions of the schemes varied significantly, for example, in terms of preference, perceived
usability, perceived effort, perceived security, and privacy concerns. Furthermore, while usability-related
constructs correlated with the users’ preference, security and privacy ratings did not.
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However, besides familiarity with a scheme and ease of use, perceived security and privacy concerns were
often mentioned as reasons for preferring or disliking a scheme.
Overall, passwords were rated highest in terms of preference and usability-related measures despite the
cognitive load passwords pose for users. The biometric fingerprint scheme was rated second in terms of
preference, with high usability and security ratings, but also high levels of privacy concerns.
Afterwards, an online study analysed the impact of the type of scheme and the context of use on users’
perceptions. A comparison of the knowledge-based password, biometric fingerprint, and token-based Pho-
toTAN scheme confirmed the assumed single and combined impact of scheme and context on user percep-
tions. Again, the password scheme was preferred across all contexts of use, even though the fingerprint
scheme was perceived as more secure. As in the laboratory study, the fingerprint’s high security ratings
were accompanied by high privacy concerns.
As described in the interim conclusion, a focus was set on secure and usable password creation in the second
part of this research. The reasons included not only the high levels of user preference revealed in the two
studies and their pilot studies, but also the recognition of the persistence of passwords. Given the lack of a
”silver bullet” in terms of other authentication schemes as an adequate replacement, password authentica-
tion will likely be relevant for some more time [133]. Furthermore, research showed that password security
not only depends on technical measures but very much on the human factor, that is the users’ password
creation and password handling. Current password practice, including weak and reused passwords, as well
and misconceptions in terms of password security [116, 314, 315], indicates the need for supporting users
in creating secure passwords.
The subsequent part pursuing the second aim thus started with a review of strategies for enhancing pass-
word security. The aim was to balance technical security requirements with the users’ needs. Based on
previous work and the human-centred stance taken in this research, it was decided to focus on strategies
that support the user without restricting choice or applying strict rules. As a promising, but not yet
well-researched approach in terms of password security, the concept of nudging emerged [303].
Three consecutive exploratory field studies trialled several password nudges, small changes to the password
creation interface aimed to encourage the creation of stronger passwords without enforcement and by
activating automatic cognitive processes [303]. A number of nudges that were supposed to work by priming
or by activating social comparisons and norms trialled in the first two studies did not lead to significant
improvements. However, a hybrid nudge, combining a visual nudge, the compensation of stronger passwords
with later expiry dates, and educational elements informing users about password strength in a third study,
was effective compared to the results of the second field study.
A reflection on the trialled nudges and methodology led to a detailed examination of the nudge-related
literature. This review resulted in a differentiation of the nudge from related interventions such as a code,
sludge, or information provision. Based on the field study, the combination of a nudge and information
provision was labelled a hybrid nudge. Furthermore, guidelines for the ethical deployment of nudges were
derived from a discussion of arguments for and against nudging. The transparency of nudges to the user
was found to be an important aspect of their ethical deployment. First, nudges themselves can be designed
to be more or less visible to the user in terms of informing them about their existence and purpose [123].
Second, the combination of a nudge targeting automatic cognitive processes with information provision
targeting reflective reasoning might further contribute to the nudge’s transparency.
Therefore, an online study tested the single and joint effects of nudging on different cybersecurity-related
decisions, including password creation. It was found that across all decisions, the hybrid nudge was at
least as or even more effective in encouraging secure choices as compared to the individual deployment
of a nudge or information provision. However, assumed educational effects of information provision on
future decisions in which the nudge is absent could not be confirmed. In terms of password creation, in
particular, the hybrid nudge was more effective than the exclusive use of a nudge, i.e., a colour-coded
strength bar, or the use of static information. Yet, the hybrid nudge was not more effective than dynamic
textual information as a variant of information provision.
As the online study only analysed one type of (hybrid) nudge within a password meter, another study was
conducted to analyse potential differences in password creation based on nudges targeting different types
of biases and heuristics. Another focus was on the usability of hybrid nudges.
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Thus memorability and user perceptions were considered as well. The hybrid password nudge analysed in
the previous study was compared to six hybrid nudge variations that only differed in terms of the nudges
included. The study furthermore included two control conditions, an exclusive nudge and an exclusive
information condition.
The results revealed that the hybrid nudges, for the most part, were more effective in encouraging secure
passwords as compared to the control conditions. Furthermore, there were no indications for decreased but
rather increased memorability rates.
Also, the subjective user perceptions were more favourable with regard to the hybrid nudges. However,
with one exception, no significant differences could be found between the different hybrid nudge variants.
The implications and the contribution of these findings will be discussed in the next section.
10.2 Implications & Contribution
The results of this research have implications across the different research steps. This section thus reviews
the contribution and implications of the research steps in chronological order as presented in this research.
10.2.1 Rating of Authentication Schemes
The rating of authentication schemes was conducted according to an established framework by Bonneau
et al. [34] and a refinement proposed by Mayer et al. [197]. The rating results have been implemented in
ACCESS, a publicly available authentication choice support platform 1 [198, 247]. This research contributed
to the platform by extending its database by 40 additional schemes to a total of 85 included schemes. By
so doing, researchers and practitioners can profit from the rating results when selecting an authentication
scheme for their own purpose. Furthermore, ACCESS includes a discussion module that allows other
researchers and practitioners to extend the database further or to suggest changes or updates to already
included schemes. Given some of the rating challenges presented in the limitations section 10.3, this option
might further enhance the quality and actuality of the rating results.
With regard to the next research step, the rating results of the objective usability, deployability, and
security features revealed that despite adding 40 schemes to the database, no easy replacement for the
password scheme exists. Given the advantages and disadvantages of different schemes in different aspects,
the ”best” option depends on the individual prioritization of features, and sometimes also on the concrete
implementation of the scheme. Considering user perceptions in the next research step was thus deemed
relevant to shine light on the seemingly intractable issue.
10.2.2 Studies on User Perceptions of Authentication Schemes
The laboratory study compared authentication schemes in terms of subjective user perceptions. It con-
tributes to the existing literature in that a large number of schemes across multiple authentication categories
was analysed in terms of actual as compared to hypothesized interaction. So far, subjective user perceptions
of authentication schemes have been studied less frequently than technical aspects and often in the form of
surveys (e.g., [23, 101, 152]) or focus groups asking users to imagine the interaction with the scheme (e.g.,
[81]).
In terms of the results, the study contributes by shining light on differences in the users’ perceptions and
potential reasons for them. For example, the finding that users prefer password authentication despite
its downsides in terms of cognitive load is surprising, but reasonable considering the reasons provided
by the participants. These included high familiarity with the scheme, ease of use, and speed, especially
compared with other partially very complex schemes. Like in other studies, fingerprint authentication
scored high in terms of usability and especially security [23, 81, 139]. That is was not preferred over
password authentication may be due to the high level of privacy concerns, some participants reporting
experience with the scheme only in certain contexts, and about 40% of the participants having no previous
experience with biometrics. Thus, the results imply that familiarity or experience with a scheme and the
context of use might impact its perception.
1 available from: https://access.secuso.org/
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In addition, the combination of the quantitative and qualitative results from this study led to the assump-
tion of a security-privacy trade-off in authentication schemes that may lead some people to reject providing
their personal information for biometric schemes even though perceived as very secure. Furthermore, the
lack of correlation between security or privacy and preference indicates that the two constructs may also
be weighed up with other aspects when users are indicating their preference.
An explanation for this might be that security and privacy are complex constructs that are often invisible
to the user. The potential inability to estimate the security and privacy of a scheme might result in giving
more weight to other factors such as usability. This has two important implications: First, some kind of
security-privacy trade-off is assumed that should be further analysed in future work.
Second, in terms of interface design, security and privacy should be made visible and easily graspable for
users. That way, it could be adequately considered in the users’ decision process, and potential adverse
effects resulting from misconceptions [140] could be reduced. One approach to achieve this is the ”security
theatre” suggested by Schneier [268] that, correctly used, can contribute to aligning the security perception
with the technical security level.
Based on the implications of the laboratory study, an additional online study was conducted to shine
light on the assumed security-privacy trade-off, the influence of familiarity, and the context of use on
user perceptions. The findings confirmed the previous result that biometric fingerprint authentication was
deemed most secure, but less preferred than password authentication, perhaps due to the high level of
privacy concerns. This also became visible in the ambiguous distribution of preference ratings in terms
of fingerprint authentication. Furthermore, while preference ratings varied across contexts of use, security
and privacy perceptions were only related to the scheme. This provides another indication for security and
privacy somehow being traded-off with other factors such as usability-related measures that might be easier
to include in the decision from a user perspective. Furthermore, even though indications for the impact of
familiarity were visible, these could not be confirmed statistically, perhaps due to methodological aspects.
Overall, the implications of the online study confirm and mirror that of the laboratory study: First, user
perceptions that differ across schemes and contexts should be considered as a relevant factor influencing
acceptance and ultimately security. Second, the potential influence of familiarity on user preference of au-
thentication schemes should be further analysed along with the assumed security-privacy trade-off. Third,
the call for including usable security and privacy information in the interface design so that it can be
considered in users’ decision process needs to be repeated.
10.2.3 Field Studies on Password Nudges
Two field studies trialling several password nudges show that not any nudge works just anywhere but that
the consideration of the context and the choice is highly relevant. Aside from the limited variance in the
results because of the chosen strength measure, the insignificant findings may well have context-related
reasons. Most of the trialled nudges did not provide users with an indication of password strength but
just encouraged ”stronger” passwords. Even if picked upon by the participants, there might have been
uncertainty about whether that aim was accomplished. This might be especially relevant in complex and
multi-faceted decisions like password creation where it might not be clear what the ”right” choice users are
nudged towards actually is.
The certainty provided by the nudge in a third field study might thus have been one of the reasons for its
positive outcome as compared to the other nudges. It provided feedback in terms of password strength in
a graspable format, that is a later expiry date for a stronger password.
Thus, the findings imply that the context and decision type should be carefully analysed before deploying
a nudge. In line with that, Caraban et al. [46] and Brown [41] agree that nudges are not ”one-size-fits-all”
solutions but that the effectiveness of nudges is largely influenced by their fit with the users, their goals,
and the aspects of the decision context. Likewise, Lindhout and Reniers [184] suggest to first analyse the
situation at hand and the individual behaviour within the situation before selecting or designing a nudge.
The field studies also had implications for the nudge concept that appeared not as clear-cut as initially
thought. The implications thereof are described in the next section.
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10.2.4 The Concept of Nudging
When reflecting on the nudges trialled in the field study, ambiguity in terms of what actually counts as a
nudge arose. For example, priming users with a change of wording from ”password” to ”secret” to encourage
stronger passwords seemed to comply with the original definition provided by Thaler and Sunstein [303].
This includes ”any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” [303, p.6].
Furthermore, nudges usually make use of automatic cognitive processes [43, 122, 129] associated with
System 1 according to Dual Process Theories [88, 156, 285, 290].
Yet, what about making users reflect on their password strength as tested in another nudge variation?
Does reflection, associated with System 2 information processing, still count as a nudge? And what about
compensation in the form of later expiry?
Can the compensation be considered a ”significant” incentive exceeding the definition? This uncertainty
also became visible in the nudge debate and led to some variations of the original definition as, e.g.,
proposed by Hansen [122] or Calo [43]. Some researchers even questioned the novelty of the concept when
compared to information provision [122] and stated that many existing interventions could retrospectively
be labelled as nudges [192].
As an implication of this ambiguity, in this research, an extensive literature review was conducted. It
led to an adaption of the definition of the nudge and its differentiation from related interventions such
as information provision. Even though probably not perfectly clear-cut across all cases either, the dif-
ferentiation supported the analysis of the single and joint effects of nudging and information provision
without mixing the two beforehand. The definition also allowed for a differentiated analysis of the ethical
considerations in terms of nudging. The contribution of this research step does not only lie in a summary
of arguments for and against nudging, but also in transferring these arguments to ethical principles guiding
psychological research inspired by a similar procedure used by McMillan, Morrison and Chalmers [202].
These not only contributed to the design of the nudges used in the following research steps, especially
regarding transparency, but may also provide a valuable aid for other researchers. They may use the dif-
ferentiation of the concepts and the discussion of their ethical considerations to evaluate interventions they
intend to use. They may furthermore benefit from the ethical checklist providing first aid for conducting
nudge-related research. Sharing the insights with the research community might also encourage feedback
from other researchers and contribute to further improvements in terms of the nudge’s classification or
ethical guidelines.
10.2.5 Online Studies on Hybrid Password Nudges
Both online studies provided indications that the hybrid nudge as a combination of a nudge and information
provision is at least as, and sometimes even more effective than either intervention on its own. Even
though based on a selection, this could be shown across different cybersecurity decisions in general and
for password creation in particular. Furthermore, the hybrid nudges were preferred over exclusive single
nudge or information interventions from a user perspective and did not seem to impact memorability of
the created passwords negatively. The mainly insignificant differences between the hybrid nudge variants
in the second online study indicate that the combination of a carefully selected nudge and information
provision as such might be more important than its individual nudge components.
Taken together, hybrid password nudges appear to be a promising approach for supporting secure as well
as usable password creation. However, across all implications, it has to be acknowledged that the studies
so far analysed individual password creation in a somewhat artificial online context even though research
suggests that the results might be comparable to actual password creation [92, 171, 200]. The field studies
exploring the application of (hybrid) nudges ”in the wild” are relevant in this regard but took place at an
early stage of this research so that the results are not directly comparable. Further research is thus required
to evaluate the generalisability to multiple real-life accounts. This and other limitations are discussed in
section 10.3. Directions for future research to address the discussed aspects are explored in section 10.4.1.
Within the broader authentication context of this research, the promising results in terms of hybrid nudges
indicate that their use might also be suitable in other authentication schemes. As suggested by Senarath,
Arachchilage, and Gupta [277], hybrid nudges could also be applied for encouraging stronger answers in
personal questions as a fallback mechanism.
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Furthermore, the literature review on password meters also revealed indications for their applicability to
graphical schemes such as Android Unlock Patterns [288, 294]. Future work should thus consider the use
of hybrid nudges for encouraging secure and usable authentication across different schemes.
Furthermore, the findings have implications regarding the nudge and its transparency: First, the findings
imply that information provision does not necessarily diminish the nudge’s effectiveness.
In line with that, also Kroese, Marchiori, and de Ridder [173] found that the combination of a nudge and
information provision did not decrease the effectiveness of the intervention when they combined a nudge
encouraging healthy food choices with a sign informing about this intention.
Second, the inclusion of information appears favourable in terms of ethical considerations. As information
provision is supposed to target System 2 information processing, it may enhance users’ awareness of the
intervention. This may be especially true in combination with transparent Type 2 nudges. Initial support
for this assumption is provided by some participants in the first online study specifically mentioning the
nudge intervention as a reason for their decision.
Yet, the information provided in the two online studies provided reasons for encouraging the secure decision
and support to decide securely but did not explicitly inform about the nudge. Thus, especially in the case
of the invisible Type 1 nudges, users might still have been unaware of this intervention component. Future
studies should thus trial more explicit information with regard to the nudge and potentially move towards
more transparent Type 2 nudges.
That the hoped for educational and long-term effects of the included information could not be confirmed,
has several implications: On the one hand, it suggests that the intervention should always be present to
exert its influence. On the other hand, repeated exposure to the intervention in the case of relatively
frequent decisions such as password creation may lead to habituation or annoyance. Thus, future research
should first analyse the long-term effects of repeated exposure to (hybrid) nudges and second, explore
ways to decrease user effort in the long-term. One possibility would be to provide users with the option
to make storing the created password in a password manager a default setting after creating a long and
secure password with the hybrid nudge for the first time. This way, the cognitive load and the potential
number of password resets may be reduced in the long-term and also across multiple accounts. This is also
discussed in section 10.4.1, along with other directions for future research.
10.3 Reflection & Limitations
The reflection on this research can be broadly divided into methodological and content-related considera-
tions. Thus, this section will first reflect on the different methodologies and study designs before discussing
authentication- and password-related aspects.
10.3.1 Methodological Considerations
Overall, this research included literature-based approaches and empirical studies involving users. These
will be detailed in the following.
Literature-based approaches
The literature-based approaches in this research included the analysis and rating of authentication schemes
in Manuscript 1, a discussion and reflection on the ethical deployment of nudging in Manuscript 5, a
systematic literature review on password meters in Manuscript 7, and a problematization approach used
in Manuscript 8.
Rating of Authentication Schemes. The analysis and rating of authentication schemes in Manuscript
1 formed the basis for the selection of authentication schemes for the next research steps. However,
it was not without challenges and limitations: First of all, the underlying literature analysis does not
claim completeness. As the focus of the analysis was on user-centred authentication, especially technical
authentication approaches might not be included in the rating. Furthermore, the rating process as such
posed several challenges. Based on their different maturity levels and spread, some schemes were only
described in a single paper and as a concept. Others were described across multiple papers with detailed,
but also varying descriptions. In the first case, some assumptions for the rating had to be logically derived
from the concepts. In the second case, one description out of many had to be selected.
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Next, the authentication landscape is dynamically evolving. It is thus possible that some schemes advanced
since the rating, while others might become outdated. Moreover, some rating criteria were not clear-cut. For
example, the sub-feature ”negligible-cost-per-user” may depend on whether the costs per user or stationary
access point are considered. These challenges were addressed by having a team of researchers rate and
discuss the authentication schemes and applying consistent criteria in ambiguous cases.
Examination of the Nudge Concept. The relevance of the extended examination of the nudge-related
literature in Manuscript 5 emerged from the reflection on the insignificant results in the field studies on
password nudges (see section 6.2). It became clear that a deeper understanding of the nudge concept and
its implications was necessary to differentiate the nudge from related interventions and to design nudges in
line with ethical considerations. The literature review included various perspectives and disciplines, such
as economics, philosophy, psychology, and medicine. Still, there are limitations to this approach. First, the
reviewed arguments for and against nudging, and thus the resulting implications, might not be exhaustive.
Second, the ethical principles are formulated in a rather generic way to support understandability and
applicability.
Thus, they may not account for the complexity of certain situations or special characteristics of people.
For example, on the one hand, deviations from the guidelines, e.g., in that people are only informed about
the nudge after the intervention, may be justified in some cases. On the other hand, people with certain
disabilities or mental issues might require special care and perhaps a stricter application of the guidelines.
Systematic Literature Review. In contrast to the two examples mentioned before, the systematic literature
review on password meters in Manuscript 7 exhaustively included all publications across a number of
relevant journals and conferences that included certain search terms and fulfilled certain criteria. Besides,
a forward and backward search of all included publications was conducted. Despite these measures, it may
be that relevant articles using other terms or published at other venues were not identified. The publications
were used to compare the study designs, password meters and their results in terms of the question ”what
makes effective password meters?”. This provided valuable insights into the factors that might positively
affect password creation. However, due to differences between studies and contexts, and also sometimes
short or partially ambiguous descriptions, no ”evidence” could be derived from the comparison. Thus, to
analyse the derived assumptions further, an additional study controlling for differences was necessary, as
described in Manuscript 7.
Problematization Approach. Manuscript 8 that is described in more detail in the outlook section 10.4, made
use of a problematization approach. Introduced by Bacchi [18, 19], the approach is based on the idea that
in any discipline measures and solutions are developed based on what is considered to be ”the problem”.
Identifying the ”problem” and questioning the underlying assumptions can lead to new perspectives, and
thus may open the room for alternative measures and solutions. In this research, the approach has been
used to identify what is considered to be the problem in the cybersecurity area. To do so, a number of
industry reports, policy documents, and hacker reports have been analysed. Even though the selection
of publications has been made based on relevance, it remains a selection. The inclusion of additional
publications may have led to a different set of ”problematizations” or differences in the weighting of dif-
ferent aspects. Furthermore, even though two researchers were involved, the analysis includes a subjective
element that may have influenced the results.
Empirical User Studies
This dissertation included three general types of empirical user studies: a) a laboratory study as described
in Manuscript 2, b) online studies conducted via online survey platforms in Manuscript 3, 6, and 7, and
c) field studies as described in Manuscript 4. The studies often combined quantitative data in the form
or ratings or decisions with qualitative data such as open answers or short follow-up interviews. Each of
these study types has certain advantages and limitations. According to McGrath [201], selecting a study
design is subject to consideration as it is impossible to maximise generalisability, precision, and realism at
the same time.
Laboratory Study. The laboratory study in Manuscript 2 ensured the same setup and devices for all
participants. The development of interactive HTML-Mock-Ups to simulate the selected authentication
schemes also allowed to control for differences in the design, brand, or maturity levels of the schemes. It
furthermore allowed for protecting the participants’ privacy as no personal information had to be stored
or shared with a third party. In that, precision and control for external influences were high.
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A certain degree of realism was created by having interactive mock-ups that responded to the participants’
input and by the inclusion of realistic email tasks for which participants authenticated. Yet, the sample
consisted of a relatively small and homogeneous group of psychology (in IT) students. The majority of the
N = 41 participants was female with most being in their early twenties. Thus, the results of the study
only have limited generalisability.
Online Studies. Contrary to that, the samples were larger and more heterogeneous in the online studies
conducted via the online survey platforms Clickworker or Amazon Mechanical Turk. The participants were
more evenly distributed across gender and age and had various occupations. This might contribute to the
generalisability of the findings.
Nevertheless, research showed that people who are registered with survey platforms such as Amazon Me-
chanical Turk might be biased in terms of age, education, or experience with certain types of studies [226].
It also has to be noted that the participants were financially compensated for their participation.
In terms of precision, the online study set-up allowed to control for some variables, such as for the stimuli
used, their order, the type of device used, and partially for the participants’ attention via attention check
items. Still, the environment was less controlled compared to the laboratory study.
It was not possible, for example, to check whether the participants completed the study on their own or
whether they were distracted by other tasks or people. The realism of the study might be similar to that
of a laboratory study in that the tasks were somewhat artificial. For example, two of the password nudge
studies (Manuscript 6 and 7) asked participants to role-play a certain scenario. This might impact the
external validity of the findings even though previous research has shown passwords that were created
in these kinds of role-playing tasks to be rather representative for actual password creation for real-life
accounts [92, 171, 200].
Field Studies. The field studies score highest in terms of realism. The students’ real university account
with their actual and relevant passwords was used to test the effectiveness of different password nudges.
Furthermore, the study did not consist of one-time interventions, but the interventions were integrated
in the system for an academic year. For ethical reasons, the only ”deduction” in terms of realism was
that users were informed about the study beforehand and could freely decide to participate or to reject.
However, the high level of realism was accompanied by some downsides. Based on ethical considerations
and system restrictions, it was not possible to collect certain demographic or control variables or to have
participants rate the interventions. This would have been highly beneficial for understanding why some
interventions were not successful. Furthermore, the lack of an adequate control group in the third study
led to a provisional but not ideal comparison with the previous study’s results. The generalisability of the
study was probably higher than that of the laboratory study due to the much larger sample size and the
increased realism of the task. However, it was also limited because only students of one university with a
major in computer science were studied.
Finally, reflecting on the insignificant findings of the field studies, it might have been beneficial to first
test password nudges and related interventions in a more controlled setting before transferring the promis-
ing interventions to realistic field settings. Still, taking the opportunity at the time it arose also had an
important learning effect. The insignificant findings led to an in-depth reflection and an extended exami-
nation of the literature that encouraged a new line of research, as described in Manuscripts 5, 6, and 7. It
furthermore resulted in improvements to the methodological setup and a more clear-cut definition of the
nudge.
Besides the study designs in general, the samples and the applied password strength measures require
further consideration.
Samples. The two studies conducted to address the first research aim in terms of user perceptions of
authentication schemes were conducted with German samples. In contrast, the studies to address the second
research aim involved English-speaking samples. The change happened for two reasons: First, studies
concerning password nudges and especially password meters have often been conducted with English-
speaking samples. For example, the password meter by Ur et al. [313] that part of this research builds on,
was developed and tested with an English-speaking sample. For the purpose of comparability with previous
findings, and because the password meter was based on English dictionaries, an English-speaking sample
was selected. Second, a research cooperation with an English-speaking professor has been established
during the second phase of this research. The use of English as scientific language facilitated the exchange
about the study designs, stimuli and results, and their inclusion in joint publications.
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Password Strength Measures. The measures to analyse password strength first included a 5-point score
metric based on the zxcvbn password strength estimator [331]. After realizing that the score considerably
constrained the variance of the results as described in section 6.2, other measures were sought.
As different measures are currently used to estimate password strength as visible in the literature review in
Manuscript 7, it was decided to include multiple measures. First, the length of a password is an important
contributor to its strength [115, 163, 171, 237]. Second, password entropy, as introduced by Shannon [278],
is a measure for the password’s complexity or unpredictability. Third, the 100-point password strength
score by Ur et al. [313] was used for comparability with other studies and is based on a number of heuristics
and calculated from the number of guesses an attacker would need to crack the password. Even though
the measures partially influence one another, e.g., length contributes to entropy as well as the 100-point
score, the measures were applied in parallel to be able to detect and discuss variations in the results.
10.3.2 Content-related Considerations
The content-related considerations concern the interdisciplinary nature and the human-centred focus of
this research as well as aspects of password creation.
Interdisciplinary Research. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this research, it included not only psy-
chological constructs, methodologies, and research questions, but also approaches from other areas such as
the rating framework for authentication schemes developed by Bonneau et al. [34] or the problematization
approach by Bacchi [18, 19]. Furthermore, with regard to the computer science aspect of this research,
an intense preoccupation with the technological foundations of authentication and password security took
place. However, this research was primarily conducted from a psychological rather than a computer science
perspective. While technical security was always considered, for example, in the rating framework and in
terms of password strength, the focus of this research was on human-centred security and human percep-
tions of security. Instead of aiming for ”maximum” security from a technological perspective, the aim was
to understand user perceptions of security, to support users in increasing password strength, and to align
perceptions of security with technological measures. However, a better understanding of the human factor
in security may also contribute to a better understanding of the complex and multi-faceted construct of
security overall.
Password Creation. The second part of this research focused on supporting secure and usable password
creation with the help of (hybrid) nudges. This human-centred approach did not constrain the user in their
choice of passwords. No requirements were enforced. While it could be shown that this approach fostered
secure password creation overall, it would also allow for very short or very weak passwords. Still, some
real-life accounts holding sensitive information, or organisational accounts with extensive access rights,
might require a certain minimum password strength. Furthermore, in some cases, there might be legal
requirements in terms of authentication as, e.g., detailed in the European Payment Services Directive
(PSD2) [62] for banking services. Thus, even though the idea that all users voluntarily increase their
password strength above a certain level when adequately supported is desirable, some real-life accounts
might need to enforce a minimum length or minimum strength level. However, this does not exclude
the use of hybrid password nudges. They might provide feedback to the user in terms of the minimum
requirements before trying to encourage even stronger security levels beyond that point.
Furthermore, this research so far focused on individual password creation as it was necessary first to
understand the nudge concept and the mechanisms underlying nudging. However, as already acknowledged
in the introduction and as found in the online study in Manuscript 3, the context is a relevant aspect
for understanding users’ choices and perceptions. Users authenticate for many accounts with varying
sensitivity. Even though this research showed that hybrid password nudges or hybrid password meters
might be beneficial for supporting secure password creation in individual accounts, this effect might not
transfer to the many real-life accounts to the same extent. While creating and memorizing a few strong
passwords might be possible, it is unfeasible on a large scale. One limitation of this research is that the
effects of the interventions across accounts or in the long-term have not yet been researched. Therefore,
the next section provides some promising ideas for addressing the scalability and memorability aspect, e.g.,
by integrating hybrid nudges into tools that work across multiple accounts.
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10.4 Outlook & Future Work
This section first provides an outlook in terms of future work on password creation and hybrid password
nudges across multiple accounts. Second, the potential future application of the findings beyond the context
of password creation to a human-centred cybersecurity approach labelled ”Cybersecurity, Differently” is
presented.
10.4.1 Considering the Password Creation Context
As already acknowledged in the introduction, users have to manage numerous accounts and associated
passwords. Still, security or password advice is often presented without any contextual acknowledgement
of the significance and quantity of accounts [293]. So far, also this research focused on individual passwords
as a starting point.
Hybrid password nudges or password meters may well support creating secure passwords for an individual
account without compromising memorability. However, the interventions did not yet address the memo-
rability issue per se, nor did they consider password creation and reuse across accounts. In this regard,
related work points towards at least three paths that might work well in combination with hybrid password
meters:
The first is password managers that aim to lessen the cognitive effort for memorizing passwords by storing
them securely in a password ”vault”. As discussed in section 5.2.2, password managers require users only to
memorize one strong master password that protects access to all the others. Hybrid password meters could
be implemented to guide users towards a very secure master password. Furthermore, a hybrid password
meter might also be implemented within the password manager for cases in which the password manager
does not offer an automated password generator, or in which users prefer generating passwords themselves
over system-generated random passwords. This is especially relevant given the findings of Pearman et al.
[230] and Lyastani et al. [186] who showed that using a password manager does not increase password
strength per se. They showed that the influence on password strength depends on the users’ strategies and
their reliance on technical password-generating tools provided in the password manager.
The other way round, a hybrid password meter could also be used to ”nudge” users towards making use of
a password manager in the long-term. Considering the uncertain and perhaps adverse effects of frequent
exposure to hybrid password meters as discussed in sections 9.1.4 and 10.2, a hybrid password meter could
include a link to a password manager. After creating a strong password with a hybrid password meter
for the first time, the user could choose to make storing the created password in a password manager a
default setting in order to reduce cognitive load. The user might further have the option to completely
switch from self-created to computer-generated and stored passwords in the future. This would be in line
with the idea discussed in section 9.1.4 to not only help users to make a secure decision the first time but
to facilitate choice for future related decisions by offering suitable options or tools.
The second path concerns password feedback mechanisms that consider password strength and similarity
across different user accounts. One such promising example is provided by Kim et al. [167]: In a dashboard,
the users’ passwords are rated against each other while considering password similarity and the sensitivity
of certain accounts. The same password used for the banking account and a newsletter would be visually
grouped to make users aware of the similarity. It would also be rated differently in terms of strength,
i.e., as weaker for the more sensitive banking account. It might be helpful to integrate a hybrid password
meter into the dashboard to support strong password creation when users decide to change a password to
increase their overall strength score.
The third path includes portfolio approaches that acknowledge that completely ruling out weak passwords
and reuse are unrealistic, given the number of accounts that users manage [96]. Instead, Florencio, Herley,
and van Oorshot [96] suggest to consider realistic attack scenarios and to find suitable compromises in
terms of risks and effort. For example, the authors present some principles, including the grouping of
accounts for password reuse. In line with that, Zhang-Kennedy, Chiasson, and van Oorshot [345] reviewed
and updated wide-spread password advice to facilitate realistic human management of passwords. For
example, they suggest to strategically reuse passwords to match the account value or to keep written
passwords hidden instead of completely arguing against writing passwords down. In this context, hybrid
password nudges or hybrid password meters could be used to support the creation of passwords for very
sensitive accounts. However, they might not be used when creating passwords for non-sensitive accounts.
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These considerations are mirrored by the concept of ”Equitable Security” [241]. It suggests to not deploy
nudges for just everything, but to consider increased costs and effort.
10.4.2 Cybersecurity, Differently
This section first describes the authentication-related insights that inspired a new viewpoint on cybersecu-
rity. Second, the resulting ”Cybersecurity, Differently” approach described in Manuscript 8 is summarized.
From Password Creation to Cybersecurity
In as early as 1987 Paans and Herschberg acknowledged ”It seems sensible to consider the user, for a
change, as an adult partner and to accept that he has certain responsibilities of his own when using the
system. One of those responsibilities definitely is the control of his own password.” [224, p.409].
Even though studies on the generalisability to real-life accounts are yet to be conducted, the findings of
this research indicate that users might well be able to live up to that responsibility. Although the hybrid
password nudges did not constrain the users in their password choices, they encouraged stronger password
creation voluntarily.
For this potential to unfold, it was found important to consider several aspects: Users likely create weak
passwords or reuse passwords not because they do not want to protect their data but to cope with the
cognitive load posed by multiple passwords [94, 293], misconceptions in terms of technical security measures
[275, 314, 315], and security being a secondary rather than a primary aim [332]. Understanding the user’s
aims, the context of the task, and the implications of deployed measures thus seems highly relevant to
enable users to contribute to success. In line with that, this authentication-related research revealed the
importance of considering, e.g., potential security-privacy trade-offs (Manuscript 2), the sensitivity of the
account type (Manuscript 3), the increased effort associated with stronger passwords (Manuscript 4), the
ethical implications of nudging (Manuscript 5), or the relevance of feedback for aligning perceptions with
technical security measures (Manuscript 6 and 7).
Comparisons with more constraining measures such as password policies further indicate that these do
not necessarily lead to stronger passwords than the use of password meters [171, 175, 313], even when
the meter enforces no minimum requirements [338]. Furthermore, like all strategies, password policies are
accompanied by their own disadvantages, including the creation of predictable password patterns [237] or
usability issues [142].
Thus, overall, it seems that providing users with flexibility and suitable support is a promising approach
for enabling users to be ”the first line of defense” [128, p.20]. The next section describes how these insights
may be of relevance beyond the context of authentication and password creation.
Summary of ”Cybersecurity, Differently”
...
Figure 25: Research Step 11.
Manuscript 8: Zimmermann, V., and Renaud, K. Moving from a ‘human-as-problem” to a ‘human-as-
solution” cybersecurity mindset. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 131 (2019), 169–187.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2019.05.005.
This section is a brief summary of Manuscript 8 ”Moving from a ‘human-as-problem” to a ‘human-as-
solution” cybersecurity mindset” by Zimmermann and Renaud [353] that details the findings of applying
a ”problematization approach” [18, 19] to the area of cybersecurity. In the following, the problematiza-
tion approach is briefly described before summarizing its outcome and the main guidelines derived from
questioning underlying assumptions.
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According to Bacchi [18, 19], in different areas, the assumption about what the ”problem” is, informs the
measures and solutions to address the problem. For example, if a crime was viewed to be caused by poverty,
measures might be directed at changing the circumstances. However, if a crime was assumed to be caused
by a person’s behaviour, measures might be developed to constrain or change the behaviour.
A mismatch might occur if the assumptions are incomplete, outdated, or not based on evidence. It is
thus important to reveal and question the underlying assumptions. This can be done via ”problematizing”
using the ”What’s the problem represented to be” (WPR) approach [18] that has been originally applied
to feminist theory and critical policy studies.
The research aimed to analyse what the ”problem” in cybersecurity is considered to be, to question the
assumptions, and, if applicable, to suggest alternative viewpoints to the problem. To do so, a slightly
adapted version of the original approach by Bacchi [18] was conducted. The six process steps are graphically
depicted in Figure 26 and summarized below.
Figure 26: Graphical depiction of the problematization approach and the ”Cybersecurity, Differently” principles
derived thereof, adapted from [353].
What is the problem? To uncover the ”problem” in the cybersecurity area, a selection of governmental
policy documents, security reports from industry and research, as well as some interviews with and reports
about hackers have been analysed using an open coding approach.
A code was assigned whenever a) a specific cybersecurity problem, b) a measure, or c) a strategic aim was
mentioned. For example, the notion ”lack of clarity around who exactly is responsible” in the Cisco security
report [58, p.24] was coded as a cybersecurity problem. The notion “it is vital we place a strong focus on
securing our information systems and building the skills” in the New Zealand strategy document [213, p.2]
was coded as strategic aim.
After coding all documents, the codes were clustered into 18 ”problem” categories by two researchers. These
could be further summarized into eight problems concerning the individual and ten problems concerning
the societal level. On the individual level, these, for example, included a lack of cybersecurity awareness,
knowledge and skills (Problem 1), or people not following security best practices (Problem 4). On the
societal level, a lack of global communication and collaboration (Problem 12), or the inability to defend
against and respond to cybersecurity threats (Problem 13) were identified.
Overall, the process revealed that the human actor in various roles, either explicitly or implicitly, has
often been considered a ”problem” in cybersecurity. This concerns, for example, developers who create
and maintain security technologies, policymakers who develop security standards, and end-users who use
security technologies for various purposes. Thus, this first research step revealed a ”human-as-problem”
viewpoint.
What effects are produced? Like in the previous step, the codings from the document analysis were used
to reveal the measures designed to deal with the ”problem”, i.e., the human actor.
The analysis revealed that to identify the problem or responsible person, and to prevent future adverse
events, often root cause analyses are conducted in the aftermath of an adverse event. They rely on the
assumption that adverse events can be traced back to single components within the socio-technical system.
74
The measures to deal with the ”human-as-problem” assumption could be clustered into three major groups:
(1) exclude the human actor from the socio-technical system, e.g., by use of automation, (2) educate and
train the human actor, e.g., with regular training or use of manuals, and (3) control and constrain the
users, e.g., by using security policies.
What assumptions have been made? For each of the measures supposed to deal with the ”human-as-
problem” perspective, the underlying assumptions were derived. For example, the measure to educate and
train people is based on the assumption that human actors lack sufficient awareness, knowledge, and the
ability to act securely.
All assumptions taken together form the current viewpoint on the cybersecurity problem, labelled ”Cyber-
security, Currently”. It is based on the assumption that socio-technical systems are decomposable so that
problems can be traced back to individual components such as the human actor via root cause analyses.
The current viewpoint is characterized by a resistance stance with the aim to prevent errors by applying
the excluding, educating, and constraining measures described above.
How has this representation come about? Analysing the historical roots can be helpful for better under-
standing the revealed assumptions. However, an extensive exploration of the historical development was
outside the scope of the analysis.
How could this representation be questioned? Again, each of the revealed assumptions was analysed in
terms of how it could be questioned. For example, the assumption that a problem in today’s complex and
interconnected socio-technical systems can be traced back to an individual component appears increasingly
difficult or mere impossible. Regarding the cybersecurity domain, for example, the World Economic Fo-
rum [339, p.7] acknowledges that the “greater interdependence among different infrastructure networks is
increasing the scope for systemic failures – whether from cyberattacks, software glitches, natural disasters
or other causes – to cascade across networks and affect society in unanticipated ways”. Thus, systemic
failures appear to emerge from the interactions between the system components and external influences
rather than being caused by a single component.
The ”human-as-problem” assumption could also be questioned with instances in which human actors
considerably contribute to security, as illustrated by the following quote from the Microsoft report: ”An
employee that spots and reports a suspicious email could head off an extensive phishing campaign. And
employees that note unexpected latency in systems can set off investigations that uncover lurking threat
actors.” [128, p.20].
How can the problem be thought about differently? So far, the analysis relied on the document analysis
and the categories derived from the coding approach. However, to question the underlying assumptions of
”Cybersecurity, Currently” and to derive an alternative viewpoint, relevant insights from related disciplines
were considered. For example, in the field of management, Hart [125] describes how controlling the human
may create a situation in which the human becomes the problem. In contrast, allowing people to take
responsibility can increase their agency for acting securely.
The related field of safety science also offers valuable insights: Similar to the security area, in safety
science, human actors have long been considered a problem to control, and problems have often been
labelled ”human error” [71, 131]. Yet, with increasing system complexity, safety scientists acknowledged
that problems could no longer be easily traced back to individual system components such as individual
human actors [73, 233]. At the same time, some researchers analysed the nearly error-free functioning
of complex socio-technical systems such as nuclear aircraft carriers [256]. They found that the human
actors within the systems contributed to that success. The systems, among others, were characterized
by high flexibility, deference to expertise, and a focus on safety. Threats were actively looked for and
addressed, and errors were considered a possibility to learn. Based on these insights and later approaches
(e.g., [70, 137, 138]), a new viewpoint on safety emerged. ”Safety, Differently” no longer considered the
human ”a problem to control” [70, p.13] but ”a solution to harness” [70, p.235].
Based on the adaption of relevant principles from ”Safety, Differently” and related approaches to a new
area of application, the alternative viewpoint on security, ”Cybersecurity, Differently”, was developed.
”Cybersecurity, Differently” comprises the following principles:
• Principle A: Acknowledge the Human Actor’s Ability to be Part of the Solution. This principle does
not suggest that humans do not make mistakes, but that they have the ability to contribute to the
solution when supported rather than constrained. Error and success are two sides of the same coin,
and the label can only be provided in hindsight [137].
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• Principle B: Balance Resistance & Resilience. In contrast to the resistance stance taken by ”Cy-
bersecurity, Currently”, resilience describes the capability to flexibly adapt to and recover from
unanticipated events [138]. In order to build resilience, systems should anticipate unexpected events,
monitor the past and current situation, flexibly respond to emerging situations, and learn from
negative as well as positive outcomes [138].
• Principle C: Communicate & Collaborate. Communication and collaboration are relevant in two
regards: first, the communication and collaboration in human-technology ”teams” that should com-
plement rather than replace each other, and second, communication between humans. Transparent
communication within and outside of teams, or even beyond organizations and states, as called for
by PwC [48], may contribute to increased resilience.
• Principle D: Defer to Expertise. Deference of expertise suggests that regardless of any hierarchy the
person with the highest level of expertise for a certain task should be involved in the decision process
[70]. Besides security experts, this also includes end-users that have a high level of expertise with
regard to their profession, tasks, and aims.
• Principle E: Encourage Learning. To learn from and prevent future adverse events, it should be
focused on how it happened instead of looking for someone to blame [69]. To establish a learning
culture, organizations could, for example, establish risk-free and anonymous reporting [69].
• Principle F: Focus on Success. Besides the things that go wrong, it should also be focused on normal
operation and success, which form the vast majority of events [137]. Often, the same factors that
contribute to failure also contribute to success [72, 138]. Considering both sides can thus provide
valuable insights.
These principles provide an initial step towards appreciating and fostering the human actor’s potential to
contribute to success in the area of cybersecurity. They acknowledge the complexity and interconnect-
edness of today’s socio-technical systems in which problems emerge from the interaction of processes and
components. Considering the human factor in cybersecurity by applying these principles, opens the path to
a more human-centred approach in which the human actor is considered an equal partner in cybersecurity,
instead of a problem to control.
Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that the ”human-as-problem” outcome of the analysis, and thus
also the outcome of the subsequent steps, was based on a small selection of documents. The ”Cybersecurity,
Differently” principles are thus preliminary. Furthermore, the approach is based on the assumption that the
general human actor aims to do a good job rather than to compromise security actively. Still, malicious
behaviour cannot be excluded. Thus, a balance between providing flexibility to the large majority of
well-intended human actors and measures to detect malicious actions should be sought.
The aim of this research primarily is to spark interest in the vision of ”Cybersecurity, Differently” and to
encourage future work towards this human-centred approach. For example, future research with regard to
the principles and their practical deployment would be highly valuable. The development and evaluation
of concrete measures may help to make the vision of ”Cybersecurity, Differently” more graspable and to
contribute to a change in perspective.
10.5 Conclusion
This line of interdisciplinary research considered the area of authentication from a psychological and human-
centred perspective. Thereby, it targeted two main aims: first, to explore the user perceptions of different
forms of authentication, and second, to support secure and usable authentication. To address these aims,
this research made use of different methodological approaches including qualitative and quantitative data as
well as elements from a number of disciplines, such as psychology, computer science, behavioural economics,
ethics, and policy studies.
Regarding the first research aim, the combination of a literature review, a comparative rating of authentica-
tion schemes, and two types of user studies led to acknowledging the relevance of password authentication
already believed dead by some (e.g., [20, 189]). An extension and actualization of an authentication scheme
rating conducted by Bonneau et al. [34] revealed that replacing the password with a scheme outranking it
in all regards still is an intractable issue. Furthermore, even though users are aware of the downsides of
passwords, they seem to prefer passwords because of their year-long experience with them and ease of use,
at least when compared to other existing schemes.
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For example, password authentication was rated less complex than some cognitive schemes and was not
accompanied by the privacy concerns often mentioned in relation to biometric schemes.
The consideration of these findings and the fact that password security is largely dependent on the users’
password creation and handling led to an exploration of measures to support secure and usable password
creation as a next step. From a review of existing strategies, Thaler and Sunstein’s concept of nudging [303]
emerged as a promising approach for encouraging stronger password choices without constraining the user.
The results of three consecutive field studies, a review of the nudge concept and its ethical implications,
and two online studies revealed hybrid nudges as a promising strategy for supporting users in creating
secure passwords.
Hybrid nudges are essentially a combination of a nudge and information provision. The results indicate
that the combination can potentially leverage the power of the nudge, while increasing the intervention’s
transparency by informing users about the reasons for encouraging secure password creation and by provid-
ing feedback on goal attainment. Even though the results form relevant steps towards the second research
aim, they still warrant future work to evaluate the hybrid nudge’s effectiveness in real-life settings, across
multiple accounts, and in the long-term. Next steps would thus include the transfer of hybrid nudges
to actual accounts and their integration with concepts that consider the multitude of user accounts with
varying sensitivity.
Overall, this line of research provided relevant insights regarding user perceptions of authentication schemes
as such and across different contexts of use. The analysis of the nudge concept and its ethical implications
may provide an aid for future nudge-related research and application given the debate surrounding the
ethical deployment of nudges. Furthermore, the concept of hybrid nudges contributes to empirical research
on digital nudging that appears promising not only for future password-related research, but also for
the wider field of cybersecurity. Finally, the finding that supporting instead of constraining users can
lead to successful results provides potential for an even more human-centred approach in cybersecurity as
envisioned in the ”Cybersecurity, Differently” mindset.
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Appendix C: Reference List of Authentication Schemes
The following tables provides references to the authentication schemes listed as examples in Figure 3, Figure
4 and Figure 5. The references given are either the developers of a scheme where available, or articles that
describe and/ or evaluate the scheme. For general concepts and schemes for which no specific author can




Android Pattern Unlock [114, 312]
Associative Questions [246]
Blonder Scheme [30]
Challenge Questions [153, 154]




Mnemonic Password [180, 340]













Text password general concept

















Gesture Recognition [242, 265]
Hand Geometrics [178]
Hand Vein Pattern [177]
Heart Rate (Variability) [6, 283]
Iris Recognition [334]












ID Card general concept
Ironkey [168]
Key general concept
Magnetic Stripe Card [172]
MPAuth [191]
One-Time Codes / TAN [120]
Paper Card general concept
Phoolproof [227]
PhotoTAN [220]
Physical Object general concept
Pico [135, 289]




Table 9: Reference list of exemplary token-based authentication schemes.
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